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ABSTRACT   
 
Narratives surrounding algorithmic surveillance typically emphasise 
negativity and concerns about privacy. In contrast, we argue that current 
research underestimates potentially positive consequences of algorithmic 
surveillance in the form of group-based recognition. Specifically, we test 
whether (accurate) algorithmic surveillance (i.e., the extent to which those 
surveilled believe surveillance mirrors their own self-concept) provides a vehicle 
for group-based recognition in two contexts: (1) those under outgroup 
surveillance and (2) surveillance from the perspective of stigmatised and 
misrecognised groups. In turn, we test whether this can lead to more positive 
(and less negative) feelings towards surveillance. Alongside this, we also test 
whether a countervailing negative pathway exists, whereby more accurate 
surveillance is associated with more privacy concern, and in turn, more negative 
(and less positive) feelings towards surveillance. The final study also tests 
whether positive perceptions of accurate surveillance arising through group-
based recognition are limited only to misrecognised groups, or whether this is 
true for people more generally. Across seven studies, we test the core 
hypothesis that group-based recognition from accurate surveillance provides a 
basis for positive reactions to algorithmic surveillance that countervails the 
negative pathway through privacy concern. Overall, we found support for the 
positive pathway, whereby more accurate surveillance was associated with 
more positive feelings towards surveillance through group-based recognition. 
The positive pathway was present for both typically recognised and 
misrecognised groups. We also found partial support for the negative pathway; 
whereby privacy concern was associated with less positive feelings towards 
surveillance. However, we did not find that surveillance accuracy was 
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associated with privacy concern; one implication of this is that the presence of 
surveillance per se overwhelms any additional effect of surveillance accuracy. 
Additionally, surveiller social identity (ingroup vs. outgroup) influenced both the 
positive and negative pathways: surveillance from an outgroup was considered 
less trustworthy than ingroup surveillance, which in turn predicted less positive 
outcomes in the form of more privacy concern and less group-based 
recognition. This thesis challenges the current techno-pessimistic view that 
algorithms are inherently negative and contributes to research that endeavours 
to gain a greater understanding of society’s relationship with algorithms and 
artificial intelligence. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
Processes that contribute towards the public’s feelings towards 
algorithmic surveillance are poorly understood. Modern forms of surveillance 
use algorithms, which are integral to the online surveillance architecture. 
Algorithmic surveillance enables organisations (both corporate and state) to 
gather and analyse our online behaviour through code (or a set of rules), which 
use data to produce a specified output (Sandvig, Hamilton, Karahalios, & 
Langbort, 2015). Within a surveillance context, algorithms scan individuals’ data 
to identify patterns or correlations (Tene & Polonetsky, 2014), which are then 
used to categorise people into social groups. From these groups, organisations 
infer our characteristics and make predictions about our future behaviour (Lyon, 
2003). Ultimately, algorithmic surveillance allows companies to recognise who 
we are, and to tailor their response accordingly.  
Websites often claim that algorithmic surveillance will ‘improve the user 
experience’ (Unidrain, 2018, para. 5), as material can be ‘tailored to your own 
specifications’ (The Independent, n.d., How do we use cookies section, para. 1) 
to ensure it is ‘relevant and engaging’ (Bright Horizons, n.d., Marketing section, 
para. 1). In other words, users are assumed to feel more positively towards 
surveillance, as it can recognise who they are and what they want. These 
narratives surrounding commercial surveillance highlight the potential for both 
positive and negative outcomes. On one hand, users are offered the opportunity 
of greater recognition, yet on the other hand the harvesting of users’ data may 
threaten privacy. This thesis examines whether these two countervailing 
processes contribute to users’ feelings towards surveillance. Additionally, we 
predict that the accuracy of surveillance (i.e. the extent to which targeted 
material reflects the user’s identity) will affect these outcomes: individuals may 
vi 
 
simultaneously experience more privacy concern and recognition when 
surveillance is of greater accuracy. In this instance, accurate algorithmic 
surveillance functions as a double-edged sword, providing both positive and 
negative psychological outcomes.  
Privacy concern 
Surveillance has historically prompted discussions surrounding privacy. 
Digital privacy advocates argue that online mass surveillance threatens both 
individual liberty (Gillmor, 2014) and national security (Schneier, 2016). Some 
have taken this further: in 2015, the United Nations privacy chief accused 
surveillance practices of being worse than the dystopia illustrated in Orwell’s 
1984 (Culpan, 2015). Indeed, the growing concern for our online privacy has 
given rise to groups and movements dedicated to restoring online freedom. For 
example, the protest ‘The Day We Fight Back’ aimed to protect user privacy by 
exerting pressure on US law makers to restrict the state’s ability to engage in 
mass surveillance (Gillmor, 2014). Additionally, The American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) has campaigned to end the United States of America (USA) 
Patriot Act, which gives the government greater powers to collect data from 
those who are not necessarily under suspicion (ACLU, n.d.). Algorithmic 
surveillance can thus in some circumstances create concern for privacy online, 
and this in turn can create animosity towards those surveillance systems.    
Recognition 
However, an alternative narrative (typically put forward by those 
conducting commercial surveillance) argues that algorithmic surveillance can 
foster positive feelings towards surveilling platforms, as it can enhance user 
recognition. In particular, this thesis focuses on group-based recognition: the 
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extent to which others (specifically those from other groups) perceive the 
ingroup in a way that reflects the ingroup’s own self-concept (Tajfel, 1981).1 
 For example, the cookie disclaimer is a familiar form of algorithmic 
surveillance and an inevitable part of the online landscape for many internet 
users. The cookie pop-up notifies users that the website employs surveillance, 
and that continued use of the site implicitly provides consent to this. Prior to the 
cookie warning, data collection practices were unbeknownst to many internet 
users (Friedland & Sommer, 2010). Many became alarmed once they learned of 
these surveillance practices (Vega, 2010), which prompted the European Union 
(EU) to implement ‘The Cookie Law’ in May, 2011. Once passed, this ordered 
companies conducting surveillance to gain consent from site visitors. The law 
was designed to increase transparency by informing users how their data were 
being collected and used (OneTrust, n.d).  
Whilst this was the original purpose of the cookie pop-up, many 
companies have since used the disclaimer as an opportunity to advocate what 
they believe is a key benefit of surveillance: recognition. This has contributed to 
the alternative discourse that suggests surveillance is beneficial for users 
because user recognition is enhanced. For example, Facebook argues that 
relevant (targeted) material on their platform enhances user experience; the 
relevance of an advert is calculated by assessing how similar the content of the 
advert is to the user’s (inferred) attitudes (Facebook, 2015). Users are then only 
shown content that aligns with their predicted preferences. In essence, 
Facebook expects individuals to feel more positively about the platform when 
their beliefs are recognised in some capacity. Similarly, in 2012 Google made 
controversial changes to its privacy policy, resulting in the consolidation of 
 
1 The definition and concept of group-based recognition is explored in greater depth in Chapter 1. 
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users’ data across its product lines (e.g. Google search engine, Gmail, and 
Youtube). Google defended the changes, arguing that this enabled them to 
better recognise users’ interests and in turn tailor content across services 
(Melvin, 2012). Whilst Google and Facebook likely have profit-driven motives for 
increasing user recognition, the assumption that surveillance can increase 
group-based recognition, and in turn increase favourability towards surveillance, 
has not yet been tested.    
Surveillance accuracy 
 Both narratives surrounding privacy and recognition typically assume that 
to some extent surveillance gets us right. In other words, increased privacy 
concern and/or recognition are inevitable outcomes of surveillance. This may 
not always be the case, as the accuracy of surveillance can vary considerably. 
For example, Itrona and Wood (2004) claim that surveillance systems can be 
infused with human biases, whereby social groups are associated with 
stereotypical behaviours and beliefs. They argue these biases are also likely to 
go unnoticed, as algorithms are assumed to be neutral in their decision making. 
Additionally, they suggest that human operators are less likely to intervene if 
they suspect an error with an algorithm, as the system is assumed to hold more 
authority due to its perceived sophistication.  
Surveillance accuracy may also vary because of the quantity of data 
collected. For example, Murphy (2017) suggested that data become 
unmanageable when collected in vast amounts, even when analysis is 
automated using algorithms. As a result, online profiles can become 
decontextualized versions of users’ ‘real’ self and similarities to others can 
become exaggerated (de Zwart, Humphreys, & Dissel, 2014). Indeed, some 
within the National Security Agency (NSA) have acknowledged that the deluge 
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of information collected can increase the likelihood of errors in data 
interpretation (Maass, 2015). Consequently, the accuracy of surveillance may 
vary depending on how much data is collected and the subsequent design and 
application of algorithms used to analyse it.  
In light of this, we predict that variation in perceived surveillance 
accuracy may affect the degree to which internet users experience privacy 
concern and group-based recognition. Greater surveillance accuracy may be 
associated with an increase in privacy concern, yet simultaneously offer greater 
recognition. In turn, these outcomes may be associated with users’ feelings 
towards surveillance; more privacy concern and group-based recognition should 
predict more negative and more positive feelings towards surveillance 
respectively. However, the effect of surveillance accuracy on feelings towards 
surveillance through privacy concern and group-based recognition have not yet 
been investigated. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Variation in feelings towards surveillance 
Since the dawn of digital surveillance, public sentiment towards 
surveillance has been varied. Anecdotally, this was demonstrated by responses 
to several recent changes in surveillance policy. In 2016, Facebook announced 
that despite initial reassurances, it would begin sharing user data between the 
WhatsApp and Facebook platforms (Tech Crunch, 2016). The changes meant 
that Facebook could aggregate user data from both platforms to infer their likes, 
attitudes, contacts, and behaviour. Whilst this prompted investigation from both 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) Information Commissioner and the European 
Commission, the public appeared undaunted, as active users on WhatsApp 
increased from 500 million to 1.2 billion between 2015 and 2017 (Statistica, 
n.d.). In contrast, the British government was met with a public outcry after it 
proposed changes to the way it could access people’s online data. In November 
2016, the UK Houses of Parliament passed The Investigatory Powers Act 2016, 
which ruled that all website and phone companies must retain customer data for 
a minimum of 12 months. The new legislation would allow security services 
unrestricted access to companies’ customer records and the ability to collect 
data from personal computers and mobile devices. The media soon dubbed the 
law ‘the snoopers’ charter’ (Travis, 2016) and a petition to repeal the bill 
garnered over 200,000 signatures (Skillinger, 2016).  
 Variation in responses towards surveillance has also been demonstrated 
in public polls. A YouGov poll conducted in 2013 found that British people were 
largely divided on Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) mass 
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surveillance. When asked if they believed that GCHQ were right to conduct 
mass surveillance on people not suspected of wrongdoing, 41% believed that 
GCHQ were right, whereas 45% believed they were wrong. American polls 
have also demonstrated division in feelings towards surveillance; a small 
majority of 54% approved of NSA surveillance, whereas 42% disapproved 
(Gao, 2015).  
 Academic research presents a similar picture. Oulasvirta et al. (2012) 
measured participants emotions and feelings towards surveillance over a 6-
month period whilst their homes were fitted with CCTV. It was anticipated that 
all participants would (at least initially) feel negatively about the surveillance, yet 
this was not the case. Whilst some participants felt hostility and even rage 
towards the surveillance, others reported more positive feelings, to the extent 
that they gave names to the cameras in their home. Similar results have also 
been found through focus groups. Pavone and Esposti (2010) found that some 
participants had few concerns and felt trusting of surveillance technologies, 
whilst others were intensely distrustful and felt surveillance jeopardised their 
privacy without improving security. In sum, society appears ambivalent towards 
surveillance, yet the processes that may contribute to this variation are poorly 
understood and rarely researched.  
This thesis aims to address this gap in the literature by exploring the 
effects of surveillance accuracy (rather than simply comparing the effects of 
surveillance when it is present versus absent). Additionally, we examine 
potential positive psychological outcomes in the form of group-based 
recognition, as this may help explain why individuals feel less negatively or 
more positively towards surveillance in some circumstances.  
3 
 
The importance of understanding the processes that contribute to 
feelings towards surveillance 
Considering the ubiquity of surveillance, it is vital to understand the 
processes that determine how people feel towards these technologies. 
Surveillance systems are embedded within modern society. They underpin 
much of our communication (Cohen, 2008), purchasing (Schneier, 2015), 
access to information and resources (Pariser, 2011; Vaidhyanathan, 2018; 
O’Neil, 2016), opportunities for education or employment (O’Neil, 2016), and 
political engagement (Vaidhyanathan, 2018). According to the former Google 
chief executive officer, Eric Schmidt, the future heralds an even greater 
assimilation between online and offline life: ‘the internet will disappear. There 
will be so many IP addresses…so many devices, sensors, things that you are 
wearing, things that you are interacting with, that you won’t even sense it. It will 
be part of your presence all the time’ (Smith, 2015; para 2-3). Here, Schmidt 
implies that the internet will cease to exist as a platform on which you log in or 
log off. Instead it will become a constant, seamlessly operating in parallel to our 
daily life. Indeed, Lanier (2018) argued that surveillance is so ingrained within 
society that ‘…if two people wish to communicate the only way that can happen 
is if it's financed by a third person who wishes to manipulate them’ (14:14).   
As surveillance is so embedded in daily life, our feelings towards 
surveillance may have implications for how individuals and groups 
communicate, spend their money, and engage politically. In this thesis we do 
not suggest that surveillance is inherently good or bad, nor do we qualify the 
broader implications of surveillance. Instead we suggest that the research 
community and the wider public may only fully understand the implications of 
surveillance when the processes underlying society’s feelings towards it are 
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better understood. Despite a general lack of research on these potential 
processes, several psychological outcomes have been highlighted in previous 
work – some of which serve the basis of this thesis. These include a lack of 
perceived control, chilling effects, privacy concern, and group-based 
recognition.2  
Predictors of feelings towards surveillance 
To date, the surveillance literature has highlighted several factors that 
predict how we feel towards surveillance. These factors are typically negative, 
in that those under surveillance are described as experiencing more negative 
psychological/behavioural outcomes than those not under surveillance. Here, 
we will turn our attention to the most prominent negative drivers of feelings 
towards surveillance highlighted in the literature thus far: a lack of perceived 
control, chilling effects, and privacy concern.  
Negative psychological drivers. Perceived control. A sense of control 
is critical for wellbeing. For example, those who perceive more personal control 
are more likely to be happier (Larson, 1989; Verme, 2009) and report greater 
levels of wellbeing generally (Spector et al., 2002). Additionally, feeling less 
control is associated with various forms of psychological distress, such as 
depression and anxiety (Glass, McKnight, & Valdimarsdottir, 1993; Griffin, 
Fuhrer, Stansfeld, & Marmot, 2002). Understandably, then, individuals tend to 
favour environments which facilitate a sense of control and avoid those which 
diminish it. Indeed, those who feel less control at work are more likely to report 
low work satisfaction (Caprara, Barbaranelli, Steca, & Malone, 2006) and higher 
turnover rates (Jensen, Patel, & Messersmith, 2013). Consequently, individuals 
typically dislike and avoid stressors which diminish their sense of control.  
 
2 Privacy concern and group-based recognition are the focus of this thesis.  
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Historically, surveillance has been used as a method of controlling 
others. For example, surveillance can control where and when individuals 
gather together in public spaces, and more recently, whether certain groups are 
intercepted before travelling at airports (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2015). 
This dynamic of control also exists online. Surveillance algorithms often limit 
users’ choice of content by using prior online behaviour to manipulate what we 
are shown in the future. Specifically, personalised material is designed to align 
with our inferred attitudes and beliefs, creating a cycle of attitude reinforcement 
known as a filter bubble (Bozdag & van den Hoven, 2015). As a result, filter 
bubbles reduce the diversity of content that users are exposed to and restricts 
access to content users would otherwise interact with. Indeed, Eslami et al. 
(2015) illustrated that Facebook users are shocked when they learn algorithms 
manipulate what content is shown on their news feed, with one participant 
drawing comparisons between the platform and a science fiction dystopia: ‘…it’s 
kind of waking up in the Matrix in a way…you think about, kind of, how much 
control they have’ (p. 6). Additionally, when given a choice of diverse content, 
users consume as much belief-affirming content as disaffirming content 
(Gladfelter, 2018). Therefore, surveilling algorithms often homogenise the 
content users are exposed to, which typically diverges from the unfiltered 
content users choose to consume.  
As well as controlling the content we are exposed to, algorithmic 
surveillance diminishes the control we have over our own data. Individuals 
strive to maintain integrity (or contextual integrity – Nissenbaum, 2004) by 
managing the different facets of their identity depending on their audience. 
Goffman (1959) argued that we behave within the boundaries of norms dictated 
by our context – and our context is often defined by those around us (Davis & 
6 
 
Jurgenson, 2014). From this perspective, Goffman suggests we do not have a 
single identity, but multiple facets of self which we choose to express in some 
contexts and not others. This is also true of online contexts; our online personas 
are often extensions of our ‘real’ self, and we shape our behaviour in relation to 
our perceived audience (Miller, 2013). For example, Humphrey (2009) found 
that those in chat rooms express multiple identities depending on their position 
on the platform. One platform user changed their avatar in response to being 
criticised over their post; their new avatar communicated their perceived victim 
status to the others in the group.  
Users can lose control over their performed identity when data becomes 
accessible to inappropriate or unexpected audiences (Garrido, 2015). This can 
occur online when organisations harvest and share our data with third parties. 
In these circumstances, users are prevented from managing their identities 
appropriately (Brown, 2013). This is known as context collapse (Wesch, 2009; 
Marwick & Boyd, 2011), whereby the boundaries between contexts becomes 
blurred. Users respond negatively towards this sort of loss of control over online 
data: Mamonov and Koufaris (2016) found individuals became concerned about 
surveillance when they believed their data were being shared with unknown 
third parties. This has also been demonstrated by Koskela and Tuominen 
(2003; cited in Koskela, 2004) who found that whilst people were accepting of 
CCTV surveillance in public spaces, they felt more negatively about the 
technology when they were told the footage would be used by the media for 
entertainment purposes. Consequently, surveillance can diminish our sense of 
control and can in turn make individuals feel more negatively towards 
surveillance systems.  
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Chilling effects. Our inability to control the flow of our data can lead to a 
further negative outcome of surveillance: chilling effects. This occurs when an 
individual modifies their behaviour or removes themselves entirely from an 
online context in response to surveillance (Marthews & Tucker, 2017; Penney, 
2016; Stoycheff, 2016).3 Foucault initially described this phenomenon as a 
social good; when reflecting on Bentham’s panopticon design, Foucault 
suggests that surveillance serves as ‘a gaze which each individual under its 
weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer’ (p. 155). 
Thus, an individual only needs to be aware of the potential for surveillance for it 
to exert psychological and behavioural pressures. In an online context, these 
individuals may be behaving in entirely lawful ways, yet the inability to control 
who has access to their online data or how this might be interpreted 
discourages innocent behaviour or involvement (Penney, 2016). Often, this 
originates from fear that state organisations will improperly use their data to 
justify punishment or discrimination (Penney, 2016).  
The ‘chilling’ phenomenon was demonstrated by Marthews and Tucker 
(2017), who found that online search behaviour changed after the 2013 
Snowdon revelations.4 In their study, they found that people were less likely to 
search for sensitive terms after the revelations (‘pipe-bomb’ was considered 
highly sensitive) compared to before. Similarly, Penney (2016) found that 
controversial Wikipedia articles received less internet traffic after the Snowdon 
revelations. Together, this suggests that a loss of control over who is privy to 
our online data may encourage individuals to disengage or modify their 
 
3 Chilling effects operate as both a psychological and behavioural consequence of surveillance. Despite 
there being a behavioural component, we argue that chilling effects may also predict negative feelings 
towards surveillance. Arguably, individuals may be more likely to feel negatively towards surveillance if 
they feel surveillance has exerted psychological and behavioural pressures.  
4 Snowden was a former contractor for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who exposed pervasive 
surveillance of US civilians by American intelligence in 2013. 
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behaviour online, which may in turn cause users to feel more negatively 
towards surveillance. 
Privacy concern. The negative outcomes described thus far do not 
appear in isolation but are often interrelated and experienced in tandem with 
one another as a general sense of concern (Ellis, Tucker, Harper, 2013; 
Penney, 2016). The most prominent concerns reported in the literature are 
those of safety and privacy (Ellis et al., 2013; Patel, 2012),5 the latter being 
most discussed (Graham & Wood, 2003) and also central to this project.  
Many definitions of privacy reinforce its connection with control; the 
object of control differs depending on the chosen definition (see Stuart, 
Bandara, & Levine (2019) for an overview). Altman (1975) defined privacy as 
‘an interpersonal boundary process by which a person or a group regulates 
interaction with others…involving selective control over a self-boundary’ (p. 6). 
Whilst earlier conceptions of privacy focus on informational control (e.g. Westin, 
1967), Altman’s definition emphasises that privacy also involves interpersonal 
control; i.e., the management of who you or your group interact with. The notion 
of interpersonal control is also mirrored in Margulis’ (1977) definition: ‘privacy is 
an interpersonal boundary control process that regulates, paces, and controls 
social interaction’ (p. 12). In an online context, control over interaction partners 
and personal data are inextricably linked. Who we interact with is registered as 
data currency and potentially shared with third parties. This data also feeds into 
who we are encouraged to interact with in the future (Hunt, 2016). Indeed, the 
multifaceted nature of privacy has been noted by others (Cho, Rivera-Sánchez, 
& Lim, 2009), in that privacy is the ability to control multiple aspects of one’s life.  
 
5 It is worth noting that whilst some surveillance systems are designed to ostensibly improve safety, those 
who feel personally targeted often report less safety when under surveillance (Patel, 2012).  
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Reports of privacy concern are especially prominent during the 
implementation of new technologies with surveilling capabilities; when users are 
aware of surveilling components within a technology, privacy often becomes a 
salient concern (Möllers & Hälterlein, 2013). For example, Wang et al. (2014) 
found that when participants were aware of surveillance on social media, they 
reported more privacy concern and altered their behaviour to restrict access to 
their content. This has also been demonstrated by Almuhimedi et al. (2015), 
who notified participants when (and how much) data had been shared with third 
parties on their phone. When receiving these nudges, participants reported 
more concern about access to personal information – such as location data – 
and stated that apps running in the background on their phone made them feel 
‘followed’ (p. 17). Participants were also more likely to restrict permissions on 
their phone when they were made aware of app access. More moderate levels 
of privacy concern are found when individuals are not directly informed about 
surveillance. For example, Paine, Reips, Stieger, Joinson, and Buchanan 
(2007) asked participants if they were concerned for their privacy whilst online, 
without reference to any specific surveillance technique. They found that only a 
modest majority (56%) of participants felt concerned for their privacy online. 
This suggests that when individuals are aware of surveillance, they are more 
likely to report privacy concerns and may be more likely to alter their privacy 
behaviours online (see also Khovanskaya, Baumer, Cosley, Voida, & Gay, 
2013).  
 The privacy paradox. Despite this, others have argued that privacy 
concern rarely translates to behaviour change. Whilst individuals report concern 
for their privacy, they often do little online to protect it. This is known as the 
privacy paradox (Barnes, 2006; Norberg, Horne, & Horne, 2007). One of the 
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first illustrations of the paradox was provided by Spiekermann, Grossklags, and 
Berendt (2001). Participants were first asked about their privacy preferences 
and attitudes, including the information they would be willing to provide and how 
concerned they were in general about their personal data. They then introduced 
participants to a shopping platform which requested numerous aspects of 
personal information (e.g. how photogenic they believed themselves to be and 
their home address). The researchers found that the majority of participants 
were willing to disclose personal information when prompted, despite reporting 
concerns for their privacy online. The privacy paradox was also shown more 
recently by Athey, Catalini, and Tucker (2017), who found that when the 
disclosure of personal information is incentivised (through either reward or 
cost), participants are willing to relinquish personal data despite concerns for 
privacy. As a result, some have heralded the end of privacy (Preston, 2014), 
arguing that privacy concerns appear inconsequential when sharing has 
become the norm and organisations hoover up the wealth of information users 
provide.  
 Nevertheless, the presence of the privacy paradox has been questioned 
for numerous reasons. Firstly, many people may not perceive an alternative to 
disclosing their personal information online. Tene and Polonetsky (2014) argue 
that software and browser settings intended to help users control their data 
online are often too complex for the average internet user to navigate. The 
authors argue that this is especially true when surveillance technologies rapidly 
evolve in order to out-manoeuvre data protection services. This requires users 
to routinely update their software and settings. Some have even suggested that 
privacy settings and services may be purposefully obscure, as business models 
of platforms (such as Facebook) rely on disclosure (Brown, 2013). Therefore, 
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despite many users’ best efforts, information disclosure is often unavoidable or 
even accidental.  
 Aside from the technological pressures to disclose information, social 
pressures may also limit users’ perceived options for privacy control. 
Compliance with surveillance practices is viewed as necessary to achieve 
digital engagement (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2018). This is especially true for 
social networks, which often require users to divulge personal information 
before creating an account. As many offline interactions now predominantly 
take place online, users risk social isolation if they are not willing to provide this 
data (Welinder, 2012). As a result, users become embedded within online 
networks and their ability to remove themselves – whilst maintaining social 
connectivity – relies on others in their network following suit (Welinder, 2012). 
Furthermore, social network platforms actively discourage user abandonment. 
Facebook presents those attempting to deactivate their account with pictures of 
their closest friends, warning them that these individuals will no longer be able 
to keep in touch once the user has left (Hoare, 2010).  
The risk of social exclusion encourages users to be present, but to also 
actively engage with the platform. Normative pressures to disclose online were 
evidenced by Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein (2012). In their study, 
participants were asked sensitive questions about their engagement in unethical 
behaviours. After each question, participants were informed that either most or 
few people had provided an answer. The authors found that participants were 
more likely to divulge sensitive information if they believed others had also done 
so. Welinder (2012) described platforms that operate in this way as ‘beautiful 
walled gardens’ (p. 216), as users have little choice but to register and 
participate. Platforms are also not incentivised to change privacy policies, as 
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users are unlikely to abandon platforms (due to social costs) despite privacy 
concerns (Welinder, 2012). Therefore, information disclosure is often perceived 
to be the only choice for many users.  
It is clear, then, that users experience multiple obstacles when 
attempting to maintain their online privacy. Nevertheless, these barriers 
continually shift as organisations adapt their privacy policies in response to 
public sentiment; this often reignites discussions surrounding privacy concern. 
In many circumstances, company surveillance policies have evolved to reflect 
users’ needs, abilities, and demands (Möllers & Hälterlein, 2013). For example, 
in March 2019, Mark Zuckerberg announced that the company aimed to 
become more privacy focussed and promised that less metadata would be 
retained by the company (Newton, 2019). Additionally, data-sharing scandals 
ensure issues surrounding privacy remain at the forefront of public debate. In 
2018 the public learned how a Facebook app allowed Cambridge Analytica to 
harvest data from 87 million Facebook profiles, which was subsequently used to 
influence both the EU referendum and the US presidential election (Chang, 
2018). Additionally, a popular face modification app called ‘FaceApp’ was 
recently criticised for its data sharing practices, along with its potential ties to 
Russia.6 As such, privacy is likely to remain a prominent concern for many 
users (Paine et al., 2007; Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell, 2000), and society is likely 
to continue demanding greater data control. In light of this, developers may 
benefit from an increased understanding of when and why privacy becomes an 
issue for users, and in what circumstances users may benefit from greater 
privacy and control. As such, processes associated with user privacy concerns 
 
6 The app’s data sharing practices are still considered questionable, however the app’s ties with Russia 
have since been considered non-nefarious (Brewster, 2019). 
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remain a valuable avenue of research within surveillance studies. The current 
thesis examines the processes surrounding privacy online. In particular, we 
explore whether more accurate surveillance heightens privacy concern, and 
whether this in turn contributes to more negative (and less positive) feelings 
towards surveillance.  
Privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance. As discussed, 
privacy concern can be a common outcome of surveillance. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, qualitative research and anecdotal evidence have found greater 
concern for one’s privacy is associated with increased negativity towards 
surveillance. Pavone and Esposti (2010) found that individuals with greater 
privacy concerns felt more negatively towards surveillance compared to 
individuals who did not feel as though surveillance was an invasion of privacy. 
Similarly, after installing a surveillance system in participants’ homes, Oulasvirta 
and colleagues (2012) found that some participants reported a strong dislike 
towards the surveillance, as they became deeply concerned for their privacy.7 
On the other hand, participants who did not perceive the surveillance system as 
an invasion of privacy saw the system as a friendly entity, to the extent that 
some participants gave names to individual cameras. The association between 
privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance is further illustrated by the 
public’s reaction to Facebook’s creation of the ‘News Feed’. In 2006, upon 
logging in, a user was presented with an aggregation of all their friends’ recent 
activity (e.g. relationship status changes and befriending). Users became 
outraged and concerned that their information (although not previously private) 
became so easily accessible to others, and many users formed groups such as 
 
7 Privacy concerns typically related to participants’ common daily activities, such as undressing or 
speaking on the telephone. 
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‘Students Against Facebook News Feeds’ in protest (boyd, 20088). In sum, 
those with greater privacy concerns under surveillance are likely to experience 
more negative feelings towards surveillance and surveilling platforms compared 
to those who have fewer concerns for their privacy.  
However, the direct relationship between privacy concerns and feelings 
towards surveillance has not explicitly been explored. Typically, this association 
has been implied through qualitative work. For example, a potential association 
between privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance was found by 
Pavone and Esposti (2010) through focus groups, as participants typically 
voiced negative feelings towards surveillance in conjunction with an experience 
of privacy concern. Additionally, general affect towards surveillance has rarely 
been explored. Previous research has either included privacy concern as the 
dependent variable (e.g. Alge, 2001; O’Donnell et al., 2010) or have explored 
other outcomes of privacy concern, such as willingness to share data online 
(Dinev, Hart, & Mullen, 2008). However, others have noted that surveillance can 
contribute towards a general feeling or affect. Ellis et al. (2013) argue that the 
multiplicity of psychological outcomes from surveillance creates an affective 
atmosphere, which is an abstract sense or impression of something – a general 
feeling. Ellis and colleagues argue that the general affective response to 
surveillance deserves more psychological research, as surveillance ‘systems 
grow in stature and complexity’ (p. 729). The authors argue that the affective 
response to surveillance can impact on how society relates with it. Therefore, 
we aim to empirically test whether feelings towards surveillance are in part 
predicted by privacy concern.  
 
8 dana boyd has requested that her first and last name be kept lower case (see www.danah.org/name for 
an explanation). As such, all references of dana boyd will not be capitalised in this thesis.  
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 Positive psychological drivers of feelings towards surveillance. 
There are clearly a number of negative psychological outcomes associated with 
online surveillance. However, in order to explain the variation in public reactions 
towards algorithmic surveillance we must also examine potential positive 
psychological outcomes. As of yet, this subject has not been explicitly 
investigated. Here, we suggest that recognition can be a positive outcome 
experienced by those surveilled online and may facilitate more positive (and/or 
less negative) feelings towards surveillance.  
Recognition. Surveillance may foster a greater sense of recognition in 
some circumstances. Before outlining the evidence in support of this, it is 
important to define what is meant by recognition in this context. Typically, the 
concept of recognition is poorly understood, and recognition is rarely defined in 
literature (Bartelson, 2013). Our conceptualisation of recognition developed 
throughout this project, as we included (and in some cases later excluded) 
dimensions of recognition that had been suggested in previous work. 
Additionally, we explored recognition in both individual and group-based 
contexts, and the dimensions of recognition included here will be explored from 
both an individual and social identity perspective. We describe the four 
dimensions of recognition included in this thesis below.  
Accuracy. Firstly, one must be seen accurately (i.e., as one intends to be 
perceived) in order to be recognised. Goffman (1956) argues that identity is 
multifaceted, and each facet of identity is more or less appropriate for a given 
context and audience. A ‘performer’ will choose which aspect of their identity to 
disclose to their audience, and which ones to hide. Ultimately, the performer 
hopes that the audience accepts this display as being an honest representation, 
and that they perceive the performer in the way intended. In other words, our 
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aim when interacting with others is that they develop an accurate impression of 
who we are. Whilst implied, Goffman does not explicitly state that identity 
performances are to foster social recognition, nor does he argue that accurate 
impressions constitute social recognition. However, others have argued that in 
return for our identity performances, we have a reasonable expectation for 
social recognition (Jacobsen & Kristiansen, 2015). Therefore, it may be argued 
that the accuracy of others’ impressions of us are necessary for perceived 
recognition to occur.  
The importance of impression accuracy is also described in self-
verification theory (Swann & Read, 1981; Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003). 
The theory suggests that individuals attempt to create accurate impressions of 
themselves in their interaction partners. In turn, individuals hope to receive 
feedback from others that corresponds to how they perceive themselves. This 
then validates the individual’s own self-concept (i.e., thoughts and feelings 
about the self; Swann & Read, 1981). Arguably, the theory suggests that 
recognition – which ultimately fosters self-validation – is only possible if we 
believe others hold an accurate impression of our identity.  
Indeed, the role of accuracy as a component of recognition – particularly 
online – is evidenced in previous research. For example, individuals often use 
online platforms to engage in identity performances (Kennedy, 2006). Kennedy 
(2006) interviewed women involved in the Her@ project, an initiative to help 
disadvantaged women gain access to higher education through computer-
mediated distance learning. In this project, women were asked to create 
homepages of themselves. One participant highlighted how it was important for 
her to accurately represent herself on her homepage in order to be recognised 
by her peers: ‘I felt it was difficult to incorporate the ‘right’ image of myself, an 
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image I wanted the rest of the world to see and like’ (p. 12). Similar sentiments 
were found in young girls using social media. Steeves and Bailey (2016) 
interviewed young female Facebook users, who explained that an accurate 
profile was integral for facilitating recognition from their peers; they described 
how Facebook allowed them to ‘build a picture of themselves as what they want 
to be perceived as’ (p. 6); ‘you just want people to associate the face that you 
kind of posted on Facebook with who you are’ (p. 7). The participants also 
voiced concern over being seen inaccurately; users were afraid of ‘being 
perceived as something I’m not’ (p. 12). This suggests that an accurate 
representation online is a key component of recognition from others.  
Other notable work has also considered accuracy to be central to the 
conceptualisation of recognition. For example, Hopkins (2011) conceptualised 
recognition as the acknowledgment of one’s group membership. Through 
interviews, Hopkins (2011) found that participants experienced recognition 
when their dual identities were accurately identified by others; one participant 
felt recognised when her friend commented that her dress sense embodied both 
her British and Muslim identity, ‘I love this urban Muslim female look because 
you are marrying the Britishness with your Islamicness’ (p. 266). In this case, to 
be recognised is to be accurately identified as a member of your group(s). 
 Conversely, individuals experience misrecognition when they believe 
others perceive them inaccurately. This is commonly illustrated in categorisation 
threat or identity denial research, whereby individuals are mistakenly assumed 
to be a member of another social group, or to not belong to the group to which 
they identify. For example, in Hopkins and Greenwood’s (2013) research, 
Muslim participants explained that others would often assume that they were 
foreign from their Muslim dress (e.g., the hijab). Similarly, Blackwood, Hopkins, 
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and Reicher (2013) interviewed British Muslims about their experiences at 
airports and found that participants reported frequent miscategorisation as 
terrorists because of their Muslim identity: ‘when she goes travelling she takes 
the niqab off…because she knows people look at her like, yeah OK, she’s the 
scary one’ (p. 157). Indeed, the conflation of their Muslim identity with terrorism 
fostered feelings of misrecognition amongst many of the participants. In sum, 
this illustrates that accuracy (of others’ perceptions) is a fundamental dimension 
of recognition, in that recognition is in part experienced by being perceived 
accurately.   
Distinctiveness. Identity is often considered a relational concept; 
identities do not exist in isolation but are instead defined by their position 
amongst others (Oyserman, 2004; Skeggs, 1999). As such, identity is 
conceived by how we are different (or distinct) from those we do not identify 
with. This is a central component of the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979), which posits that individuals strive for their group to be seen as 
positively distinct from other groups. Differences between the ingroup and the 
outgroup are often exaggerated in order to emphasise group distinctiveness 
(Greene, 2004; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012). Consequently, we argue that 
being perceived as distinct is an important aspect of being recognised.  
Individuals often experience distinctiveness threat (a form of identity 
threat) when others do not recognise their social identity as sufficiently distinct 
from comparison groups (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). 
When threat is experienced, individuals will often attempt to exaggerate 
distinctive group characteristics or intergroup differences to achieve recognition 
of their desired identity (the reactive distinctiveness hypothesis; Jetten, Spears, 
& Postmes, 2004). Individuals are even willing to incur personal costs in order 
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to maximise intergroup differences (Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979). The 
preference for distinctiveness has also been found at the individual level. For 
example, Berger and Heath (2007) found that consumers who believed they 
were similar to the majority (e.g., in terms of preferences towards music and car 
brands) abandoned previously-stated preferences. Participants were also more 
likely to choose a product if it was the least-commonly chosen, unless this 
product was commonly chosen by an outgroup. Therefore, the authors argue 
that product selection was a strategy to ensure both individual and group-based 
recognition.9 In sum, identity distinctiveness may be an essential component of 
identity recognition.  
Positivity. Alongside distinctiveness, SIT also suggests that individuals 
strive for their identities to be perceived positively; often, groups do not simply 
want to be seen as different, they want to be seen positively relative to others 
(referred to as positive distinctiveness). Individuals will often enhance the 
ingroup (e.g., through ingroup favouritism) to maximise positive distinctiveness 
(Brewer, 1979). For example, in minimal group settings, individuals are more 
likely to rate their ingroup more favourably on important dimensions 
(Mummendey, 1984). The need to be seen positively is also supported in an 
online context by Steeves and Bailey (2016), who found that young girls online 
wanted to be seen as popular and attractive through their Facebook profile. One 
participant likened Facebook to “…a personal ad, yourself. Like, ‘I’m a good 
time; if you’re with me, you’re going to have fun’” (p. 8). British Muslims have 
also expressed that being seen as different is often not enough to foster 
recognition; Hopkins (2011) found that although Muslims occasionally felt non-
 
9 The phenomenon whereby individuals are motivated to achieve individual distinctiveness whilst 
maintaining group membership is known as Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991). 
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Muslims acknowledged their British-Muslim identity, the identity and culture was 
not always seen favourably: ‘I think the nation has to begin to see the 
achievements of the Muslim community. I mean we’ve put up some magnificent 
buildings’, “people should recognise this, ‘hey hang on, you guys are doing 
something’” (p. 263-264). Together, this suggests that individuals need to be 
seen as different, but also different in a good way in order to feel recognised.  
Understanding. Whilst conceptually ambiguous (Reis, Lemay Jr, & 
Finkenauer, 2017), the final dimension of recognition encompasses and 
extends the aforementioned components. In addition to being perceived 
accurately, as distinct, and positively, the broader context of their identity must 
also be understood. Reis et al. (2017) describes felt understanding as when a 
“person ‘gets them’ in some fundamental way, and they tend to feel 
psychologically connected to this person” (p. 1). Understanding is a purposefully 
broad term, as it encompasses knowing the self; it is the knowledge of all 
expects and experiences that may comprise the self (Reis et al., 2017). For 
example, a transgender person may be accurately perceived by others as the 
gender they identify, they may be seen as distinct from other LGBTQ+ groups, 
and those around them may regard transgender people positively. However, 
others may not truly appreciate how important their identity is to them, or the 
struggles that they may experience. Here, we argue that this deeper level of 
appraisal is an example of understanding, which is considered a basic need 
from social interaction (Cahn, 1990).  
Intergroup understanding has previously been encouraged to foster 
better intergroup relationships. For example, greater understanding has been 
found to predict more intergroup trust and forgiveness (Livingstone, Fernández 
Rodríguez, & Rothers, in press). Interventions aiming to improve intergroup 
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understanding have also had positive consequences for social relationships. 
Nagda, Gurin, Sorensen, and Zúñiga (2009) aimed to improve intergroup 
understanding by ‘helping students explore their own and others’ social 
identities and statuses, and the role of social structure in relationships of 
privilege and inequality’ (p. 2). Indeed, understanding is considered integral for 
wellbeing (Lun, Kesebir, & Oishi, 2008) and relationship quality (Cohen, Schulz, 
Weiss, & Waldinger, 2012). Together, this may suggest that understanding is a 
further component of recognition, as it represents a deeper awareness of an 
individual or group’s experiences and beliefs, which are integral to their identity. 
The importance of recognition. The importance of recognition has 
been widely explored within philosophy literature. The most prominent theories 
of recognition have been proposed by Taylor (1994), Fraser (1995), and 
Honneth (1995). Each argue that identity is formed through social processes, 
and that recognition is borne from these social relations. They also highlight that 
recognition is fundamental for wellbeing; it is integral to develop ‘a healthy and 
intact sense of self’ and that this is ‘a crucial ingredient of the good for 
individuals’ (p. 519; Zurn, 2003). This is largely because we view ourselves 
through the lens of our society, as Laitinen (2003) argues: ‘self-esteem depends 
on social esteem, self-respect on respect, basic self-confidence on love and 
care, self-consciousness on communicative treatment, self-images on others’ 
views’ (p. 2). In sum, how we see ourselves is largely dependent on how others 
perceive us. This can have profound consequences for our emotional wellbeing. 
If one’s group is loved, then one may love themselves – if not, individuals may 
experience negative self-directed affect, such as self-loathing (Laitinen, 2003).  
This is also supported by psychological evidence. Higher levels of 
recognition are associated with greater wellbeing (Oishi, Krochik, & Akimoto, 
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2010), autonomy (Renger, Renger, Miché, & Simon, 2017), self-esteem 
(Howarth, 2002; Shechtman & Bar-el, 1994), and relationship satisfaction 
(Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, 2002). Feeling recognised by 
others can also improve how individuals interact and feel towards those around 
them. For example, Simon and Grabow (2014) found that gay men who felt 
recognised within society had lower levels of anti-Muslim attitudes, suggesting 
that recognition not only improves how individuals feel about themselves, but 
also those around them.  
Conversely, a lack of recognition can have deleterious effects. 
Bachmann and Simon (2014) found that gay men who did not feel recognised 
by society experienced poorer life satisfaction than those with greater levels of 
recognition. Misrecognition has also been associated with social isolation 
(McLean, 2008) and social pain; Morelli, Torre, and Eisenberger (2014) found 
that feeling misunderstood activated brain regions associated with social 
disconnection and negative affect, which are experienced similarly to physical 
pain. In sum, recognition is vital for developing a positive relationship with both 
the self and others. Given the intrinsic value of recognition, we suggest that 
recognition may partially explain the variation in feelings towards surveillance. 
As recognition is experienced positively, recognition from surveillance may 
encourage more positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance 
systems.  
 Surveillance and recognition. As discussed, algorithmic surveillance 
attempts to learn as much as possible about our identity from our online 
behaviour. We also receive feedback on the assumptions made about us, 
typically through online advertising. This gives internet users the unique 
opportunity to receive insight into how others perceive them and the groups to 
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which they belong. In turn, this may provide internet users with the opportunity 
for recognition; if surveillance feedback mirrors how individuals see themselves, 
they may feel better recognised. Indeed, surveillance has been shown to foster 
recognition in some surveillance contexts, namely social-veillance scenarios.10 
For example, Albrechtslund (2008) argues that social media gives users the 
opportunity to construct and communicate their identity on their own terms. In 
this context, surveillance through social media is a mutual exercise that can 
empower the user, as users can find online spaces where their desired identity 
is acknowledged by others. Supporting this, de Laat (2008) interviewed those 
using online platforms such as blogs, and found that users commonly 
expressed social recognition as a positive outcome from online engagement: 
“And to finally know that people out there actually did read what I had to 
say…‘OK, what you are doing is good and you should keep on doing it’” (p. 62). 
This was also reported by an interviewee in Steeves and Bailey (2016), who 
noted that users ‘…are seeking that attention more, and seeking that approval’ 
(p. 15).  
Social-veillance also provides users the opportunity to achieve 
recognition after experiencing identity threat. Toma and Hancock (2013) found 
that participants were more likely to gravitate towards their Facebook profile 
after receiving negative feedback compared to those who had received positive 
feedback. The authors argued that their profile served as a venue for others to 
see them in their preferred state, therefore boosting recognition at a time of 
threat. Consequently, surveillance online may provide a vehicle for identity 
recognition in some contexts.    
 
10 Social-veillance (also referred to as lateral surveillance; Andrejevic, 2005, or participatory surveillance; 
Albrechtslund, 2008) is a term used to describe a scenario where the majority watch one another, typically 
via social media (Lupton, 2014). Social-veillance does not usually involve hierarchical differences between 
the surveiller and surveilled. 
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Group-based recognition in online contexts: The SIDE model. The 
majority of previous studies examining the role of recognition in online contexts 
typically focus on individual-based recognition. Studies often focus on the 
individual’s personal online homepage, blog, or profile, and social identity (or 
group membership) is rarely referenced. Consequently, processes surrounding 
group-based recognition online is less understood. It is especially prudent to 
address this gap considering group-based processes may be especially 
pronounced in online contexts. The social identity model of deindividuation 
(SIDE; Lea & Spears, 1991; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995) suggests that 
group contexts or situations that render an individual anonymous make 
individualistic conceptions of the self less salient and instead heighten the 
salience of relevant social identities. Computer-mediated communication (CMC) 
arguably facilitates more anonymous communication, as individual identity cues 
may be less salient than face-to-face interaction (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 
1991). As a result, CMC obscures interpersonal differences, which in turn 
makes broader group characteristics more prominent.  
This phenomenon was demonstrated by Postmes and Spears (2002), 
who found that men rated themselves as more masculine (compared to the self-
reports of women) in anonymous CMC than men who were not anonymous. 
Additionally, men were more likely to display autonomous behaviour than 
women when anonymous in CMC. Furthermore, the anonymity offered by 
online contexts may embolden group normative behaviour; when using CMC, 
individuals are more likely to express group normative views punishable by an 
outgroup (Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, & Harr, 2002). Together this 
suggests that online contexts may reduce the salience of interpersonal 
differences and heighten social identity, which has consequences for both 
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users’ perceptions (e.g., increased stereotyping) and behaviour (e.g., increased 
stereotypical/group normative behaviour).  
As social identity may have greater salience in online contexts, 
individuals may demonstrate greater sensitivity to opportunities online that 
foster group-based recognition and those that thwart it. The opportunity for 
recognition (or the risk of identity threat) may also depend on the perceived 
audience in online contexts. As argued by Klein, Spears, and Reicher (2007), 
whether the audience is considered an ingroup or outgroup determines the 
constraints in which identity is performed. Consequently, this thesis builds upon 
social-veillance literature that predominantly explores individual-based 
recognition in online contexts. From the perspective of the SIDE model, this 
thesis examines group-based recognition online. Specifically, in Chapter 3 we 
investigate group-based recognition online when the group membership of the 
surveiller is known. Intergroup processes associated with online surveillance is 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3.  
 Recognition and feelings towards surveillance. As a consequence of 
greater recognition online, individuals may feel more positively towards online 
surveillance systems. For example, internet users typically prefer online 
advertising when adverts appear to recognise their interests (Campbell & 
Wright, 2008; McDonald & Cranor, 2010). Additionally, Ur, Leon, Cranor, Shay, 
and Wang (2012) found that a subset of their participants implied that targeted 
adverts had an intrinsic value, irrespective of their utility (e.g. discounts and 
vouchers). Together, this suggests that when users believe their identity is 
recognised (from the content of targeted adverts) they may feel more positively 
towards surveillance.  
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The role of surveillance accuracy 
Thus far, it has been suggested that both privacy concerns and 
recognition are key contributors to how individuals feel towards surveillance. 
However, we suggest that the levels of privacy concern and recognition depend 
on the accuracy of the surveillance; how we feel is determined by the extent to 
which surveillance gets us right. Here, our conceptualisation of surveillance 
accuracy pertains to the perspective of those surveilled. As proposed by SCT, 
individuals have multiple social identities, which vary in salience depending on 
the context. Social identity is therefore a fluid, rather than static, component of 
the self. From this, we define surveillance accuracy is the extent to which 
surveillance mirrors/captures how an individual defines themselves in that 
moment, including group-based self-definition or social identity. In other words, 
surveillance accuracy as we define it is in the eye of the surveilled. In this 
sense, social identity (or identity more broadly) is not a static trait to be inferred 
from an objective and stable quality of a person (e.g., Pham, Tran, & Hoang, 
2019). Rather, surveillance accuracy as we define it relates to the subjective 
experience of the user, in terms of the degree to which surveillance (and its 
feedback) mirrors the users’ own self-perceptions. 
To date, the literature has typically assessed how individuals feel 
towards the presence (vs. absence) of surveillance (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2015; 
Dawson, Burnett, & McArdle, 2005; Marthews & Tucker, 2017; McDonald & 
Cranor, 2010; Oulasvirta et al., 2012; Pavone & Esposti, 2010). However, this 
thesis aims to take a more nuanced approach to better understand variation in 
feelings towards surveillance. Arguably, modern surveillance is more often 
present than it is absent. For example, in 2015 Julian Assange warned that 
‘we’ve increasingly become accepting of the surveillance that exists at all levels 
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of society. It’s hard to escape from that in any traditional way’ (Lee, 2015, para. 
4). Furthermore, most individuals are aware (at least to some degree) of 
government surveillance practices following the Snowdon revelations (87%; 
Shelton et al., 2015). As such, it may be more fruitful to explore how individuals 
experience the nuances of surveillance. In particular, this project will focus on 
the role of perceived surveillance accuracy.  
 Surveillance accuracy can vary greatly. For example, those within the 
field of surveillance have suggested that the wealth of information collected can 
contribute to ‘analysis paralysis’ (para. 2), whereby too much information 
creates an excess of noise that can increase the likelihood of an error (Maass, 
2015). Users are also aware of the variation in surveillance accuracy. For 
example, Ur et al. (2012) found that some participants enjoyed online 
surveillance when it offered a lower price for products that they had previously 
searched. Yet they also perceived inaccurate surveillance: ‘I feel that 
sometimes advertisers stereotype me. I find this to be offensive…it’s collecting 
all this information about you that doesn’t even describe who you are’ (p. 6). It is 
evident then, that modern surveillance can vary considerably in its accuracy and 
that users are aware of this variability. Therefore, the potential effect of 
surveillance accuracy on feelings towards surveillance and the aforementioned 
psychological outcomes will now be discussed. 
 Surveillance of greater accuracy may increase perceived 
recognition. Surveillance may enhance feelings of identity recognition in some 
contexts; however, it may be that users only experience greater recognition 
when surveillance is accurate. Users are more likely to report feelings of 
recognition from surveillance when targeted adverts accurately reflect aspects 
of their identity (Campbell & Wright, 2008; McDonald & Cranor, 2010). Those 
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online have also been shown to curate more accurate profiles in order to 
mitigate misrecognition; one participant in Marwick (2012) stated that ‘if there’s 
a rumour they can confirm or deny it on there’, suggesting that users can 
harness social media to create accurate impressions of themselves. These 
sentiments were also mirrored by participants in Steeves and Bailey (2016), 
who reported that social media allowed them to ‘build a picture of themselves as 
what they want to be perceived’ (p. 6). Thus, users strive for accurate profiles 
online to facilitate recognition from their peers.  
 On the other hand, users are also likely to report misrecognition (or less 
recognition) when surveillance is perceived as inaccurate. For example, Asian 
or Black individuals who do not identify as Muslim have reported feelings of 
misrecognition when they are mistaken as Muslim or a terrorist (Hopkins, 
Boteerill, Sanghera, & Arshad, 2017). Misrecognition has also been 
experienced by lesbians who do not adhere to group stereotypes; Tayor (2007) 
found that some lesbians were frequently misidentified as straight because they 
had ‘long hair’ and did not wear a ‘big leather jacket’ (p. 171). Participants 
reported that others’ inaccurate perceptions contributed to feelings of 
misrecognition and social exclusion. In sum, individuals are more likely to report 
feelings of recognition when they are perceived accurately and are less likely to 
report feelings of recognition when they are perceived inaccurately. As such, 
surveillance at greater levels of accuracy may facilitate identity recognition 
compared to surveillance that is less accurate.  
 Surveillance accuracy and privacy concerns. However, whilst 
accurate surveillance may encourage positive psychological outcomes 
(recognition), it may also contribute to greater privacy concerns. This was 
illustrated by a participant in Ur et al (2012), who felt uncomfortable about 
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targeted advertising because it appeared highly accurate: ‘…I notice that when I 
look at an email, the ad at the top seems to cater to what I’m looking at, and I 
just think that might be an invasion of privacy.’ (p. 5). Those with greater privacy 
concerns are also more likely to fabricate personal details to decrease the 
accuracy of surveillance, suggesting that when surveillance is less accurate, 
privacy concerns are assuaged (Wirtz, Lwin, & Williams, 2007). Similar 
techniques have been developed to enhance privacy whilst under video 
surveillance. A method known as ‘warping’ uses an algorithm to obscure the 
faces of those surveilled; this method aims to increase privacy by making 
surveillance less accurate (Korshunov & Ebrahimi, 2013). Indeed, technology 
manufacturers have injected accuracy-limiting software into their apps or 
services to reduce privacy concerns in those using their products (e.g., reducing 
location tracking accuracy; Xu & Teo, 2004). Consequently, this suggests that 
accurate surveillance can increase privacy concerns in those surveilled, 
whereas less accurate surveillance is associated with fewer privacy concerns.  
The present research 
In sum, there is little research that addresses the broad variation in 
people’s feelings towards algorithmic surveillance. This thesis addresses this 
gap in three ways: first, we go beyond the distinction of surveillance as either 
present or absent by examining the outcomes of perceived surveillance 
accuracy. Second, we build upon previous literature by examining both negative 
and positive psychological outcomes of surveillance. Lastly, whilst previous 
literature has focussed on individualistic psychological outcomes, we explore 
the social identity processes associated with surveillance. By building upon 
previous literature in this way, we argue that a more comprehensive and 
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nuanced perspective may be achieved, which can elucidate the processes 
predicting feelings towards surveillance.  
In more concrete terms, we investigated whether variation in feelings 
towards surveillance may be partially explained by variation in perceived 
surveillance accuracy, and whether two countervailing pathways predict feelings 
towards surveillance: a negative pathway through privacy concerns, and a 
positive pathway through recognition (see Figure 1).  
Chapter 2 reports our first study that tests this model in a general 
population. We manipulated surveillance accuracy and measured recognition, 
privacy concern, and feelings towards surveillance. In this study we did not 
make a social identity salient and did not specifically examine group processes 
in response to surveillance. Chapters 3-5 then report tests of the effects of 
surveillance accuracy within a social identity framework.  
Chapter 3 tests the predicted model (Figure 1) within an intergroup 
context. Both surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity (ingroup vs outgroup) 
were manipulated. In this chapter we tested whether surveiller identity would 
moderate the relationship between surveillance accuracy and recognition, as 
the identity of the surveiller would determine recognition needs. Specifically, we 
predicted that no association would be found between surveillance accuracy 
and group-based recognition when the surveiller belonged to the ingroup, as 
recognition needs were already met. In this instance accurate surveillance may 
not provide any further recognition benefits. On the other hand, we predicted 
that outgroup surveillance would produce a linear effect of surveillance 
accuracy on group-based recognition, as the outgroup is typically assumed to 
misrecognise the ingroup, and therefore accurate surveillance serves as a 
vehicle for intergroup recognition.  
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Chapter 4 then reports tests of the predicted model within chronically-
misrecognised populations. We suggested that the effect of surveillance 
accuracy on recognition would be especially pronounced in chronically-
misrecognised groups, as group recognition needs are not met; therefore, 
accurate surveillance provides the opportunity for greater group-based 
recognition. As such, we predicted that findings from these studies would mirror 
those from outgroup surveillance in Chapter 3. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 we suggest that accurate surveillance may facilitate 
group-based recognition for those chronically misrecognised or surveilled by an 
outgroup because recognition needs are salient. Chapter 5 then reports a test 
of this proposition by manipulating chronic (mis)recognition directly. Participants 
were informed that their group was either recognised or misrecognised by wider 
society. Surveillance accuracy was also manipulated. We predicted that 
surveillance accuracy would have a stronger effect on group-based recognition 
if participants believed that their group was chronically-misrecognised. Lastly, 
Chapter 6 provides a discussion of the findings from the empirical chapters and 
offers limitations and directions for future research.  
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Figure 1. Theoretical model demonstrating the positive and negative pathway 
which produce countervailing effects on feelings towards surveillance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 aimed to test the model outlined in Chapter 1 by manipulating 
the perceived accuracy of algorithmic surveillance, and examining its effects on 
feelings towards surveillance, on privacy concern and on recognition. To 
manipulate surveillance accuracy, participants were presented with an article 
ostensibly from Wired created by the researchers. In the article, surveillance 
was described as being of either low, medium, or high accuracy. Outcome 
variables were then measured using a survey. 
Visibility 
In Chapter 1 we outlined four possible dimensions of recognition: 
accuracy, distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding. Here we also suggest 
that all four dimensions rely on visibility. Consequently, an additional aim of this 
first study was to test whether visibility functioned as an additional positive 
driver of feelings towards surveillance (i.e., whether more accurate surveillance 
predicted more visibility, and whether this in turn predicted more positive 
feelings towards surveillance).  
Visibility and recognition are related but distinct in important ways. 
Visibility is necessary – yet not always sufficient – to foster recognition. As 
Brighenti (2007) argues, recognition is not an inevitable outcome of visibility; 
individuals may be visible, yet they may also be misrecognised. Therefore, 
visibility may facilitate or obstruct recognition. Although there has been no direct 
examination of the link between surveillance accuracy and perceived visibility, 
research on social visibility amongst minority populations provides tangential 
evidence. Typically, groups that believe they are inaccurately perceived also 
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report feeling socially invisible (Clark & Griffin, 2008). In these cases, others’ 
inaccurate perceptions involve a denouncement or denial of core components 
of their identity, which ultimately contributes to a feeling that their social 
presence is diminished.  
Surveillance accuracy and visibility. The validation and worth of one’s 
identity also rely on the perceptions of others (Fischer & Holz, 2007; Verkuyten, 
2006); if society perceives an inaccurate version of oneself, the ‘true’ version of 
self is assumed less visible.  For example, Clarke and Griffin (2008) interviewed 
older women about beauty and social visibility. While many participants felt 
physically visible, the inaccurate perceptions believed to be held by others (e.g., 
that older women lacked beauty and femininity) made them feel less socially 
visible: ‘we won’t love women if they’re not lovely…for women who are older, 
we’re invisible anyway’ (p. 660). Additionally, racial minorities have reported 
feelings of social invisibility from others’ inaccurate perceptions. In the context 
of a national celebration (a St Patrick’s Day parade in Ireland), many ethnic 
minority individuals reported feeling as though their identity was invisible 
because of inaccurate or obscure representations of their identity in the parade: 
“here, you had people I think really wondering ‘who the hell are these guys’” (p. 
9; Pehrson, Stevenson, & Muldoon, 2014). Consequently, it could be argued 
that as surveillance becomes more accurate, individuals are more likely to feel 
visible. 
Visibility and feelings towards surveillance. In turn, the more visible 
individuals feel, the more positive they may feel towards surveillance, as 
visibility enables the self to have a social presence. Supporting this, individuals 
are often drawn to and feel more positively about media which grant them 
greater visibility (McGrath, 2004). Likewise, Bucher (2012) argues that 
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Facebook offers the promise of visibility, but also the threat of invisibility if a 
users’ content is not favoured and thus promoted by a platform’s algorithms. As 
a result, individuals are motivated to participate on Facebook to gain visibility 
and avoid potential social invisibility. Furthermore, Steeves and Bailey (2016) 
found that young girls felt favourably towards Facebook because it provided 
them with visibility within their social network. As a result, greater perceived 
visibility from surveillance is likely to predict more positive feelings towards 
surveillance. Therefore, whilst conceptually distinct, we predict that visibility and 
recognition are both positive psychological outcomes of surveillance accuracy 
(Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted model with visibility as an additional mediator. 
Method 
Participants and design 
 Opportunistic sampling was used to collect data from 152 participants. 
Recruitment predominantly took place on university grounds and included both 
staff and students. Online recruitment also took place using platforms such as 
Facebook and Twitter. Respondents were aged between 19 and 72 years (M = 
34.29, SD = 15.79) and 53% were female (44% were male, 1% chose not to 
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indicate their gender and 2% did not provide a response). The majority of 
participants were British (82%) with the remaining participants holding other 
European nationalities (7%) or nationalities from outside of Europe (including 
Indian, Brazilian and Canadian nationalities; 6%). The remaining 1% did not 
provide a response. Participants held a variety of occupations; 30% were 
students, 55% were employed, 1% were homemakers, 7% were unemployed 
and 7% did not wish to provide an answer or did not respond.  
A sensitivity analysis using g*power indicated that the sample of the 
current study is sufficient to detect an effect size using ANOVA of f = 0.25 (ηp2 = 
.06) with 80% power for the main effect of surveillance accuracy (dfnum = 2). 
When using regression (three predictors), the current study is sufficient to 
detect an effect size of f = 0.23 (partial r = .22) with 80% power for each of the 
effects of recognition, privacy concern, and visibility.  
 The study had a one-way experimental design. Accuracy of surveillance 
was manipulated as a between-participant factor to create three levels: low, 
medium, and high (Appendix A). The dependent variable was participants’ 
feelings towards surveillance. Mediators included privacy concern, perceived 
recognition, and visibility. While not explicitly hypothesised, we also reasoned 
that the amount an individual used the internet may affect the relationship 
between surveillance accuracy and psychological outcomes, as internet use 
has previously been shown to have a moderating effect on other online 
behaviour (Wilkins, Livingstone, & Levine, 2017). In this study, it is possible that 
the accuracy of surveillance may be more relevant for those who spend more 
time online compared to those who do not. For the latter, they may engage in 
less identity-relevant behaviours online and thus the accuracy of surveillance 
may have less of an effect. Consequently, the amount participants spent on the 
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internet was included as a potential moderator for follow-up analyses. A number 
of exploratory dependent variables and moderators were also included in the 
survey but are not discussed in the results of this report as they are not relevant 
to the hypotheses described above. A full list of the measures may be found in 
Appendix B. 
Measures 
 Unless otherwise stated, responses to each item were recorded on a 7-
point scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree).  
Manipulation. Participants were initially presented with a fabricated 
article ostensibly from the media source Wired, titled ‘Our digital footprint: are 
algorithms any good at tracking us online?’. There were three versions of the 
article (one for each condition), and each contained a version of the accuracy 
manipulation text. In all conditions the article explained how we leave a digital 
trace online, which can be harvested by both private and state organisations. It 
also highlighted that the purpose of surveillance was to make predictions about 
internet users and their behaviour. Following this, the accuracy of surveillance 
was manipulated. The low accuracy condition informed participants that their 
data profiles produced by algorithmic surveillance were 19% accurate. In the 
medium accuracy condition these profiles were described as 50% accurate, and 
in the high accuracy condition they were described as 81% accurate.  
 Manipulation check. Six items were included to ensure that participants’ 
perceptions of surveillance accuracy corresponded to their assigned condition. 
Items included ‘In my view, algorithmic surveillance is accurate in identifying 
people’. On analysis items 5 and 6 did not conceptually relate to accuracy so 
much as the scope or extent of surveillance (‘…able to access many aspects of 
people’s lives’, ‘…limited in what types of information it can gather on people’), 
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and did not correlate well with the other items. Additionally, the negatively-
phrased items did not load onto the same factor as positively-phrased items. 
Therefore, the negatively-phrased items along with items 5 and 6 were deleted 
and the remaining positively-phrased items (items 1 and 3) were averaged to 
create the manipulation check scale (r = .46, p < .001; M = 4.20; SD = 1.19). 
 Feelings towards surveillance. Semantic differential scales were used 
to measure participants’ emotional response towards algorithmic surveillance. 
Negative adjectives were placed at the left-hand side of the scale and their 
positive antonyms were listed to the right (e.g., worried/calm; 
uncomfortable/comfortable; annoyed/pleased). Participants were asked to place 
a tick on one of the 8 points along the (unnumbered) scale to represent which 
adjective best described their feelings. On review, the adjective pairs 
repressed/free and powerless/in control did not conceptually align with the other 
adjective pairs and were dropped from the scale. Additionally, 
disinterested/engaged did not correlate well with the other items. As a result, 
the scores for the remaining seven pairs were averaged to create the feelings 
towards surveillance scale (α = .93; M = 3.42; SD = 1.24). 
 Visibility. Six semantic differential items were used to assess how 
visible participants felt in response to algorithmic surveillance (e.g., 
visible/invisible; identifiable/anonymous; known/unknown). The scale consisted 
of 8 unnumbered points between each adjective. Two adjective pairs 
(misrepresented/understood and judged/unappraised) did not correlate well with 
the other adjective pairs. On reflection, these items referred to a process 
subsequent to becoming visible, rather than visibility per se. As a result, these 
two pairs were removed and scores on the remaining four items were averaged 
to create the visibility scale (α = .83; M = 2.60; SD = 1.05). 
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 Privacy concerns. Four items measured how concerned participants 
were for their privacy due to algorithmic surveillance (α = .71; M = 5.00; SD = 
1.14), for example ‘internet surveillance is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘internet 
users have a right to use the internet without being surveilled’.  
 Recognition. Six items measured the extent to which participants felt 
recognised. Two items related to the sub-dimension accuracy (e.g. ‘algorithmic 
surveillance can accurately portray everything about me’), two items related to 
the dimension distinctiveness (e.g. ‘algorithmic surveillance can accurately 
distinguish me from others’), and two items related to the understanding sub-
dimension (e.g. ‘someone using algorithmic surveillance could know me better 
than I know myself’). Scores were averaged to create the recognition scale (α = 
.78; M = 3.02; SD = 0.99).11 
 Demographics. Internet use. The amount of time participants spent 
online was measured by asking participants to estimate the number of hours 
per week they spent on the internet. This was measured with an open 
response.12  
 Personal information. Age, gender, nationality, and occupation were 
requested, and responses were given in open-ended format.  
Procedure 
 Paper-copy survey. Participants were approached in person primarily 
on University grounds. Participants were told that the survey concerned 
people’s attitudes towards online surveillance. It was explained that an article 
from a technology magazine was included to ensure participants understood the 
 
11 Other items were initially included in the recognition scale but were not included in the analyses due to 
poor conceptual fit. These included those relating to discrimination (a process following misrecognition, 
e.g. ‘internet users could be treated unfairly because of algorithmic surveillance’) and perceptions of 
scrutiny (e.g. the use of algorithmic surveillance makes me feel analysed’).  
12 Participants were also asked to estimate how many minutes they spent online in a single session, 
however this was not used in the analyses as hours per week was considered a more comprehensive 
measure of time spent online. 
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nature of algorithmic surveillance before participating. Once a consent form was 
signed, participants were given the stimulus article (Appendix A) and the 
survey. On completion, participants were thanked for their participation and 
were offered a debrief sheet which explained the details of the study and 
outlined the accuracy manipulation. They were assured that the article and the 
information within the text were not genuine. Participants were also provided 
with various online sources regarding data privacy, should they have any 
concerns or want to know more about the topic.   
 Online survey. Recruitment online occurred through snowball sampling. 
A link to the online survey was posted on a variety of Facebook groups 
accessible to the primary researcher. The researcher also requested that others 
share the link on their Facebook profiles. A similar approach was taken via 
email, whereby the researcher emailed personal contacts and requested their 
participation. They were also asked to email the link to others within their 
contact list. On opening the link, the participants were presented with a consent 
page. Once consent was given, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the three versions of the Wired article. The materials presented in the online 
version were identical to those provided during paper-copy recruitment. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
There was a significant effect of condition (accuracy) on perceived 
accuracy of surveillance, F(2, 149) = 14.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .163. Those in the 
high accuracy condition perceived surveillance to be more accurate (M = 4.87, 
SD = 1.01) than did those in the medium condition (M = 3.89, SD = 1.01; p < 
.001). Those in the medium condition also perceived surveillance as slightly 
more accurate than those in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.82, SD = 1.31); 
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however, this was not a significant difference (p = .746). As the overall effect 
was significant and the mean values demonstrate the predicted trend the 
manipulation was considered a qualified success.  
 
Table 1. Correlations between measures 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Recognition -    
2. Privacy concern -.16 -   
3. Visibility .004 .25** -  
4. Accuracy perceptions .32*** .05 .23** - 
5. Feelings towards 
surveillance 
.24** -.49*** -.47*** -.03 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis testing 
 Feelings towards surveillance. A one-way between-participants 
ANOVA did not reveal an effect of accuracy of surveillance on feelings towards 
surveillance, F(2, 148) = 0.99, p = .375, ηp2 = .013. However, in light of previous 
work which has highlighted level of internet use as an important moderator of 
online behaviour, a 2-way ANOVA was performed, with internet use 
(continuous) as a second independent variable. The main effect of accuracy 
was again not significant, F(2, 141) = 0.88, p = .418, ηp2 = .012, nor was the 
main effect of internet usage, F(1, 141) = 0.05, p = .829, ηp2 = .000. However, 
the interaction between accuracy and internet usage was marginally significant 
(Figure 3), F(2, 141) = 2.82, p = .063, ηp2 = .038.  
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The simple main effect of surveillance accuracy for low users (scoring 
1SD below the mean) was not significant, F(1, 141) = 1.63, p = .200, ηp2 = .023, 
nor was the simple main effect for high users (scoring 1SD above the mean), 
F(1, 141) = 2.17, p = .118, ηp2 = .030. However, for high users, simple pairwise 
comparisons revealed that those in the high accuracy condition (M = 3.08) had 
significantly more negative feelings towards surveillance than those in the 
medium accuracy condition (p = .039). Furthermore, high internet users in the 
medium accuracy condition had more positive emotions (M = 3.77) than those 
in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.40), however this difference was not 
significant (p = .326). There was no significant difference in feelings towards 
surveillance between the high and low condition (p = .412). Therefore, results 
illustrated a non-linear trend of accuracy, whereby positive feelings towards 
surveillance peaked when surveillance was of medium accuracy. None of the 
pairwise comparisons were significant for low internet use, although a non-
linear trend of the opposite from to that of high internet use was apparent. 
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A post-hoc contrast analysis was conducted at both high and low levels 
of internet use, to assess whether the curvilinear trends were statistically 
significant (contrast weights used: -1, 2, -1). A marginally significant curvilinear 
trend was found at high levels of internet use: F(1, 141) = 3.18, p = .077, ηp2 
.022; however the trend was not significant at low levels: F(1, 141) = 2.63, p = 
.107, ηp2 .018. 
Privacy concerns. A similar 2-way ANOVA on privacy concerns did not 
reveal a significant simple main effect for accuracy, F(2, 142) = 0.85, p = .431, 
ηp2 .012, nor internet use, F(1, 142) = 2.45, p = .120, ηp2 .047. Only a significant 
Figure 3. Feelings towards algorithmic surveillance as a function of surveillance 
accuracy. Low internet use is a score 1SD below the mean for internet use and 
high internet use is a score 1SD above the mean. 
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two-way interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and internet use 
(Figure 4), F(2, 142) = 3.80, p = .025, ηp2 .051. The simple main effect of 
surveillance accuracy was significant for high internet use F(1, 142) = 3.36, p = 
.038, ηp2 = .045, but was not significant for low internet use F(1, 142) = 1.33, p = 
.268, ηp2 = .018. Simple pairwise comparisons revealed that for high internet 
use, those in the high accuracy condition (M = 5.24) had significantly greater 
concerns than in the medium accuracy condition (M = 4.48; p = .011). While not 
significant, mean scores reveal a trend in high users in the medium condition 
reporting fewer privacy concerns than those in the low accuracy condition (M = 
4.75).  
A post-hoc contrast analysis was conducted for both high and low 
internet use to assess the presence of a curvilinear trend (contrast weights 
used: -1, 2, -1). A significant trend was found for high internet use, whereby 
privacy concerns peaked at low and high levels of accuracy: F(2, 142) = 3.36, p 
= .038, ηp2 = .045; however the trend was not significant for low internet use: 
F(2, 142) = 1.33, p = .268, ηp2 = .018. 
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Perceived visibility. A 2-way ANOVA on visibility did not reveal an 
interaction between surveillance accuracy and time spent online F(2, 142) = 
0.34, p = .709, ηp2 = .005. However a main effect of surveillance accuracy was 
found, F(2, 142) = 3.24, p = .042, ηp2 = .044 Specifically, those in the high 
accuracy condition (M = 6.65) felt more visible than those in the low accuracy 
condition (M = 6.07; p = .010). All other pairwise comparisons were non-
significant but followed the expected trend, whereby comparatively more 
accurate surveillance was associated with greater feelings of visibility.   
Figure 4. Privacy concern as a function of surveillance accuracy. Low 
internet use is a score 1SD below the mean for internet use and high internet 
use is a score 1SD above the mean. 
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Perceived recognition. A similar 2-way ANOVA on recognition did not 
reveal an interaction between surveillance accuracy and time spent online, F(2, 
140) = 0.51, p = .600, ηp2 = .007 and the main effect of surveillance accuracy 
did not reach significance either, F(2, 140) = 1.58, p = .209, ηp2 = .022. 
However, a main effect was found for internet use, F(1, 140) = 5.11, p = .025, 
ηp2 = .035. A linear regression was conducted, which illustrated that more time 
spent online predicted greater feelings of recognition, b = .18, β = .19 SE = .08, 
p = .031. 
Do psychological outcomes predict feelings towards surveillance? 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to investigate whether privacy 
concerns, perceived visibility, and recognition predicted feelings towards 
surveillance. The overall model was significant and explained 39% of the 
variance (R2adj = .39, F(3, 143) = 32.30, p < .001). Results are presented in 
Table 1.  
Each of the predictors uniquely predicted feelings towards surveillance 
(see Table 1). Privacy concerns negatively predicted feelings towards 
surveillance, in that more concerns predicted more negative feelings. As 
expected, recognition positively predicted feelings towards surveillance, with 
more perceived recognition predicting more positive feelings towards 
surveillance. Visibility also predicted feelings towards surveillance, but this was 
not in the expected direction, as greater visibility predicted more negative 
feelings towards surveillance.   
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Table 2. Multiple Regression Analysis Investigating the Relationship Between 
Psychological Outcomes and Feelings Towards Surveillance 
IV b β SE p 95% CI (lower 
bound) 
95% CI (upper 
bound) 
Visibility -.44 -.37 .08 < .001 -0.59 -0.28 
Recognition .23 .18 .08 .006 -.07 -0.39 
Privacy 
concern 
-.40 -.37 .07 <.001 -0.54 -0.26 
 
Post-hoc: Moderated mediation analysis  
 A moderated mediation analysis was conducted using the SPSS 
PROCESS macro (Model 8; Hayes, 2013), which tested whether time spent 
online moderated the effect of surveillance accuracy on both privacy concern 
and feelings towards surveillance. Sequential coding was used, whereby 
surveillance accuracy was divided into two dummy variables: low versus 
medium and medium versus high. The mediator model was significant: R2 = .08, 
F(5, 141) = 2.33, p = .046, as was the outcome model, R2 = .27, F(6, 140) = 
8.67, p < .001. 
 Low versus medium accuracy. Privacy concern. Privacy concern did 
not differ between those in the low and medium surveillance accuracy 
conditions, (b = .11, p = .629, SE = .23, 95% CI [-0.35, 0.57]). Additionally, no 
interaction was found between time spent online and accuracy: b = -.38, p = 
.133, SE = .25, 95% CI [-0.88, 0.12].  
Feelings towards surveillance. There was no relationship between 
surveillance accuracy and feelings towards surveillance (b = -.08, p = .718, SE 
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= .22, 95% CI [-0.52, 0.36]). There was also no interaction between surveillance 
accuracy and time spent online (b = .32, p = .199, SE = .24, 95% CI [-0.17, 
0.80]). However, privacy concern significantly predicted feelings towards 
surveillance; those with greater privacy concerns had less positive feelings 
towards surveillance: b = -.53, p < .001, SE = .80, 95% CI [-0.69, -0.37]. There 
was no indication of moderated mediation (a conditional indirect effect): Index = 
.20, SE = .14, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.53]. 
Medium versus high accuracy. Privacy concern. Privacy concern did 
not differ between those in the medium and high surveillance accuracy 
conditions, (b = .17, p = .434, SE = .22, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.60]). However, an 
interaction was found between accuracy and time spent online: b = .48, p = 
.031, SE = .22, 95% CI [0.04, 0.91], whereby privacy concern was greater at 
high levels of accuracy compared to medium surveillance accuracy for high 
internet use, b = .56, SE = .28, t = 1.98, p =  .050, 95% CI [0.001, 1.11], but not 
for low internet use, b = -.26, SE = .29, t = -0.90, p =  .372, 95% CI [-0.84, 0.32]. 
Feelings towards surveillance. There was no relationship between 
surveillance accuracy and feelings towards surveillance (b = -.12, p = .577, SE 
= .21, 95% CI [-0.53, 0.29]). There was also no interaction between surveillance 
accuracy and time spent online (b = -.25, p = .252, SE = .21, 95% CI [-0.67, 
0.18]). There was no indication of a moderated mediation (a conditional indirect 
effect): Index = -.25, SE = .14, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.0003]. 
Discussion 
This first study tested whether the effect of surveillance accuracy on 
feelings towards surveillance would be explained in part by two countervailing 
pathways: one negative through privacy concern, and one positive through 
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recognition. We also aimed to test whether visibility would have a positive 
association with feelings towards surveillance.  
Surveillance accuracy’s effect on feelings towards surveillance  
 There was no main effect of surveillance accuracy on feelings towards 
surveillance. However, as with prior internet-based research (Wilkins et al., 
2017), there was some evidence of an effect when internet use was considered 
as a moderator. A curvilinear trend was found for high internet use; feelings 
towards surveillance became more positive when accuracy increased from low 
to medium, and became more negative when accuracy increased from medium 
to high. However, the only consistently significant difference was between 
medium and high levels of accuracy. This is supportive of previous research 
which has found that highly-accurate surveillance can reduce positivity towards 
surveillance, as the surveillance comes to be seen as creepy (Ur et al., 2012; 
Tene & Polonetsky, 2014). 
Our findings build upon this research by presenting further possible 
explanations as to why highly-accurate surveillance can foster negativity. Whilst 
highly-accurate surveillance may offer opportunities for recognition – which in 
turn fosters more positive feelings towards surveillance – favourability towards 
surveillance is likely to be offset by increases in privacy concern. As suggested 
in prior literature (Tene & Polonetsky, 2014; Ur et al., 2012), we found that less 
accurate (but not highly inaccurate) surveillance was associated with more 
positive feelings towards surveillance. Specifically, in the current study we found 
that surveillance of medium accuracy balances the needs best for those that 
use the internet a lot. At medium levels of surveillance accuracy, individuals 
perceive the best opportunity for recognition whilst maintaining acceptable 
levels of privacy. In this instance, the internet may be considered one of life’s 
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stages (Goffman, 1959), on which identity is both formed, enacted, and 
potentially recognised (Greenhow & Robelia, 2009). The role of these potential 
mediators is discussed below.  
Privacy concerns 
We did not find the expected positive relationship between surveillance 
accuracy and privacy concerns. Instead, a curvilinear trend was found for high 
users only. Despite this, privacy concerns only significantly differed between 
medium and high levels of accuracy; concerns peaked when accuracy 
increased from medium to high. The findings thus only partially support our 
initial prediction that privacy concerns increase as accuracy increases. This 
corroborates previous research, in that highly-accurate surveillance can elicit 
privacy concerns because it makes it salient that an individual is being observed 
and tracked (Ur et al., 2012). Therefore, while organisations have purposely 
implemented flawed targeted advertising to reduce concerns for customers 
(Duhigg, 2012), the current study provides the first empirical indication of a 
‘tipping point’ (or at least a non-linear effect) for surveillance accuracy in terms 
of how positively or negatively it is perceived.  
The findings also support the hypothesis that greater privacy concerns 
would predict more negative feelings towards surveillance. This is in line with 
research by Pavone and Esposti (2010), who found that individuals who felt 
negatively towards surveillance believed it to be an inherent invasion of privacy. 
Therefore, the present study supports previous findings that the degree to which 
we believe surveillance threatens our privacy predicts how favourably we 
perceive surveillance.  
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Visibility 
As predicted, recognition functioned differently from visibility in our 
model: results demonstrated that recognition had a predictive role over and 
above mere visibility when understanding feelings towards surveillance. Whilst 
visibility can facilitate recognition (Brighenti, 2007) the two are conceptually 
distinct. Additionally, surveillance accuracy was found to affect perceived 
visibility, in that the more accurate the surveillance, the more visible participants 
felt. To our knowledge, this is the first study to demonstrate that the accuracy of 
surveillance (as distinct from its presence or absence per se; Marthews & 
Tucker, 2017; Oulasvirta et al., 2012) can affect perceived visibility online.  
Whilst visibility was found to predict feelings towards surveillance, this 
was in the opposite direction to that hypothesised. Participants felt less positive 
towards surveillance when levels of perceived visibility were greater. This 
hypothesis was based on the reasoning that visibility was desirable, as it 
facilitates social inclusion, recognition, and empowerment (Brighenti, 2007; 
Skeggs, 1999). Nevertheless, the present results echo evidence that in some 
circumstances, greater visibility is not necessarily welcomed. For example, 
supra-visibility can encourage discriminatory practices, as supra-visible 
individuals are more likely to be caught for misdemeanours than those who are 
less visible (Brown, 2013). Furthermore, being visible does not guarantee 
individuals are visible in the way they would like to be. As argued by Brighenti 
(2007), ‘distortions in visibility lead to distortions in social representations’ (p. 
330). For example, Muslim identity at a collective level is highly visible in the 
media, yet the representation of the identity is not necessarily favourable 
(Blackwood et al., 2013). Finally, being supra-visible encourages higher levels 
of impression-management strategies, which can be psychologically draining 
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(Steeves & Bailey, 2016). Therefore, while these findings did not support initial 
hypotheses, the results echo previous research investigating responses to 
supra-visibility.  
It is also important to note that previous research finding a favourable 
response to visibility are those that focus on individuals typically struggling for a 
social presence (e.g. teenagers; boyd, 2014; Steeves & Bailey, 2016). As the 
majority of participants in the present study were white, British, and middle 
aged, visibility may have been less of a motivating factor. 
Recognition 
The findings did not indicate that accuracy of surveillance affected 
perceived recognition. This contrasts with previous social-veillance research, 
whereby surveillance from peers can result in identity recognition when those 
surveilled feel accurately perceived (Mann & Ferenbok, 2013; Kennedy, 2006). 
One methodological factor may help to account for the present null finding: the 
recognition measure followed eight other measures, meaning that the effects of 
the manipulation may have subsided by the time participants completed the 
recognition scale (no effects were evident on other variables assessed later in 
the questionnaire). Our subsequent studies addressed this possibility by placing 
the recognition measure earlier in the questionnaire.  
 Perhaps more importantly, the need for recognition may not have been 
made salient for the participants, as no specific social identity was made salient. 
Self-categorisation theory (SCT) suggests that an individual’s context 
determines which identity is the most salient at any given time (Rydell, 
McConnell, & Beilock, 2009; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
In this study we did not employ an identity-relevant context that would have 
rendered a specific social identity more salient than another. As such, it was 
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also unlikely that identity-related concerns were salient for the participants. 
Without a concern for one’s identity, participants are unlikely to register 
opportunities for recognition, as the need for recognition is not salient. 
Consequently, participants were unlikely to have felt more or less recognised as 
a result of the manipulation.  
In terms of the predictive effects of recognition, the results were 
consistent with the hypothesis that greater levels of recognition would be 
associated with more positive feelings towards surveillance. This is consistent in 
a broad sense with SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which suggests that individuals 
are motivated for their social identity to be seen accurately and positively by 
others, and that this recognition results in positive psychological outcomes (e.g., 
self-esteem; Steeves & Bailey, 2016). Thus, the current study offers a 
counterpoint to previous literature that emphasises the negative psychological 
consequences of surveillance (Marthews & Tucker, 2017; Oulasvirta et al., 
2012), as the present study illustrates a potential positive psychological 
component.  
Limitations 
The findings above are discussed in relation to high internet use only, as 
unexpectedly the same was not found for low internet use. Instead, low internet 
use showed the opposite trend, as feelings were least positive towards 
surveillance and privacy concern was greatest when accuracy was medium. 
However, this trend was neither significant nor consistent. It could be argued 
that unlike those who use the internet a lot, those who report less internet use 
may not consider the internet a relevant context in which to engage in identity 
processes. For example, Joiner and colleagues (2007) found that low internet 
users had less of an affinity to others online and were less likely to feel part of 
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an online community. Therefore, identity concerns (such as the need for 
recognition) may simply not have been relevant for these individuals.  
 Additionally, those that do not use the internet often may have less of an 
understanding regarding the consequences of surveillance accuracy. For 
example, in Ellis et al.’s (2013) research, some participants spoke about how 
they were aware of surveillance, but were not sure how this affected them: ‘Erm 
so I know there are things going on in the background but how all of this 
information gets to be processed that I don’t know’ (p. 723). This would suggest 
that the effects of surveillance accuracy may be more inconsistent for 
individuals who are less proficient online, as they are uncertain as to how their 
information is used and processed.  
As discussed, the present study did not make salient a specific social 
identity. As such, identity concerns – such as the need for recognition – were 
unlikely to be raised during the experiment. To remedy this, our subsequent 
studies aimed to test our hypotheses in contexts in which a social identity was 
explicitly salient. Additionally, as we aimed to make salient social identity, we 
amended our recognition measure to reflect this. In the subsequent chapters we 
measured group-based recognition, as opposed to individual/personal-based 
recognition. 
  Social identity concerns may be made salient in two ways. Firstly, they 
may be shaped by the perceived identity of the surveiller, as this can potentially 
affect the presumed motivation for surveillance. That is, reactions to 
surveillance are also likely to be shaped by who we assume to be surveilling us: 
are they ingroup or outgroup members, and how does this shape the intentions 
that we assume they have? For example, Klein and Azzi (2001) found that self-
presentation efforts (through strategic selection of stereotypic traits) only 
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occurred when the audience was an outgroup, rather than an ingroup. As a 
result, social identity concerns (and thus recognition concerns) may be made 
salient when the relationship with the surveiller is known. Additionally, we may 
trust the surveiller differently depending on their group membership. Typically, 
ingroup members are trusted to a greater extent than outgroup members (Tanis 
& Postmes, 2005). Trust may in turn shape individuals’ reactions towards 
surveillance. This was the focus of Chapter 3, which aimed to make recognition 
concerns salient using intergroup contexts.  
Secondly, social identity concerns may be more acute when a 
stigmatised identity is salient. The need for recognition has typically been 
demonstrated within minority groups (Blackwood et al., 2015; Brighenti, 2007; 
Skeggs, 1999; Taylor, 1994). Indeed, devalued groups have been shown to 
strategically select positive stereotypes to achieve positive distinctiveness (Klein 
& Azzi, 2001). As a result, the accuracy of surveillance may be more relevant 
for a group whose identity is stigmatised, as self-presentational concerns are 
heightened. Therefore, our aims in the studies reported in Chapter 4 included 
recruiting participants from marginalised/chronically misrecognised groups in 
order to make recognition needs salient.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
A key aim of this project is to test whether the experience of algorithmic 
surveillance can have both negative and positive impacts. The negative 
pathway is associated with privacy concerns (and is more commonly associated 
with surveillance). However, we also posit a potentially positive pathway 
associated with the concept of psychological recognition. Study 1 provides 
some supportive evidence for the negative pathways – but more limited support 
for the idea of a positive pathway through recognition. In this chapter, we 
attempt to develop the study of surveillance and recognition in a more 
theoretically-informed fashion. We build on the argument that the recognition 
effect may have failed to materialise because no relevant social identity was 
made salient. Moreover, no intergroup relationship was operationalised in Study 
1, and so it was unclear to whom participants may (or may not) have felt 
recognised. As such, this chapter describes three studies which examine the 
intergroup context of group-based recognition and the potential positive and 
negative pathways associated with surveillance when social identity is made 
salient.    
Intergroup surveillance and group-based recognition 
The group membership of a surveiller may influence the degree to which 
we experience group-based recognition from (accurate) surveillance. 
Specifically, an outgroup surveiller may make identity concerns salient and 
increase the need for group-based recognition compared to an ingroup 
surveiller. Indeed, SCT posits that individuals identify with multiple social 
groups, and the most salient identity at any given time depends on an 
individual’s context, such as audience (Rydell et al., 2009; Turner et al., 1987). 
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Group membership of an audience can determine the content of the ingroup’s 
meta-perceptions or meta-stereotypes. Meta-stereotypes are ‘beliefs regarding 
the stereotype that outgroup members hold about his or her group’ (Vorauer, 
Main, & O’Connell, 1998, p. 917). Typically, individuals perceive outgroups to 
view their group negatively or inaccurately (Finkelstein, Ryan, & King, 2013; 
Sigelman & Touch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998) – thus, meta-stereotypes are 
often unfavourable. Conversely, the ingroup is assumed to hold accurate (and 
typically positive) perceptions of the individual (Gómez, Seyle, Huici, & Swann, 
2009; Klein & Azzi, 2001). As such, an outgroup audience is more likely to elicit 
identity-related concerns, as the audience’s perceptions are assumed to 
contradict an individual’s own self-concept. The extent and nature of the 
discrepancy may also constitute identity threat (Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Vorauer et al., 1998). Consequently, an audience may elicit identity-related 
concerns if they are perceived to be a relevant outgroup. 
Accurate surveillance may provide an opportunity to assuage identity-
related concerns and/or improve group-based recognition. Research has 
demonstrated that identity-related concerns often provoke strategic behaviours 
that mitigate concerns or address identity threat. For example, SIDE argues that 
an audience prompts two identity-related processes: one cognitive and the 
other strategic (Reicher et al., 1995; Spears & Lea, 1994). Firstly, the 
characteristics of one’s audience can make a particular identity salient 
(cognitive). Secondly, an audience creates boundaries in which to express an 
identity (strategic). For example, depending on one’s audience, an individual 
may choose to conceal an identity altogether (Barreto, Ellemers, & Banal, 2006; 
Newheiser & Barreto, 2014) or withhold only aspects of their identity whilst 
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exaggerating others (Barreto, Spears, Ellemers, & Shahinper, 2003; Klein & 
Azzi, 2001; Saroglou, Yzerbyt, & Kaschten, 2011). 
 Individuals typically engage in identity-management practices based on 
assumed audience expectations and/or to create/maintain an identity 
(Baumeister, 1982). Leary and Kowalski (1990) propose that impression 
management is comprised of two processes: impression motivation and 
impression construction, both of which are largely influenced by one’s audience. 
Impression motivation is the degree to which one is motivated to shape others’ 
perceptions. For example, one may become more motivated to engage in 
impression management if they believed others’ perceptions of them were 
discrepant from the perception that they hold of themselves. The second 
process – impression construction – concerns the logistics of managing others’ 
impressions. For example, the way in which an individual constructs their 
identity depends on what the audience is inferred to value or expect. Together 
this literature suggests that an individual’s audience can elicit specific identity 
related concerns and motivations. In turn, individuals may engage in strategic 
behaviours to shape others’ perceptions of their group. In this chapter we 
propose that accurate surveillance is an avenue through which groups may 
increase group-based recognition.    
 Indeed, research has demonstrated that the presence of an outgroup 
encourages individuals to engage in identity-related strategic behaviour. This 
was demonstrated by Klein and Azzi (2001), who found that individuals visible 
to an outgroup were more likely to endorse positive traits belonging to the meta-
stereotype than negative ones. Strategic trait selection did not occur when 
participants were in the presence of an ingroup. The authors argued that 
negative meta-stereotypes are experienced as identity threat, and as such, 
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participants will use opportunities to manipulate outgroup’s perceptions. This is 
further supported by evidence on helping behaviour; individuals are more likely 
to help an outgroup member when they believe the outgroup views the ingroup 
negatively (Hopkins et al., 2007). However, individuals are not more likely to 
help a fellow ingroup member despite group-related concerns (van Leeuwen & 
Täuber, 2012).  
Further evidence suggests that online contexts may facilitate strategic 
identity performance. Online platforms often afford users more freedom to 
curate their identity in ways that align with their self-concept (boyd, 2014). 
Specifically, visibility is amplified in online spaces, which may encourage 
individuals to engage in identity performances and challenge misconceptions 
about their group (Klein et al., 2007). For example, CMC can facilitate the 
development of more positive attitudes towards an outgroup when participants 
are provided with stereotype-disconfirming information (Alvídrez, Piñeiro-Naval, 
Marcos-Ramos, & Rojas-Solís, 2014). Together, this suggests that an outgroup 
audience is more likely to provoke group-identity concerns and, if given the 
opportunity, ingroup members will attempt to challenge negative perceptions 
that may be held against them.  
 Interactive effects of surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy 
on group-based recognition. As discussed in Chapter 1, group-based 
recognition may only increase if surveillance is believed to be accurate 
(Campbell & Wright, 2008; Marwick, 2012; McDonald & Cranor, 2010; Steeves 
& Bailey, 2016; Tayor, 2007). Within intergroup contexts, more accurate 
surveillance may only be associated with greater group-based recognition when 
the surveiller belongs to the outgroup. As the outgroup is assumed to hold 
negative meta-stereotypes (Finkelstein et al., 2013; Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; 
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Vorauer et al., 1998), outgroup surveillance of higher accuracy may improve 
group-based recognition, as it may challenge these stereotypes. Outgroup 
surveillance of lower accuracy may be associated with perceptions of 
misrecognition, as negative meta-stereotypes are not challenged by accurate 
information. In this instance, those surveilled may perceive no recognition 
benefits and may instead experience identity threat in the form of 
misrecognition.  
On the other hand, surveillance from an ingroup is unlikely to provide 
recognition benefits – irrespective of its accuracy – as ingroup members are not 
expected to endorse the content of negative meta-stereotypes and are believed 
to mirror one’s own perception of the ingroup (Gómez et al., 2009; Klein & Azzi, 
2001). Consequently, we predict that surveiller identity moderates the effect of 
surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition; a linear relationship between 
surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition is only expected for 
outgroup and not ingroup surveillance. 
 Effects of surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy on privacy 
concerns 
There may be several possible outcomes regarding the effects of 
surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on privacy concern. Firstly, 
surveiller identity may have independent effects on privacy concern. Based on 
previous literature, ingroup surveillance could either elicit greater or fewer 
privacy concerns. For example, O’Donnell and colleagues have found that 
ingroup surveillance is associated with less privacy concern (O’Donnell et al., 
2010a) or more concern (O’Donnell et al., 2010b) in comparison to outgroup 
surveillance. O’Donnell et al. (2010a) argues that surveillance from an ingroup 
may elicit fewer privacy concerns when it is thought to increase ingroup safety. 
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In these cases, ingroup surveillance may be considered necessary for ingroup 
welfare. Alternatively, surveillance from the ingroup in contexts where it is not 
considered necessary (e.g., in the workplace) may be perceived negatively, as 
it is not considered necessary (O’Donnell et al., 2012; Subašić, Reynolds, 
Turner, Veenstra, & Haslam, 2011). In each of the following three studies we 
used one of two intergroup contexts: surveillance in University Departments 
(Biosciences vs Psychology) and in international relations (American vs British). 
Either of these contexts could arguably be interpreted as ‘necessary’ 
surveillance. Based on O’Donnell’s work, we have a non-directional hypothesis 
whereby ingroup (vs. outgroup) surveillance may be associated with either 
greater or fewer privacy concerns.  
To our knowledge, there is no current evidence on the effects of both 
surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy or any potential interactive effects. 
In light of this we made tentative predictions regarding potential interactive 
effects between surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy. Firstly, we 
predicted that greater surveillance accuracy may be associated with greater 
privacy concerns for an outgroup surveiller but not an ingroup surveiller. In this 
case, inaccurate surveillance may lead to more negative outcomes for a 
surveilled group because the motives of the outgroup are believed to be less 
positive (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). On the other hand, surveillance accuracy 
may not affect privacy concerns for the ingroup, as those surveilled may be 
more likely to believe the surveiller will use their data with good intentions, 
irrespective of its accuracy. Additionally, variations in accuracy may be 
considered inconsequential, as fellow ingroup members are already assumed to 
have an intimate knowledge of the ingroup (Klein & Azzi, 2001) and are 
therefore best equipped to recognise any inaccuracies.  
62 
 
The role of trust: A potential mediator between surveiller identity and 
psychological outcomes 
In addition to the predicted interactive effects between surveiller identity 
and surveillance accuracy, we predict that surveiller identity may have indirect 
effects on privacy concern and group-based recognition through trust. Typically, 
ingroup members are trusted to a greater extent than outgroup members (Tanis 
& Postmes, 2005; Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009). In turn, trust should 
predict the degree to which individuals experience group-based recognition and 
privacy concern.  
 Trust should predict greater group-based recognition. More trust in 
the surveiller should predict a greater experience of group-based recognition. 
Previous research has found that trust is related to shared values and respect 
(Brashear, Boles, Bellenger, & Brooks, 2003). As such, when a surveiller is 
afforded more trust, individuals may in turn believe that the surveiller will make 
efforts to appraise their group in ways that mirror the group’s self-concept. 
Taken together, we predict that an ingroup surveiller will be trusted to a greater 
extent, which will in turn predict more group-based recognition.  
 Trust should predict privacy concern. Greater trust in the surveiller 
should also alleviate privacy concern. Healthcare research has found that 
patients have less privacy concern regarding their medical records when they 
trust their health professional (Rohm & Milne, 2004). In online contexts, 
individuals are more likely to share personal information on trusted platforms 
compared to platforms that are less trusted (Dwyer, Hiltz, & Passerini, 2007). In 
their study, Dwyer et al. (2007) found that Facebook users typically trusted their 
chosen platform to a greater extent than MySpace users; in turn, Facebook 
users were more likely to disclose identifying information on the platform. 
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Consequently, as ingroup members are typically afforded more trust, we predict 
an ingroup surveiller may be trusted to a greater extent and in turn raise less 
privacy concern. 
Overview of studies 
 Three studies were conducted whereby the identity of the surveiller was 
manipulated (ingroup vs outgroup) along with surveillance accuracy (low, 
medium, and high). We suggested that in Study 1, no effect of surveillance 
accuracy on recognition was found because identity concerns (and thus 
recognition needs) were not made salient. Therefore, Studies 2a, 2b, and 2c13 
aimed to raise social identity concerns by making participants aware of the 
surveiller’s social identity. Secondly, the studies tested whether the surveiller’s 
identity moderates the relationship between surveillance accuracy and group-
based recognition; an effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based 
recognition is only expected when the surveiller is a relevant outgroup. The first 
two studies recruited Psychology students and the surveiller was described as 
either the Psychology Department (ingroup) or the Biosciences Department 
(outgroup). The third study recruited British participants and described 
surveillance from either British intelligence (GCHQ: ingroup) or American 
intelligence (NSA: outgroup). In all three studies we measured group-based 
recognition and privacy concern to investigate the positive and negative 
pathways outlined in Chapter 1. We also measured surveiller trust, to examine 
potential indirect effects of surveiller identity on psychological outcomes through 
trust.   
 
13 In this thesis the number designated to each study pertains to the cluster of empirical studies (studies 
are clustered by chapter), and the letter refers to its order in that chapter.  
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STUDY 2A 
Study 2a tested whether surveiller identity moderates the effect of 
surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition and privacy concern. We also 
predicted a main effect between surveiller identity and psychological outcomes, 
and that this association may be mediated by trust. We manipulated both 
surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity using a University weekly bulletin. 
Student participants were provided with a screenshot of an online weekly news 
bulletin, which is typically sent to students via their student email. Within this 
bulletin, surveillance accuracy was either described as being of low, medium, or 
high accuracy and the surveiller was identified as either the Biosciences 
Department (outgroup) or the Psychology Department (ingroup). Our key 
dependent variable in Study 2a was behaviour change intentions. This departs 
from the main dependent variable in Study 1, which in turn is our main 
dependent variable in the other studies included in this thesis. Our predictions 
relating to behaviour change intentions are outlined below.  
Behaviour change intentions 
 Greater group-based recognition should predict lower behaviour 
change intentions. Impression management literature suggests that when an 
individual feels misrecognised, they are more likely to modify their behaviour in 
order to achieve recognition. For example, those who believe they are 
perceived as unkind are more likely to volunteer then those who believe they 
are already perceived as a kind person (Hopkins et al., 2007). Additionally, 
individuals are more likely to endorse positive stereotypes if they believe they 
are perceived negatively (Klein & Azzi, 2001). Therefore, we predict that when 
group-based recognition is low, individuals will report greater behaviour change 
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intentions online, as individuals will be motivated to manage others’ perceptions 
of the group. However, greater perceived group-based recognition will be 
associated with less online behaviour change intentions, as recognition needs 
are already met.  
 Greater privacy concern should predict more behaviour change 
intentions. We predict that higher privacy concern will be associated with 
greater behaviour change intentions online. Chilling effects research suggests 
that when individuals are concerned for their privacy they make efforts to modify 
their behaviour or disengage from online platforms entirely. For example, 
Tufekci (2008) found that individuals attempted to conceal their real identity 
online with nicknames or aliases when privacy concerns were high. Additionally, 
after the Snowdon revelations in 2013, individuals were less likely to visit 
privacy-sensitive Wikipedia articles than before the publicity regarding 
government surveillance (Penney, 2016). This suggests that higher privacy 
concern may predict greater behaviour change intentions, as individuals may be 
more incentivised to modify or limit their engagement online.  
Method 
Participants and design 
 Using purposive sampling, data were collected from 184 undergraduate 
students at the University of Exeter who were in the first or second year of their 
Psychology programme. Participants were recruited online or in person. Most 
participants were female (83%) and were aged between 18 and 35 years (M = 
19.48, SD = 1.77). A majority (82%) identified as British, 11% identified as 
another European nationality and 7% were of a non-European nationality.  
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 The study had a 2 (surveiller identity: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 3 (accuracy 
of surveillance: low, medium, and high) factorial between-participants design. In 
the outgroup surveiller condition, the surveiller was identified as the Biosciences 
Department, and the ingroup surveiller condition the surveiller was identified as 
the Psychology Department. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
six conditions.  A sensitivity analysis using g*power indicated that the sample of 
184 is sufficient to detect an effect size using MANOVA of f = 0.27 (ηp2 = .07) 
with 80% power for the main effects of and interaction between surveillance 
accuracy and surveiller identity (two predictors; six groups). When using 
regression (three predictors), the current study is sufficient to detect an effect 
size of f = 0.21 (partial r = .21) with 80% power for each of the effects of group-
based recognition, privacy concern, and trust.  
Measures 
 Unless otherwise stated, responses were scored using a 7-point scale (1 
= Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). All negatively phrased items were 
reverse-scored. 
 Manipulations. Participants were shown a fabricated University online 
news bulletin (Appendix C). The news bulletin described a surveillance 
programme to begin in the next academic year, which would only affect 
psychology students. To manipulate surveiller identity, the bulletin explained 
that the surveillance programme was to be conducted by either the Biosciences 
(outgroup) or Psychology (ingroup) Department. To manipulate surveillance 
accuracy, the programme was either described as 21% accurate (low), 50% 
accurate (medium), or 89% accurate (high). Students were informed in the 
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bulletin that they would be required to consent to the programme when enrolling 
for the next academic year. 
 Dependent measures. After reading one of the six manipulation texts, 
participants were asked to complete an accuracy manipulation check and 
measures of identification as a psychology student, privacy concern, behaviour 
change intentions, group-based recognition, and trust. Demographic information 
was then requested along with a measure of time spent logged into University 
Wi-Fi. A measure was also included to indicate how much participants believed 
the authenticity of the news bulletin. All measures may be found in Appendix D. 
 Manipulation check. Four items measured the extent to which the 
students understood the accuracy manipulation, for example ‘In my view, the 
surveillance conducted by the Psychology department is accurate in identifying 
students’. However, the removal of item 3 offered an alpha increase of .06 (from 
α = .64). Therefore item 3 was removed prior to hypothesis-testing analyses 
and the remaining three items were averaged to create the final scale (α = .70, 
M = 4.26; SD = 1.11). 
 Ingroup identification. The extent to which participants identified as 
being a psychology student was measured using four items adapted from the 
identity subscale of Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) collective self-esteem scale. 
This included ‘being a psychology student is an important reflection of who I 
am’. Scores on all items were averaged to produce the final scale (α = .84, M = 
4.70; SD = 1.15). 
 Privacy concern. Levels of privacy concern in response to the 
surveillance programme were measured using four items, for example 
‘psychology students have a right to use the University Wi-Fi without being 
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surveilled’ and ‘surveillance from the (x) Department is an invasion of privacy’. 
Scores on all items were averaged to produce the final scale (α = .82, M = 5.42; 
SD = 1.15). 
 Behaviour change. Using four items, participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they believed they would change their behaviour in 
response to the surveillance programme. Items included ‘data surveillance from 
the (x) Department would make me censor what I do online while using the 
University Wi-Fi’ and ‘data surveillance from the (x) Department would not affect 
what I did online while using the University Wi-Fi’ (reverse coded). All items 
were averaged to produce the final scale (α = .88, M = 4.54; SD = 1.48). 
 Group-based recognition. The extent to which participants felt that their 
ingroup was recognised as a result of the surveillance programme was 
measured using six items, such as ‘the surveillance programme could 
distinguish how psychology students are unique from students in other 
departments’, ‘by using psychology student data, the (x) Department will 
accurately understand what a prototypical psychology student is like’, and ‘by 
using psychology student data, the (x) Department could understand 
psychology students better than I could’. Item 6 (‘no matter how much data the 
(x) Department collects, only psychology students understand what it truly 
means to be a psychology student’) had a poor correlation with other items and 
improved scale reliability by .05 (from α = .77) when removed. Therefore, item 6 
was removed prior to hypothesis-testing analyses and the remaining five items 
were averaged to form the final scale (α = .82, M = 3.40; SD = 1.07). 
 Trust of surveiller. Participants completed four items which measured 
the levels of trust participants felt towards the surveilling department, for 
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example ‘I trust the intentions of the (x) Department’ and ‘surveillance 
conducted by the (x) Department will be for psychology students’ benefit’. All 
items were used to form the final scale (α = .85, M = 4.04; SD = 1.20). 
   Demographics. Age was requested in an open-ended format and 
participants were asked to indicate their gender (male, female, or other). 
Participants were also asked to indicate their nationality as either British, other 
European, or Non-European.  
 Time spent online. Participants indicated the number of days logged on 
to University Wi-Fi and how many hours they logged on per session. 
Responses to these two measures were then multiplied to create a variable of 
time spent online (total number of hours per week).  
 Bulletin authenticity. To establish the extent participants believed the 
news bulletin, participants responded to two items at the end of the study 
investigating the bulletin’s believability, including ‘the University news bulletin 
was trustworthy’.  
Procedure 
 Paper-copy survey. Participants were predominantly approached after 
exiting lectures on University grounds. They were informed that the researchers 
were conducting a study on behalf of the University to investigate student 
attitudes to a new surveillance programme being introduced in the next 
academic year. On giving their informed consent, participants were given a 
screenshot of a University Weekly Bulletin, ostensibly from the University 
website. Once participants read the bulletin they completed the survey 
containing the dependent variables. On completion, participants were assured 
that the news bulletin was not a genuine University publication and that the 
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University had no intentions to implement the programme described within the 
bulletin. Participants were then thanked and provided with a debrief form 
containing various online sources regarding data privacy should they be 
concerned.  
 Online survey. Participants were recruited through social media groups 
accessible to the researchers. A link to the survey was posted on these groups 
with a brief description of the study. Once the link was opened, participants 
were presented with a consent page. Once consent was given, participants 
were randomly assigned by the software to one of the six conditions. The 
survey following the manipulation and the final debrief form were identical to the 
paper-copy materials.  
Results 
Manipulation checks 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the surveillance 
accuracy and surveiller identity manipulation on surveillance accuracy 
perceptions. A significant effect of accuracy was found on perceptions of 
surveillance accuracy, F(2, 178) = 9.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .092. Those in the high 
accuracy condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.13) perceived surveillance as more 
accurate than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 4.25, SD = 1.02; p 
= .032). Additionally, those in the medium accuracy condition perceived 
surveillance as more accurate than those in the low accuracy condition (M = 
3.83, SD = 1.03; p = .034). As such, the surveillance accuracy manipulation was 
considered successful. No main effect was found for surveiller identity F(1, 178) 
= 0.01, p = .943, ηp2 < .001 and there was no evidence of an interaction, F(2, 
178) = 0.19, p = .825, ηp2 = .002. 
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Main analyses 
Behaviour change intentions. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to 
assess the effects of surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on behaviour 
change intentions (Figure 5). There was no main effect of surveillance accuracy 
F(2, 178) = 0.77, p = .465, ηp2 = .009. The main effect of surveiller identity 
approached significance, F(1, 178) = 2.99, p = .090, ηp2 = .016. The interaction 
between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity also approached 
significance, F(2, 178) = 2.46, p = .088, ηp2 = .027. Behaviour change intentions 
were significantly higher in the outgroup surveiller condition compared to the 
ingroup surveiller condition at low levels of surveillance accuracy, F(1, 178) = 
5.33, p = .022, ηp2 = .029. Behaviour change intentions did not significantly differ 
between groups at medium (F(1, 178) = 0.54, p = .463, ηp2 = .003) or high (F(1, 
178) = 1.77, p = .186, ηp2 = .010) levels of surveillance accuracy.  
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Group-based recognition. A similar two-way ANOVA was conducted on 
group-based recognition. There was no main effect of surveillance accuracy 
F(2, 178) = 0.71, p = .495, ηp2 = .008, nor of surveiller identity F(1, 178) = 0.42, 
p = .519, ηp2= .002. Contrary to our hypotheses, no significant interaction was 
found between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on group-based 
recognition, F(2, 178) = 0.21, p = .813, ηp2 = .002. 
However, whilst the accuracy manipulation did not affect group-based 
recognition, the measure of surveillance accuracy perceptions (the manipulation 
check) was associated with group-based recognition (see Table 3). As a post-
hoc alternative test of whether the association between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and group-based recognition depended on surveiller identity, we 
conducted a moderation analysis using PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013). No 
main effect was found for surveiller identity, b = -0.05, se = .077, p = .507, 95% 
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Figure 5. The conditional effect of surveillance accuracy on behaviour 
change intentions at the level of surveiller identity (ingroup surveillance 
versus outgroup surveillance). 
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CI [-0.202, 0.100], however a main effect was found for accuracy perceptions, b 
= 0.23, se = .077, p = .003, 95% CI [0.080, 0.384] whereby perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate was associated with more group-based 
recognition. An interaction was also found between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and surveiller identity on group-based recognition that was 
descriptively consistent with the predicted pattern (Figure 6), b = .15, se = .077, 
p = .050, 95% CI [-0.0001, 0.304]. Specifically, the relationship between 
surveillance accuracy perceptions was significant and positive for the outgroup, 
b = .38, se = .104, p < .001, 95% CI [0.178, 0.590], but was not significant for 
those under ingroup surveillance, b = .08, se = .113, p = .479, 95% CI [-0.143, 
0.304]. Consequently, those under outgroup surveillance were more likely to 
report group-based recognition when surveillance was perceived as more 
accurate, whereas those under ingroup surveillance did not receive group-
based recognition benefits when surveillance was perceived as more accurate.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between measures 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Recognition -      
2. Privacy concern -.30*** -     
3. Trust .28*** -.50*** -    
4. Identification -.01 .09 .01 -   
5. Accuracy 
perceptions 
.23** -.02 .11 .05 -  
6. Behaviour 
change 
-.11 .50*** -.41*** .07 -.02 - 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Privacy concern. A 3(surveillance accuracy: low, medium, high) X 2 
(surveiller identity: ingroup, outgroup) ANOVA was conducted on privacy 
concerns. There was no main effect of accuracy F(2, 177) = 0.15, p = .864, ηp2 
= .002. A significant main effect was found of group F(1, 177) = 5.59, p = .019, 
ηp2= .031, with those in the outgroup condition reporting more privacy concerns 
(M = 5.63) than those in the ingroup condition (M = 5.23). No interaction was 
found between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on privacy 
concerns, F(2, 177) = 2.30, p = .103, ηp2= .025. A post-hoc moderation analysis 
was conducted in PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 2013) to test for an interaction 
between surveillance accuracy perception (i.e., the manipulation measure) and 
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Figure 6. The conditional effect of surveillance accuracy perceptions on 
group-based recognition at the level of surveiller identity (ingroup 
surveillance versus outgroup surveillance). Low and high accuracy are 
valued at 1SD below and above the mean respectively. Medium is valued 
at the mean. 
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surveiller identity on privacy concern. No main effect was found for surveillance 
accuracy perceptions (b = -.03, se = .085, p = .751, 95% CI [-0.194, 0.140]) but 
a main effect was found for surveiller identity (b = .20, se = .085, p = .020, 95% 
CI [0.032, 0.366]) whereby those under outgroup surveillance reported more 
privacy concern than those under ingroup surveillance. There was also no 
evidence for an interaction between surveillance accuracy perceptions and 
surveiller identity on privacy concern (b = .03, se = .085, p = .715, 95% CI [-
0.136, 0.199]).  
Trust. A 3(surveillance accuracy: low, medium, high) X 2 (surveiller 
identity: ingroup, outgroup) ANOVA was conducted on trust. There was no main 
effect of accuracy F(2, 178) = 1.57, p = .211, ηp2 = .017. A significant main effect 
was found of group F(1, 178) = 21.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .108, with those in the 
outgroup condition reporting less trust (M = 3.64, SD = 1.10) than those in the 
ingroup condition (M = 4.42, SD = 1.18). No interaction was found between 
surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on trust, F(2, 177) = 0.49, p = .613, 
ηp2 = .005. A post-hoc moderation analysis using was conducted in PROCESS 
(Model 1; Hayes, 2013) to test for an interaction between surveillance accuracy 
perception and surveiller identity on trust. No main effect was found for 
surveillance accuracy perceptions (b = .14, se = .085, p = .102, 95% CI [-0.028, 
0.306]) but a main effect was found for surveiller identity (b = -.39, se = .084, p 
< .001, 95% CI [-0.557, -0.225]). There was no evidence of an interaction (b = -
.004, se = .085, p = .964, 95% CI [-0.171, 0.163]).  
The mediating role of trust. The main effect of surveiller identity on 
trust is consistent with previous research showing that in general, ingroup 
members are trusted to a greater extent than outgroup members, and 
individuals feel and behave more positively towards ingroup members (Brewer 
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& Campbell, 1976; Brewer, 1999; Foddy et al., 2009; Lonsdale & North, 2009; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). We predicted in turn that the effect of 
surveiller identity on group-based recognition and privacy concerns may be 
mediated by trust in the surveiller. 
We conducted a mediation analysis using PROCESS (Model 4; Hayes, 
2013) to test the indirect effect of surveiller identity on privacy concern via trust 
(Figure 7). Results revealed a significant indirect effect of surveiller identity on 
privacy concern through trust, b = .32, se = .076, 95% CI [0.179, 0.477]. There 
was no evidence that surveiller identity (ingroup vs outgroup) affected privacy 
concerns independently of trust (b = .03, se = .158, p = .859, 95% CI [-0.283, 
0.339]). As such, those in the outgroup condition reported less trust in the 
surveiller (b = -.79, se = .169, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.1222, -0.454]), which in turn 
predicted greater levels of privacy concern (b = -.47, se = .067, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-0.598, 0.340]).  
 
A similar analysis was conducted for group-based recognition as the 
dependent variable (see Figure 8). A significant indirect effect of surveiller 
identity was found on group- based recognition through trust, b = -.19, se = 
Figure 7. Path diagram illustrating the effect of surveiller identity on 
privacy concern through trust. 
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.067, 95% CI [-0.337, -0.076]. As with privacy concerns, there was no evidence 
that surveiller identity (ingroup vs outgroup) affected group-based recognition 
independently of trust, b = .12, se = .161, p = .515, 95% CI [-0.213, 0.423]). 
Therefore, those in the outgroup condition were less likely to trust the surveiller 
(b = -.78, se = .168, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.113, -0.449]), and in turn, reported 
less group-based recognition (b = .26, se = .067, p < .001, 95% CI [0.131, 
0.395]). 
 
The effects of recognition, privacy concern, and trust on behaviour 
change intentions online 
A multiple regression analysis was then conducted to investigate whether 
group-based recognition, privacy concerns, and trust predicted behaviour 
change intentions online. The overall model was significant and explained 29% 
of the variance (R2 adj = .28, F(3, 179) = 24.61, p < .001). As can be seen from 
Table 4, greater privacy concerns and less trust were associated with stronger 
intentions to change online behaviour. However, contrary to predictions, 
recognition did not uniquely predict behaviour change intentions online. 
 
Figure 8. Path diagram illustrating the effect of surveiller identity on group-
based recognition through inferred trust. 
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Table 4. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and behaviour change intentions online 
IV b β t p 
Recognition .10 .07 1.06 .290 
Privacy 
concern 
.53 .41 5.58 < .001 
Trust -.28 -.23 -3.09  .002 
 
Discussion 
Study 2a aimed tested whether the effect of surveillance accuracy on 
online behaviour change intentions would be explained in part by two pathways: 
a positive pathway through group-based recognition and a negative pathway 
through privacy concern. We also anticipated that the positive pathway and 
potentially the negative pathway may be moderated by surveiller social identity. 
For the positive pathway, we suggested that greater surveillance accuracy 
would increase feelings of group-based recognition, and that this would be 
particularly so when the surveiller was part of the outgroup. In turn, we expected 
that greater group-based recognition would predict lower behaviour change 
intentions. We did not predict an association between surveillance accuracy and 
group-based recognition when surveillance was conducted by the ingroup, as 
recognition is already implied by shared group membership.  
For the negative pathway, we proposed several possible outcomes. We 
predicted that surveiller identity may independently affect privacy concerns in 
either of two ways: ingroup surveillance may elicit more privacy concern 
(O’Donnell et al., 2010b), or less privacy concern (O’Donnell et al., 2010a). 
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Additionally, we predicted that there may be an interaction between surveiller 
identity and surveillance accuracy: greater surveillance accuracy may be 
associated with increased privacy concern only when surveillance was 
conducted by the outgroup, as the outgroup is assumed to have negative 
intentions towards the ingroup. For the ingroup, surveillance accuracy may not 
affect privacy concerns, as the ingroup is assumed to use group’s data within its 
best interest irrespective of its accuracy. Additionally, variations in accuracy 
may be considered inconsequential, as fellow ingroup members are assumed to 
have first-hand knowledge of whether data accurately (or inaccurately) 
represents the group. In turn, greater privacy concern was predicted to increase 
behaviour change intentions. 
Additionally, we also predicted that trust may operate as a mediator in 
both the positive and negative pathways. Specifically, we predicted that an 
ingroup surveiller would be trusted to a greater extent than an outgroup 
surveiller. In turn, we predicted that greater trust would predict more group-
based recognition and less privacy concern. 
A positive pathway through group-based recognition 
 Perceiving surveillance from an outgroup as more accurate is 
associated with greater group-based recognition. The surveillance accuracy 
manipulation did not affect group-based recognition; however, surveillance 
accuracy perceptions were associated with group-based recognition. Perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate was associated with more group-based 
recognition. This was in turn qualified by an interaction between surveillance 
accuracy perceptions and surveiller identity on group-based recognition. For 
those under outgroup surveillance, perceptions of greater surveillance accuracy 
were associated with more group-based recognition. On the other hand, no 
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association between surveillance accuracy perceptions and recognition was 
found for those under ingroup surveillance. This supports the premise that those 
under ingroup surveillance do not receive any group-based recognition benefits, 
as recognition is already implied through shared group identity, and suggests 
that surveillance from the ingroup is less likely to raise identity-related concerns 
compared to outgroup surveillance.  
This is consistent with previous research, which demonstrate that 
individuals are less likely to engage in identity management strategies when in 
the presence of an ingroup audience compared to an outgroup audience (Klein 
& Azzi, 2001). Here, it could be argued that an outgroup surveiller is believed to 
subscribe to misconceptions about the group (Finkelstein et al., 2013; Sigelman 
& Tuch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998). Therefore, participants may believe that 
surveillance of greater accuracy allows the outgroup to access information that 
may disconfirm inaccurate or negative perceptions of the ingroup. 
Consequently, whilst an outgroup audience/surveiller may pose a threat to 
identity (as it may make meta-stereotypes salient), accurate surveillance from 
an outgroup also presents the opportunity to challenge misconceptions and 
foster group-based recognition.   
 Trust. Furthermore, the present study illustrates that an ingroup 
surveiller may typically be trusted to a greater extent, and that this in turn 
predicts more group-based recognition. Previous research has found that those 
under ingroup surveillance may demonstrate behavioural backlash against 
surveillers (e.g. less helping behaviour than when under low levels of 
surveillance; O’Donnell et al., 2012). However, the present study demonstrates 
that in some circumstances ingroup surveillers are afforded more trust, which is 
associated with positive outcomes in the form of group-based recognition. 
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Indeed, this is consistent with previous research that finds the ingroup is trusted 
to a greater extent (Tanis & Postmes, 2005; Foddy et al., 2009) and that 
individuals are better able to achieve recognition and affirmation through those 
they trust (de Laat, 2008). 
 No unique association between group-based recognition and 
behaviour change intentions. Contrary to expectations, less group-based 
recognition did not predict greater behaviour change intentions online. Previous 
research suggests that when individuals feel misrecognised, they are more 
likely to change their behaviour or withdraw entirely from surveilled spaces to 
manage others’ perceptions of them (Klein & Azzi, 2001; Hopkins et al., 2007; 
Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Our findings did not echo this.  
It could be argued that as the study concerned surveillance surrounding 
university Wi-Fi and university platforms, this surveillance is unavoidable. 
Students require Wi-Fi whilst on campus and many courses require 
engagement with university online platforms. As such, participants may have 
felt that they were not able to change or modify their online behaviour whilst at 
University, since online engagement is necessary for their studies. Indeed, 
research finds that those wishing to change their online behaviour are often 
restricted by social pressures (Welinder, 2012) or do not feel technologically 
literate enough to change their behaviour effectively (Tene & Polonetsky, 2014). 
This may be especially true when attempting to engage in identity management 
through surveillance. Individuals are often unaware of what aspects of their 
online behaviour are being surveilled and how this may be represented in a 
data format (Ellis et al., 2013). As such, participants may have felt unable to 
effectively change their behaviour online to manage perceptions.  
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A negative pathway through privacy concern  
Surveiller identity (but not surveillance accuracy) is associated with 
privacy concern. The main effect of surveillance accuracy on privacy concerns 
was not significant, nor was the interaction between accuracy and surveiller 
identity. There was also no association between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and privacy concern. However, a main effect of surveiller identity 
was found, in that surveillance conducted by the outgroup was associated with 
more privacy concern than surveillance conducted by the ingroup. This echoes 
research by O’Donnell et al. (2010a), who found that surveillance from fellow 
sub-group members was seen as less concerning than surveillance from a 
superordinate group.  
Trust. Our study also extends O’Donnell et al.’s (2010a) findings by 
demonstrating that fewer privacy concerns from ingroup surveillance may be in 
part explained by greater trust for ingroup surveillers. Mediation analyses 
revealed that participants trusted an ingroup surveiller to a greater extent than 
an outgroup surveiller. In turn, greater trust predicted less privacy concern. This 
supports previous literature, which found that outgroup members are typically 
trusted less (Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Brewer, 1999; Foddy et al., 2009). The 
current study illustrates that intragroup trust also extends to potentially invasive 
behaviours, such as intragroup surveillance.  
Greater privacy concern is associated with behaviour change 
intentions online. As expected, greater privacy concern was associated with 
greater behaviour change intentions online. This is consistent with research on 
‘chilling effects’, which finds that those who are concerned for their privacy 
online, or are aware of aggressive surveillance practices online, are more likely 
to moderate their behaviour or withdraw from online platforms altogether 
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(Dawson et al., 2005; Marthews & Tucker, 2017; Oulasvirta et al., 2012). Whilst 
the current study did not explore the nature of behaviour change intentions, 
previous research illustrates that some individuals continue online engagement, 
yet use anonymising techniques, such as changing profile nicknames (Tufekci, 
2008), whilst others have found individuals withdraw entirely from surveilled 
platforms (Starr, Fernandez, Amster, Wood, & Caro, 2008). Further research is 
required to explore the reasons for variation in behaviour change online when 
individuals are concerned for their privacy.  
 
STUDY 2B 
 Study 2a suggests that surveillance can produce positive psychological 
outcomes in the form of group-based recognition when surveillance is perceived 
as having greater accuracy (however, the surveillance accuracy manipulation 
was not associated with group-based recognition). Additionally, the study 
provides preliminary evidence that the identity of the surveiller may moderate 
this effect, although the effect was weak and was only just within the 
conventional boundaries of statistical significance. As a result, Study 2b aims to 
replicate these findings and address potential limitations.  
 Firstly, in Study 2a the manipulation of surveillance accuracy did not 
affect privacy concern nor recognition. Instead, as with Study 1, only 
participants’ perceptions of surveillance accuracy predicted feelings of group-
based recognition. One possible reason for this is that the manipulation of 
surveillance accuracy may not have been strong enough. For instance, the 
accuracy manipulation within the online news bulletins was only present in one 
of the four paragraphs participants were asked to read. Consequently, whilst the 
manipulation check indicated a successful if modest manipulation, it may not 
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have been strong enough to affect participants’ responses in the later 
measures. As such, Study 2b aimed to strengthen the accuracy manipulation by 
making information about accuracy more prominent in three of the four 
paragraphs.  
 Secondly, Study 2a differed from Study 1 in that feelings towards 
surveillance were not measured. Instead, Study 2a explored the effects of 
surveillance accuracy (and group-based recognition and privacy concern) on 
behaviour change intentions online. In Study 2b we returned our focus to the 
impact of group-based recognition and privacy concern on feelings towards 
surveillance.  
 Thirdly, we aimed to replicate the mediating effect of trust found in Study 
2a. Here, we found that an ingroup surveiller was perceived as more trustworthy 
than an outgroup surveiller. In turn, greater trust predicted more group-based 
recognition and less privacy concern. Thus, ingroup surveillance was 
associated with more positive and less negative outcomes (through trust). As 
discussed above, our findings echo those of O’Donnell et al. (2010a), as they 
found surveillance from those participants closely identified with was associated 
with less privacy concern.  
Alternatively, previous literature has also found that ingroup surveillance 
can undermine shared group membership (O’Donnell et al., 2010b), and can 
produce negative outcomes (less intragroup helping; O’Donnell et al., 2012). 
Consequently, we aim to replicate the findings from Study 2a to further clarify 
the circumstances under which ingroup surveillance can contribute to more 
positive or negative outcomes.   
 As such, in Study 2b we predicted an interaction between surveillance 
accuracy and surveiller identity on group-based recognition, whereby increases 
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in recognition from accurate surveillance are only evident under outgroup 
surveillance. We also predicted a main effect of surveiller identity, in that 
ingroup surveillance will be associated with more group-based recognition, as 
the surveiller is trusted to a greater extent.  
As Study 2a did not find an interaction between surveillance accuracy 
and surveiller identity on privacy concern, we predicted that accuracy and 
surveiller identity will have independent effects. As demonstrated in Study 1, we 
expected surveillance of greater accuracy to be associated with more privacy 
concern. Additionally, we expected outgroup surveillance to be associated with 
more privacy concern than ingroup surveillance, and that this relationship will be 
mediated by trust.   
As outlined in Chapter 1 and demonstrated in Study 1, we predicted that 
more group-based recognition will predict more positive feelings towards 
surveillance, and more privacy concern will predict less positive feelings 
towards surveillance.  
In sum, Study 2b aimed to address two main limitations of Study 2a. We 
aimed to include more accuracy manipulation content in the news bulletin to 
strengthen the surveillance accuracy manipulation. Additionally, we included 
feelings towards surveillance as the primary dependent variable to remain 
consistent with the other studies of the project. Study 2b also aimed to replicate 
the exploratory findings suggesting that trust might mediate the relationship 
between surveiller identity and psychological outcomes.  
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Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited through the University of Exeter research 
portal, SONA, which is used by undergraduate students to sign up for course 
credit. A total of 217 submissions were recorded; however, 17 participants were 
not included in the analyses as they had not completed any of the dependent 
measures. This left 200 participants. A majority of 83% were women (17% men, 
1% non-binary) and 75% identified as being White (3% Mixed, 21% Asian, 1% 
Arab, 1% Other). Participants’ mean age was 18.84 years (SD = 0.86). A 
sensitivity analysis using g*power indicated that the sample is sufficient to 
detect an effect size using MANOVA of f = 0.22 (ηp2 = .05) with 80% power for 
the main effects of and interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller 
identity (two predictors; six groups). When using regression (five predictors), the 
current study is sufficient to detect an effect size of f = 0.20 (partial r = .20) with 
80% power for each of the effects of group-based recognition (distinctiveness, 
understanding, positivity), privacy concern, and trust.  
 The study had a similar 3 (accuracy: low, medium, high) x 2 (group: 
ingroup, outgroup) between-participants design to Study 2a, and participants 
were assigned randomly to one of the six conditions. Dependent measures 
included feelings towards surveillance (positive and negative) with perceived 
group-based recognition (distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding), trust, 
and privacy concern as potential mediators.14 
 
14 Additional measures were also taken but not included in the analyses. These included measures of 
behaviour change intentions, visibility, and group identification. These were not included in the analyses, 
as they were not directly relevant to the rationale of the study. All measures may be found in Appendix F. 
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Materials 
Unless otherwise stated, responses were collected using a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). Negatively-phrased items 
were reverse coded. 
 Identity salience. Based on the method used by Haslam, Oakes, 
Reynolds, and Turner (1999), participants were asked to write three things that 
they felt made those in Psychology different from those belonging to other 
disciplines. This was included to ensure that the Psychology identity was salient 
at the time of completing the survey.   
Identification. Four items were adapted from the Doosje, Ellemers, and 
Spears’ (1995) identification scale to measure ingroup (Psychology) 
identification. Items included ‘I identify with others in Psychology’ and ‘I am glad 
to be part of Psychology’. All items were used for the final identification scale (α 
= .83, M = 5.44; SD = 0.84).  
Manipulation. Participants were shown an ostensibly genuine University 
online news bulletin (Appendix E). The news bulletin described a new 
surveillance programme to begin in the next academic year, which would only 
affect Psychology students. The bulletin explained that the surveillance 
programme would be conducted by either the Biosciences or Psychology 
Department. To manipulate surveillance accuracy, the programme was 
described as either 21% accurate, 50% accurate, or 89% accurate. Students 
were informed in the bulletin that they would be required to consent to the 
programme when enrolling for the next academic year. 
Dependent measures. Accuracy manipulation check. Four items 
were included to assess the effectiveness of the accuracy manipulation (e.g. ‘In 
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my view, algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department is accurate 
at identifying people’).15 The four items were averaged to create the final scale 
(α = .79, M = 3.55; SD = 0.95). 
Perceived recognition. Recognition was divided into three dimensions: 
positivity, distinctiveness, and understanding. In Chapter 1 we outlined the 
potential dimensions of (group-based) recognition. As such, from Study 2b 
onwards we aimed to take a more nuanced approach that would enable us to 
explore which elements of group-based recognition were contributing to our 
predicted model and which dimensions may predict feelings towards 
surveillance. Confirmatory Factor Analysis supported our three-factor approach. 
These results may be found in Appendix G.  
Positivity. Four items measured how positively participants felt 
Psychology students were perceived by others (e.g., ‘We will be valued 
positively through the surveillance programme’). On analysis, item 2 
(‘Algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department would not portray us 
positively’) did not correlate with the other three items and improved the scale’s 
reliability by .06 (from α = .66) if removed. Therefore, item 2 was deleted and 
the remaining three items were averaged to create the final scale (α = .72, M = 
4.00; SD = 0.91). 
Distinctiveness. Four items measured the extent to which participants felt 
surveillance recognised those in Psychology as belonging to a distinct 
discipline. Items included ‘Algorithmic surveillance will enable the (x) 
Department to recognise that we are a unique discipline’. On analysis, item 4 
(‘Algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department would imply that we 
 
15 These items were similar to those in Study 2a, but items referred to ‘people’ rather than ‘students’.   
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are indistinguishable from other academic communities’) did not correlate with 
the other three items and improved the scale’s reliability by .014 if deleted. 
Therefore, item 4 was deleted and the remaining three items were averaged to 
create the final scale (α = .80, M = 3.70; SD = 1.07). 
Understanding. Four items were included to measure the extent to which 
participants felt surveillance understood ingroup members, such as ‘Algorithmic 
surveillance will help the (x) Department understand our values’. All four items 
were used to create the final scale (α = .73, M = 3.69; SD = 0.98). 
Feelings towards surveillance. Feelings towards surveillance were 
measured with two scales: positive emotion and negative emotion. Participants 
were asked, ‘Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel…’ and were then 
presented with 14 emotion items (seven items per scale).  
 Positive feelings. All seven items, such as ‘happy’ and ‘pleased’ were 
averaged to form the positive feelings scale (α = .93, M = 3.26; SD = 0.97). 
Negative feelings. All seven items, such as ‘angry’ and ‘anxious’ were 
averaged to create the negative feelings scale (α = .88, M = 4.19; SD = 1.02). 
Trust. Four items measured the extent to which participants trusted the 
department conducting the surveillance, such as ‘I trust the (x) Department to 
gather our online data’. All items were averaged to form the final scale (α = .78, 
M = 3.96; SD = 1.11). 
Privacy concern. Four items measured the extent to which participants 
felt surveillance compromised their privacy. Items included ‘surveillance online 
is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘people have a right to use the internet without 
being surveilled’. All items were used to create the final scale (α = .60, M = 5.07; 
SD = 0.99). 
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Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their age, gender, 
and ethnicity. They were also asked how long they spent online, whether they 
belonged to closed/private groups online, and how aware they were of 
surveillance online (1 = Not at all aware to 10 = Very aware). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through SONA, the University’s research 
participation system. Participants were presented with a brief description of the 
study before continuing to the consent form. After giving their informed consent, 
participants completed the pre-manipulation measures before being randomly 
allocated to one of the six conditions. They were then asked to read the news 
bulletin corresponding to their condition before completing the dependent 
measures. On completion or withdrawal, participants were thanked, fully 
debriefed, and provided with online sources pertaining to internet privacy online 
should they feel concerned. Participants were compensated with course credit. 
Results 
Missing data treatment 
 Analysis of missing data revealed that only 0.04% of values were missing 
across all measures.16 Missing values were imputed using the expectation-
maximisation (EM) method in SPSS (Graham, 2009) and estimated values fell 
within the scale range.  
 
 
16 Missing data analysis and treatment was used in Study 2b and onwards, as Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis (CFA) was used in these studies to test our predicted conceptualisation of (group-based) 
recognition (this was not done in Study 1 or 2a). As CFA requires complete data, missing data analysis 
and treatment was employed.  
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Manipulation checks 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the surveillance 
accuracy and surveiller identity manipulations on surveillance accuracy 
perceptions. A significant effect of surveillance accuracy was found on 
perceptions of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 5.00, p = .008, ηp2 = .049. 
Those in the high accuracy condition (M = 3.84, SD = 0.95) perceived 
surveillance as more accurate than those in the medium accuracy condition (M 
= 3.39, SD = 0.85; p = .005). However, those in the medium accuracy condition 
did not significantly differ in perceived surveillance accuracy compared to those 
in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.41, SD = 0.78; p = .863). Those in the high 
accuracy condition reported significantly higher accuracy perceptions than 
those in the low accuracy condition (p = .009). Therefore, despite there being 
no significant difference between the low and medium accuracy conditions, as 
accuracy perceptions significantly differed between low and high and medium 
and high conditions, the manipulation was considered a partial success. No 
evidence was found for a main effect of surveiller identity F(1, 194) = 0.43, p = 
.511, ηp2 = .002, nor an interaction F(2, 194) = 0.71, p = .492, ηp2 = .007. 
Correlations between all dependent measures may be found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Summary of Pearson correlations between variables in the predicted 
model 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Accuracy 
perceptions 
-       
2. Positivity .40*** -      
3. Understanding .39*** .45*** -     
4. Distinctiveness .44*** .54*** .54*** -    
5. Privacy Concern -.54* -.19** -.28*** -.25*** -   
6. Trust .32*** .45*** .50*** .41*** -.46*** -  
7. Positive feelings .37*** .56*** .44*** .48*** -.40*** .58*** - 
8. Negative feelings -.21** -.33*** -.38*** -.31*** .37*** -.67*** -.56*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
  
Hypothesis testing 
Feelings towards surveillance. A multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted with surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity as 
fixed factors. Positive emotion and negative emotion were entered as 
dependent variables. The multivariate main effect of surveiller identity was not 
significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 1.29, p = .277, ηp2 = .013, nor was the 
multivariate main effect of surveillance accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 0.27, 
p = .895, ηp2 < .001. There was also no indication of a multivariate interaction, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F = 1.48, p = .208, ηp2 = .015. 
Positive feelings. No main effects were found for surveiller identity, F(1, 
194) = 0.03, p = .874, ηp2 < .001, nor surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 0.49, p 
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= .614, ηp2 = .005 on positive feelings towards surveillance. Additionally, no 
interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on 
positive feelings towards surveillance, F(2, 194) = 0.89, p = .415, ηp2 = .009. 
Negative feelings. No main effect was found for surveiller identity on 
negative feelings towards surveillance, F(1, 194) = 1.51, p = .220, ηp2  = .008, 
nor surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 0.08, p = .924, ηp2 = .001. No interaction 
was found between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on negative 
feelings towards surveillance, F(2, 194) = 0.89, p = .415, ηp2 = .009. 
Positive psychological outcomes: group-based recognition. A 
second MANOVA was conducted with surveillance accuracy and surveiller 
identity as fixed factors. Distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding were 
entered as dependent variables. The multivariate main effect of surveiller 
identity was not significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F = 1.44, p = .233, ηp2 = .022. 
No significant multivariate main effect was found for surveillance accuracy, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F = 0.96, p = .451, ηp2 = .015. There was no indication of a 
multivariate interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .97, F = 1.14, p = .339, ηp2 = .017. 
Distinctiveness. A marginally significant main effect of surveiller identity 
was found on distinctiveness (F(1, 194) = 3.34, p = .069, ηp2 = .017) with those 
in the ingroup condition, (M = 3.56, SD = 1.14) reporting marginally less 
perceived distinctiveness than those in the outgroup condition, (M = 3.84, SD = 
0.98). There was no main effect of surveillance accuracy on perceived 
distinctiveness, F(2, 194) = 1.71, p = .184, ηp2 = .017, and no interaction was 
found between surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 1.33, p 
= .266, ηp2 = .014.  
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Understanding. No main effect was found of surveiller identity, F(1, 194) 
= 0.03, p = .871, ηp2 < .001, or of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 1.29, p = 
.278, ηp2 = .013. No interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and 
surveiller identity on felt understanding, F(2, 194) = 0.20, p = .821, ηp2 = .002. 
Positivity. No main effect was found of surveiller identity, F(1, 194) = 
0.03, p = .871, ηp2 < .001, or of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 1.29, p = 
.278, ηp2 = .013. No interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and 
surveiller identity on perceived positivity, F(2, 194) = 1.81, p = .167, ηp2 = .018. 
Privacy concern and trust. A third MANOVA was conducted with 
surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy as fixed factors and privacy 
concern and trust as dependent variables. The multivariate main effect of 
surveiller identity was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F = 5.31, p = .006, ηp2 = 
.052. No significant multivariate main effect was found for surveillance 
accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 0.44, p = .778, ηp2 = .005. There was no 
significant multivariate interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller 
identity, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F = 0.85, p = .493, ηp2 = .009. 
Privacy concern. No main effect was found of surveiller identity, F(1, 
194) = 1.17, p = .281, ηp2 = .006, or of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 194) = 0.73, p 
= .484, ηp2 = .007. No interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and 
surveiller identity on privacy concern, F(2, 194) = 1.57, p = .212, ηp2 = .016. 
Trust. A main effect of surveiller identity was found on trust towards the 
surveiller, F(1, 194) = 4.94, p = .027, ηp2 = .025; consistent with the finding in 
Study 2a, those in the ingroup condition (M = 4.13, SD = 1.10) had significantly 
more trust for the surveiller than those in the outgroup condition, (M = 3.79, SD 
= 1.09). The main effect of accuracy, F(2, 194) = 0.28, p = .760, ηp2 = .003, and 
the interaction, F(2, 194) = 0.87, p = .421, ηp2 = .009, were both non-significant. 
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The role of trust: Does surveiller identity predict group-based 
recognition and privacy concern through trust? In Study 2a, we tested an 
indirect path between surveiller identity and psychological outcomes via trust. 
Here, a main effect has been established between surveiller identity and trust, 
and trust is also correlated with the group-based recognition measures and 
privacy concern. As such, a mediation analysis was conducted using SPSS 
PROCESS macro (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) for each psychological outcome 
(Figure 9).  
Distinctiveness. Participants felt more trust when surveillance was 
conducted by the ingroup, compared to when it was conducted by the outgroup, 
b = -.35, p = .027, SE = .16, 95% CI [-0.65, -0.04]. In turn, greater feelings of 
trust predicted more perceived distinctiveness, b = .43, p < .001, SE = .06, 95% 
CI [0.31, 0.55]. The indirect effect was also significant, b = -.15, SE = .06, 95% 
CI [-0.27, -0.01]. A direct effect was also found between group and 
distinctiveness b = .42, p = .002, SE = .14, 95% CI [0.15, 0.69]. 
Understanding. Greater feelings of trust predicted more felt 
understanding, b = .46, p < .001, SE = .06, 95% CI [0.35, 0.57]. The indirect 
effect was also significant, b = -.16, SE = .07, 95% CI [-0.30, -0.02]. The direct 
effect of group on distinctiveness was not significant, b = .19, p = .129, SE = 
.12, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.42]. 
Positivity. Greater feelings of trust predicted more perceived positivity, b 
= .38, p < .001, SE = .05, 95% CI [0.28, 0.49]. The indirect effect was also 
significant, b = -.13, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.01]. The direct relationship 
between group and positivity approached significance, b = .21, p = .073, SE = 
.12, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.44]. 
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Privacy concern. More trust predicted less privacy concerns, b = -.43, p 
< .001, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.54, -0.31]. The indirect effect was also significant, 
b = .15, SE = .07, 95% CI [0.02, 0.29]. A significant direct relationship was 
found between group and privacy concern, whereby outgroup surveillance was 
associated with less privacy concern, b = -.30, p = .018, SE = .12, 95% CI [-
0.54, -0.05]. 
 
 
Figure 9. PROCESS path diagram for predicted model. Unstandardised 
regression coefficients and significance values are presented adjacent to each 
line that represents the relationship between variables. 
 
Post-hoc analyses: Accuracy perceptions as a predictor 
Whilst the accuracy manipulation again did not affect any of the 
psychological outcomes, we can see from Table 5 that accuracy perceptions 
are associated with the recognition dimensions and privacy concern. 
Additionally, Study 2a found an interaction between accuracy perceptions and 
surveiller identity on group-based recognition. As with Study 2a, we tested this 
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interaction with a moderation analysis using PROCESS (Model 1; Hayes, 
2013). Surveillance accuracy perceptions were entered as the independent 
variable and surveiller identity was entered as the moderator on each 
psychological outcome measure. 
Distinctiveness. Significant main effects were found for both 
surveillance accuracy perceptions, b = .49, se = .067, p < .001, 95% CI [0.353, 
0.618], and surveiller identity, b = 0.16, se = .067, p = .020, 95% CI [0.025, 
0.289]. Additionally, an interaction was found between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and surveiller identity on distinctiveness, b = -.14, se = .067, p = 
.041, 95% CI [-0.270, -0.006]. Simple slopes analysis revealed that the 
association between accuracy perceptions and distinctiveness was positive and 
significant for both the outgroup, b = .35, SE = .094, p < .001, 95% CI [0.163, 
0.533], and the ingroup, b = .62, SE = .096, p < .001, 95% CI [0.434, 0.813]. As 
shown in Figure 10, these results present a different pattern from those found in 
Study 2a, in that both ingroup and outgroup surveillance were more likely to 
provide group-based distinctiveness when surveillance was perceived as more 
accurate. 
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 Understanding. The main effect of accuracy perceptions on felt 
understanding was significant, b = .38, SE = .065, p < .001, 95% CI [0.255, 
0.510], whereby perceiving surveillance as more accurate was associated with 
more group-based felt understanding. No main effect was found for surveiller 
identity, b = .03, SE = .065, p = .652, 95% CI [-0.098, 0.156] and no interaction 
was found between accuracy perceptions and surveiller identity, b = -.0001, SE 
= .065, p = .999, 95% CI [-0.128, 0.127]. 
 Positivity. A main effect was found of accuracy, whereby perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate was associated with a greater experience of 
group-based positivity, b = .37, SE = .060, p < .001, 95% CI [0.249, 0.484], but 
not of surveiller identity, b = .05, SE = .059, p = .368, 95% CI [-0.064, 0.171]. 
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Figure 10. The conditional effect of surveillance accuracy perceptions on 
perceived distinctiveness at the level of the ingroup and outgroup. Low 
and high accuracy are valued at 1SD below and above the mean 
respectively. Medium is valued at the mean. 
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No interaction was found either, b = -.03, SE = .060, p = .595, 95% CI [-0.149, 
0.086]. 
 Privacy concern. A main effect was found of accuracy, whereby 
perceiving surveillance as more accurate was associated with less concern, b = 
-.15, SE = .069, p = .027, 95% CI [-0.292, -0.018], but not of surveiller identity, b 
= -.08, SE = .069, p = .244, 95% CI [-0.217, 0.056]. No interaction was found 
either, b = -.01, SE = .069, p = .924, 95% CI [-0.143, 0.130]. 
 Trust. A main effect was found of surveillance accuracy, b = .35, SE = 
.074, p < .001, 95% CI [-0.204, 0.495], whereby perceiving surveillance as more 
accurate was associated with greater trust. Additionally, a significant effect was 
found of surveiller identity, b = -.16, SE = .074, p = .033, 95% CI [-0.304, -
0.013], whereby the outgroup was trusted less than the ingroup. No interaction 
was found either, b = .05, SE = .074, p = .506, 95% CI [-0.097, 0.195]. 
Do group-based recognition, privacy concern, and trust predict feelings 
towards surveillance?  
Two multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether 
privacy concerns, trust, and group-based recognition (positivity, distinctiveness, 
and understanding) predicted feelings towards surveillance (positive and 
negative). 
Positive feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
significant and explained 47% of the variance (R2 adj = .47, F(5, 194) = 36.65, p 
< .001). Results are presented in Table 6.  
Of the recognition measures, positivity predicted positive feelings 
towards surveillance, as greater perceptions of positivity predicted more positive 
feelings towards surveillance. Understanding did not uniquely predict positive 
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feelings towards surveillance and distinctiveness approached significance. 
Privacy concerns negatively predicted positive feelings towards surveillance, in 
that more concerns predicted less positive feelings. Trust also predicted 
feelings towards surveillance, as more trust predicted more positive feelings 
towards surveillance.   
 
Table 6. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and positive feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
-.16 -.17 -2.88  .004 
Distinctiveness .12 .13 1.92 .057 
Understanding .04 .04 0.55 .582 
Positivity .33 .31 4.87 <.001 
Trust .25 .29 4.28 <.001 
 
Negative feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
significant and explained 44% of the variance (R2 adj = .44, F(5, 194) = 32.77, p 
< .001). Results are presented in Table 7.  
Trust was the only measure to significantly predict negative feelings 
towards surveillance, as greater trust predicted less negative feelings towards 
surveillance.  
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Table 7. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and negative feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
.09 .09 1.42  .156 
Distinctiveness -.01 -.01 -0.17 .868 
Understanding -.03 -.03 -0.47 .642 
Positivity -.03 -.03 -0.39 .698 
Trust -.55 -.60 -8.69 <.001 
 
Discussion 
In this study, we aimed to address two main limitations of Study 2a. 
Firstly, we argued that the surveillance accuracy manipulation in Study 2a was 
not strong enough, as accuracy was not related to privacy concern nor group-
based recognition. Therefore, in the present study we aimed to include more 
surveillance accuracy manipulation content in the news bulletin. Additionally, we 
aimed to include feelings towards surveillance as the primary dependent 
variable, rather than online behaviour change intentions, as the former was of 
greater interest to us and would be included in subsequent studies. Study 2b 
also aimed to replicate the exploratory findings suggesting that trust might 
mediate the relationship between surveiller identity and psychological 
outcomes.  
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Positive pathway: Does accurate surveillance predict more positive (and 
less negative) feelings towards surveillance through group-based 
recognition? 
The effect of surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity. Whilst 
Study 2a found an (albeit weak) interaction between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and surveiller identity on group-based recognition, no consistent 
interaction was found in Study 2b. Additionally, neither this study nor Study 2a 
found an interaction between the surveillance accuracy manipulation and 
surveiller identity on group-based recognition. Instead, both studies suggest 
greater support for the independent effects of surveillance accuracy perceptions 
and surveiller identity (through trust).  
Surveiller identity (through trust). Participants in the ingroup surveiller 
condition reported significantly more trust in the surveiller compared to those in 
the outgroup condition. In turn, greater trust predicted more group-based 
recognition (on all dimensions). This is consistent with the findings of Study 2a, 
which also found evidence for an indirect effect of surveiller identity on group-
based recognition via trust.  
Surveillance accuracy. No main effect was found of surveillance 
accuracy on group-based recognition. However, surveillance accuracy 
perceptions had a positive association with all three recognition dimensions: 
those that perceived surveillance as being more accurate were more likely to 
feel group-based recognition. This supports the findings from Study 2a and 
provides further correlational evidence for the positive pathway in our model: 
when surveillance is perceived as accurate, surveillance has the potential to 
foster positive psychological outcomes in the form of group-based recognition.  
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The relationship between group-based recognition and feelings 
towards surveillance. Both distinctiveness and positivity predicted positive 
feelings towards surveillance. Specifically, greater perceptions of group 
distinctiveness and positivity was associated with more positive feelings 
towards surveillance. Whilst this relationship has not been explored in 
psychological research on surveillance, it is consistent with research in 
marketing that demonstrates that individuals have a preference for marketing 
surveillance when it is identity relevant. Specifically, individuals typically prefer 
targeted advertising when the promoted products or services correspond to 
their attitudes and beliefs (Campbell & Wright, 2008; McDonald & Cranor, 2010; 
Ur et al., 2012). The current study illustrates that identity-relevant surveillance 
may also be preferred outside of advertising contexts. As a result, whilst most 
advertising literature argues that identity-relevant surveillance is preferred due 
to its utility for consumers (e.g., financial discounts), this study demonstrates 
that surveillance that provides group-based recognition may have an intrinsic 
value, over and above potential material gains. 
None of the group-based recognition dimensions uniquely predicted 
negative feelings towards surveillance. Thus, it could be argued that feeling 
more group-based recognition may not negate negative feelings towards 
surveillance, nor does less group-based recognition increase negative feelings 
towards surveillance. However, a more likely explanation is that the group-
based recognition items do not have unique predictive power, and the effects of 
each are cancelled out when entered together. This is evidenced by the zero-
order correlations; all the group-based recognition dimensions correlated (in the 
predicted direction) with negative feelings towards surveillance, i.e., more 
group-based recognition was correlated with less negative feelings towards 
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surveillance. As such, the three dimensions taken together may have cancelled 
out the effects of one another.  
Negative pathway: Does accurate surveillance predict less positive (and 
more negative) feelings towards surveillance through privacy concern?  
The effect of surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity. No 
interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on 
privacy concern. Additionally, no interaction was found between accuracy 
perceptions and surveiller identity. As with the positive pathway, surveillance 
accuracy perceptions and surveiller identity (through trust) appeared to have 
independent associations with privacy concerns.  
Surveiller identity (through trust). Before addressing the mediation 
findings, it is important to note that our results for a direct relationship between 
surveiller identity and privacy concern demonstrated suppression effects. When 
tested with a MANOVA we did not find evidence for a direct effect; however, a 
direct relationship was found when conducted in PROCESS when controlling for 
trust. This direct relationship was in the opposite direction to what was 
expected: outgroup surveillance was associated with less privacy concern. 
Suppression effects can occur when direct and indirect effects are in opposite 
directions. Here, it could be that outgroup surveillance is seen as less 
consequential than ingroup surveillance. When surveilled by an ingroup there is 
a degree of intragroup accountability, where group members may be punished if 
they are not conforming to group norms (Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; 
McLeish & Oxoby, 2007). As such, ingroup surveillance may be associated with 
more privacy concern (direct path). However, our findings demonstrate that 
ingroup surveillance may simultaneously be associated with less privacy 
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concern because the ingroup is trusted to a greater extent (indirect path). 
Consequently, when comparing the psychological outcomes of ingroup versus 
outgroup surveillance it is prudent to include surveiller trust in the model, as 
findings may differ depending on whether trust is controlled for in the analyses.  
Regarding the mediation findings, an ingroup surveiller was trusted to a 
greater extent than an outgroup surveiller. In turn, greater trust was associated 
with less privacy concern. This is consistent with Study 2a and prior literature, 
which finds that ingroup surveillance raises fewer privacy concerns (O’Donnell 
et al., 2010a). This present study finds further evidence that this relationship is 
explained by greater trust in an ingroup surveiller.  
Surveillance accuracy. As mentioned above, the surveillance accuracy 
manipulation did not affect privacy concerns. However, surveillance accuracy 
perceptions predicted privacy concern; surveillance of greater accuracy was 
associated with less privacy concern. As Study 2a found no association 
between surveillance accuracy perceptions and privacy concern, further 
research is required to explore the nature of the potential effects of surveillance 
accuracy on privacy concern. The relationship between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions and privacy concern is also tested in Study 2c and Chapters 4 and 
5.   
The relationship between privacy concern and feelings towards 
surveillance. Greater privacy concern predicted less positive feelings towards 
surveillance. There was no association between privacy concern and negative 
feelings towards surveillance. The latter is not consistent with prior research; for 
example, participants in Pavone and Esposti’s (2010) study found that 
participants who felt surveillance was an invasion of privacy typically reported 
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more negative feelings towards surveillance than those who did not perceive it 
as an invasion of privacy. Additionally, when Oulasvirta et al. (2012) exposed 
participants to home surveillance, respondents reported heightened privacy 
concern, which in turn made them feel ‘weirdness’ and ‘annoyance’. However, 
many reported a reduction in these negative feelings as the study progressed, 
despite intense feelings of privacy concern. Participants’ negative feelings 
subsided as they reported ‘getting used to’ and ‘normalizing’ the surveillance (p. 
46). It may be that students simply expect a degree of monitoring from the 
university. Therefore, whilst increased privacy concern predicts less positive 
feelings towards surveillance, students may not necessarily feel more 
negatively, as institutional surveillance is something they have grown 
accustomed to.  
Findings summary 
 In sum, contrary to our predictions we did not find that surveiller identity 
moderated the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition. 
Instead, we found that accuracy (perceptions) and surveiller identity had 
independent effects. Specifically, perceiving surveillance as more accurate was 
associated with greater group-based recognition and less privacy concern. 
Ingroup surveillance was also associated with more group-based recognition 
and less privacy concern through an increase in trust. Neither group-based 
recognition nor privacy concern predicted negative feelings towards 
surveillance, however greater feelings of group-based distinctiveness and 
positivity predicted more positive feelings and greater privacy concern predicted 
less positive feelings.   
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Limitations 
 It is important to note that Studies 2a and 2b both recruited student 
samples. In Study 2a a large proportion of the students were recruited whilst in 
lecture halls before their lecture began. The lecture did not begin until students 
handed their surveys back to the experimenter (either complete or incomplete). 
Additionally, in Study 2b participants received an incentive of course credit in 
exchange for participation. It is quite possible that in both studies students were 
not motivated to engage with the manipulation material, as they wanted to 
proceed with their lecture (Study 2a) or accrue course credit before the summer 
deadline (Study 2b). Additionally, as this was a relatively novel or unfamiliar 
form of surveillance, students may have been unsure of the consequences of 
surveillance or may have believed the surveillance was inconsequential. As 
such, it may not have been evident to students how or if surveillance of varying 
accuracy translated to group-based recognition or privacy infringement. 
Consequently, whilst the manipulation check was successful, the effect of the 
accuracy manipulation was again weak. This could in turn account for the lack 
of effect of the surveillance accuracy manipulation on psychological outcomes.  
On the other hand, the manipulation of surveiller identity may not have 
been affected by student engagement in the same way, as this was 
comparatively clear and concrete information. Surveillance accuracy is arguably 
more nuanced and abstract, and therefore the effect of any manipulation may 
be more vulnerable to (lack of) participant engagement or understanding. This 
is in line with the concreteness effect, whereby concrete information is typically 
processed more efficiently (and is less vulnerable to decay) than abstract 
information (Jessen et al., 2000). Therefore, participants’ potential lack of 
engagement may have weakened the surveillance accuracy manipulation.  
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STUDY 2C 
 As such, Study 2c recruited a non-student demographic, where 
participation was not compensated nor incentivised. Additionally, we changed 
the context of surveillance in Study 2c to government surveillance (American vs 
British). By doing this we hoped that the consequences of surveillance may be 
more familiar and that participants would be more likely to engage with the 
study materials. 
 The role of surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy differed between 
the findings in Study 2a and 2b. In Study 2a we found evidence that surveiller 
identity may moderate the relationship between surveillance accuracy 
perceptions on group-based recognition. However, surveiller identity did not 
moderate the effect of the surveillance accuracy manipulation on group-based 
recognition. Additionally, Study 2b did not find that surveiller identity moderated 
the association between surveillance accuracy (nor accuracy perceptions) on 
group-based recognition. Instead, Study 2b found that surveillance accuracy 
and surveiller identity had independent effects on group-based recognition. As 
such, in Study 2c we tested our predicted model in a non-student sample to test 
between the possible interactive or independent effects of the independent 
variables. Whilst we predicted interactive effects between surveiller identity and 
surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition in Studies 2a and 2b, the 
results from these studies led us to predict direct (and non-interactive) effects 
on group-based recognition in Study 2c.  
We also found a relationship between surveillance accuracy perceptions 
and privacy concern in Study 2b, but not 2a. Study 2c further tested the 
relationship between surveillance accuracy, accuracy perceptions, and privacy 
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concern. Additionally, Study 2b found no association between psychological 
outcomes (group-based recognition and privacy concern) and negative feelings 
towards surveillance. In Study 2c, we further tested whether group-based 
recognition and privacy concern are more strongly associated with positive 
feelings towards surveillance than negative feelings. We also aim to replicate 
the findings from Study 2a and 2b, whereby outgroup surveillance was 
associated with less group-based recognition and more privacy concern through 
a reduction in surveiller trust.  
 To test our predictions, we recruited British participants from the general 
population via snowball sampling online. Similar to the design in Study 1, 
participants were asked to read a news article ostensibly from Wired. The article 
described surveillance conducted by either the NSA (outgroup) or GCHQ 
(ingroup). The accuracy of the surveillance was described as being of low, 
medium, or high accuracy. Participants were then directed to the survey 
containing the dependent measures.  
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited through opportunistic sampling using social 
media platforms accessible to the researchers. A total of 489 submissions were 
recorded, however 245 participants were not included in the analyses as they 
had at least one dependent measure without any response17. This left 244 
participants. A majority of 58% were women (40% men, 2% non-binary or prefer 
not to say) and 76% identified as being White (8% Mixed, 12% Asian, 3% Black, 
 
17 Participants were excluded if they had at least one dependent measure with no response, as complete 
data was required for CFA. Missing data treatment could not be conducted if a measure had zero 
response.  
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1 Arab, 1% Other). Participants had a mean age of 27.74 years (SD = 12.81). A 
sensitivity analysis using g*power indicated that a sample of 244 is sufficient to 
detect an effect size using MANOVA of f = 0.20 (ηp2 = .19) with 80% power for 
the main effects of and interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller 
identity (two predictors; six groups). When using regression (five predictors), the 
current study is sufficient to detect an effect size of f = 0.18 (partial r = .18) with 
80% power for each of the effects of distinctiveness, understanding, positivity, 
privacy concern, and trust.  
 As in studies 2a and 2b, the study had a 3 (accuracy: low, medium, high) 
X 2 (group: ingroup, outgroup) between-participants design and participants 
were assigned randomly to one of the six conditions. Feelings towards 
surveillance was included as the dependent variable, which was divided into 
positive and negative feelings towards surveillance. Mediators included 
perceived group-based recognition (distinctiveness, positivity, and 
understanding), trust, and privacy concern.18 
Measures 
Unless otherwise stated, responses were collected using a 7-point scale 
(1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). Negatively phrased items were 
reverse coded. 
 Identity salience. Participants were asked to write three things that they 
felt made British people different from other nationalities (based on Haslam et 
al., 1999). This was included to ensure participants’ British identity was salient 
at the time of completing the survey.   
 
18 Additional measures were also taken but not included in the analyses. All measures may be found in 
Appendix I. 
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Identification. The 4-item identification scale from Study 2b was 
modified for the context of this study. Items included ‘I identify with other British 
people’ and ‘I am glad to be British’. All items were used for the final 
identification scale (α = .85 M = 5.24; SD = 1.14).  
Manipulation. Participants were then asked to read an article ostensibly 
from Wired (Appendix H). Six versions of the article were created, in which both 
surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity was manipulated. As before, 
surveillance accuracy was manipulated to have three levels: low, medium, and 
high; and accuracy manipulation information was included in all but one 
paragraph within the article. Particular reference to accuracy was on occasion 
highlighted with blue text (this type of formatting for emphasis is also common 
within genuine Wired publications). Examples include, ‘Our analyses suggest 
that the data collected by (GCHQ/NSA) is highly representative of the British 
Population’ (high accuracy), ‘Our analyses suggest that the data collected by 
(GCHQ/NSA) provides a slightly blurred impression of the British Population’ 
(medium accuracy), and ‘Our analyses suggest that the data collected by 
(GCHQ/NSA) is not at all representative of the British population’ (low 
accuracy). To manipulate surveillance surveiller identity, surveillance was 
described as being conducted by either British intelligence (ingroup) or 
American intelligence (outgroup). A picture of GCHQ or the NSA was included 
to reinforce the surveiller identity manipulation.  
Dependent measures. Accuracy manipulation check. Two items 
assessed the effectiveness of the accuracy manipulation (‘The Wired article 
suggests that algorithmic surveillance is…’, ‘After reading the article, in my 
opinion algorithmic surveillance is…). Responses were measured on a 7-point 
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Likert scale (1 = Not at all accurate to 7 = Extremely accurate). The two items 
were averaged to create the final scale (r = .65, M = 3.97; SD = 1.63). 
Perceived group-based recognition. As with Study 2b, the measures 
of group-based recognition included three dimensions (in contrast to Study 2a, 
which included a unidimensional measure of group-based recognition): 
positivity, distinctiveness, and understanding. To test our predicted factor 
structure of group-based recognition a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was 
conducted (Appendix J). A three-factor solution was supported by CFA.  
Positivity. Two items measured how positively people felt British people 
were perceived by others (e.g. ‘The results of algorithmic surveillance by the 
NSA/GCHQ offers a positive image of British people). Both items were 
averaged to create the final scale (r = .19 M = 3.88; SD = 0.85). 
Distinctiveness. Four items measured the extent to which participants felt 
surveillance recognised British people as a distinct nationality. Items included 
‘From using algorithmic surveillance, the NSA/GCHQ recognises that British 
people have distinct characteristics’. All four items were averaged to create the 
final scale (α = .42, M = 4.10; SD = 0.8219). 
Understanding. To measure the extent to which participants felt 
surveillance would allow others to understand ingroup members, four items 
were included such as ‘Algorithmic surveillance helps the NSA/GCHQ 
understand British cultural values’. All four items were used to create the final 
scale (α = .80, M = 3.44; SD = 1.19). 
 
19 Whilst scale reliability was poor, we retained all items to preserve the a priori scale structure.  
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Feelings towards surveillance. Identical to Study 2b, feelings towards 
surveillance was measured with two scales: positive emotion and negative 
emotion. Participants were asked, ‘Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel…’ 
and were then presented with 14 emotion items (seven items per scale).  
 Positive emotion. All seven items, such as ‘happy’ and ‘pleased’ were 
averaged to form the positive emotion scale (α = .93, M = 2.94; SD = 1.09). 
Negative emotion. All seven items, such as ‘angry’ and ‘anxious’ were 
averaged to create the negative emotion scale (α = .90, M = 4.28; SD = 1.11). 
Trust. To measure the extent to which participants trusted the source of 
surveillance, four items were included, such as ‘I trust the NSA/GCHQ to gather 
British people’s online data’. All items were averaged to form the final scale (α = 
.85, M = 3.35; SD = 1.27). 
Privacy concern. Four items measured the extent to which participants 
felt surveillance compromised their privacy. Items included ‘Surveillance online 
is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘people have a right to use the internet without 
being surveilled’. All items were used to create the final scale (α = .76, M = 4.78; 
SD = 1.19). 
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their age, gender, 
and ethnicity. They were also asked how long they spent online, whether they 
belonged to closed/private groups online, and how aware they were of 
surveillance online (1 = Not at all aware to 10 = Very aware). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited on social media platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter. Participants were presented with a brief description of the study 
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before continuing to the consent form. On giving their informed consent, 
participants completed the pre-manipulation measures before being randomly 
allocated to one of the six conditions. They were then asked to read the article 
corresponding to their condition before completing the dependent measures. On 
completion or withdrawal, participants were thanked, fully debriefed, and 
provided with online sources pertaining to internet privacy online should they 
feel concerned.   
Results 
Missing data treatment 
 Analysis of missing data revealed that only 0.2% of values were missing 
across all measures. Missing values were imputed using the expectation-
maximisation (EM) method in SPSS (Graham, 2009) and estimated values fell 
within the scale range.  
Manipulation check 
 A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess 
whether the level of surveillance accuracy reported in the article and the 
surveiller’s identity affected perceived surveillance accuracy. There was a 
significant effect of surveillance accuracy on perceived accuracy of surveillance 
F(2, 238) = 126.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .515 – a notably stronger effect than was 
observed in studies 2a or 2b. Pairwise comparisons revealed that those in the 
high accuracy condition (M = 5.56, SD = 1.18) reported higher accuracy 
perceptions than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 3.28, SD = 1.06; 
p < .001). Those in the medium accuracy condition reported marginally 
significantly greater accuracy perceptions than those in the low accuracy 
condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.18; p = .084). Consequently, the manipulation was 
considered successful. No main effect was found of surveiller identity F(1, 238) 
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= 0.02, p = .880, ηp2 < .001, nor an interaction, F(2, 238) = 0.42, p = .660, ηp2= 
.003. Correlations between all dependent measures may be found in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Correlations between measures 
Variable 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Accuracy 
perceptions 
-       
2. Negative feelings -.04 -      
3. Positive feelings .12 -.51*** -     
4. Trust .21** -.40*** .55*** -    
5. Privacy concern .03 .45*** -.39*** -.45*** -   
6. Distinctiveness .36*** .05 .06 .14* .11 -  
7. Understanding .48*** -.18** .27*** .39*** -.07 .27 - 
8. Positivity .16* -.27*** .29*** .29*** -.25*** .11 .25*** 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Main analyses 
Feelings towards surveillance. A multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted with surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity as 
fixed factors. Positive emotion and negative emotion were entered as 
dependent variables.  The multivariate main effect of surveiller identity 
approached significance, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F = 2.90, p = .057, ηp2 = .024. A 
significant multivariate main effect was found of surveillance accuracy, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .94, F = 3.47, p = .008, ηp2 = .028. There was no evidence of a 
multivariate interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 0.92, p = .453, ηp2 = .008. 
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Positive feelings. A significant main effect of surveiller identity was 
found on positive feelings towards surveillance, F(1, 238) = 4.01, p = .046, ηp2 = 
.017: those in the ingroup condition (M = 3.09, SD = 1.11) had more positive 
feelings towards surveillance than the outgroup condition (M = 2.81, SD = 1.07). 
The main effect of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 238) = 0.58, p = .561, ηp2= .005, 
and the interaction were both non-significant, F(2, 238) = 1.46, p = .235, ηp2= 
.012. 
Negative feelings. No main effect was found for surveiller identity on 
negative feelings towards surveillance, F(1, 238) = 0.01, p = .931, ηp2 < .001, 
but the main effect of surveillance accuracy was significant, F(2, 238) = 3.13, p 
= .045, ηp2= .026. Pairwise comparisons revealed that those in the low accuracy 
condition (M = 4.41, SD = 0.97) had significantly more negative feelings towards 
surveillance than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.23, 
p = .023). Additionally, those in the medium accuracy condition had significantly 
less negative feelings compared to those in the high accuracy condition (M = 
4.40, SD = 1.09, p = .032). There was no difference in negative feelings 
between those in the low and high accuracy conditions (p = .946). The 
interaction was not significant, F(2, 238) = 0.46, p = .635, ηp2 < .004. 
Positive psychological outcomes: Group-based recognition. A 
second MANOVA was conducted with surveillance accuracy and surveiller 
identity as fixed factors. Distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding were 
entered as dependent variables. The multivariate main effect of surveiller 
identity was not significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 1.16, p = .326, ηp2 = .015. 
A significant multivariate main effect was found for surveillance accuracy, Wilks’ 
Lambda = .82, F = 8.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .093. There was no indication of a 
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multivariate interaction between surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity, 
Wilks’ Lambda = .99, F = 0.47, p = .831, ηp2 = .006.  
Distinctiveness. The main effect of surveiller identity was not significant, 
F(1, 238) = 0.38, p = .540, ηp2 = .002, but the main effect of accuracy was 
significant F(2, 238) = 8.75, p < .001, ηp2= .068. Pairwise comparisons revealed 
that those in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.95, SD = 0.86) did not 
significantly differ in distinctiveness compared to those in the medium accuracy 
condition (M = 3.94, SD = 0.72, p = .936).  However, those in the medium 
accuracy condition reported significantly less perceived distinctiveness than 
those in the high accuracy condition (M = 4.39, SD = 0.79, p < .001). 
Additionally, those in the high accuracy condition reported significantly more 
perceived distinctiveness than those in the low accuracy condition (p < .001). 
The interaction was not significant, F(2, 238) = 0.44, p = .645, ηp2= .004. 
 Understanding. The main effect of surveiller identity was not significant, 
F(1, 238) = 2.37, p = .125, ηp2 = .010, but the main effect of accuracy was 
significant, F(2, 238) = 17.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .129. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that those in the low accuracy condition (M = 2.91, SD = 1.08) 
reported significantly less felt understanding than those in the medium accuracy 
condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.00, p = .003). Additionally, those in the medium 
accuracy condition reported significantly less felt understanding than those in 
the high accuracy condition (M = 3.93, SD = 1.19, p = .006). Finally, those in the 
high accuracy condition reported significantly more felt understanding than 
those in the low accuracy condition (p < .001). The interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 238) = 0.67, p = .515, ηp2 = .006. 
 Positivity.  No main effect was found for surveiller identity on positivity, 
F(1, 238) = 0.02, p = .882, ηp2 < .001, but the main effect of surveillance 
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accuracy was significant, F(2, 238) = 4.39, p = .013, ηp2 = .036. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that those in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.65, SD = 
0.97) reported significantly less perceived positivity than those in the medium 
accuracy condition (M = 4.01, SD = 0.77, p = .008). Those in the medium 
accuracy condition did not differ in perceived positivity compared to those in the 
high accuracy condition (M = 3.97, SD = 0.76, p = .793). Those in the high 
accuracy condition reported significantly more perceived positivity than those in 
the low accuracy condition (p = .015). No significant interaction was found, F(2, 
238) = 0.41, p = .667, ηp2 = .003. 
Privacy concern and trust. A third MANOVA was conducted with 
surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy as fixed factors and privacy 
concern and trust as dependent variables. The multivariate main effect of 
surveiller identity was significant, Wilks’ Lambda = .83, F = 24.15, p < .001, ηp2 
= .169. A significant multivariate main effect was also found for surveillance 
accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = .94, F = 3.54, p = .007, ηp2 = .029. There was no 
indication of a multivariate interaction between surveillance accuracy and 
surveiller identity, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F = 1.52, p = .196, ηp2 = .013.  
Privacy concern. No main effect was found of surveiller identity, F(1, 
238) = 0.65, p = .420, ηp2 = .003, nor of accuracy, F(2, 238) = 1.46, p = .234, ηp2 
= .012, and no interaction was found, F(2, 238) = 0.04, p = .958, ηp2 < .001. 
Trust. A main effect was found of surveiller identity, F(1, 238) = 41.22, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .148. Pairwise comparisons revealed that those in the ingroup 
condition (M = 3.85, SD = 1.28) reported significantly more trust than those in 
the outgroup condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.09). The main effect of accuracy was 
marginally significant F(2, 238) = 2.85, p = .060, ηp2 = .023. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that those in the low accuracy condition (M = 3.23, SD = 
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1.15) did not differ in trust compared to those in the medium accuracy condition 
(M = 3.22, SD = 1.17, p = .893). Those in the medium accuracy condition had 
significantly less trust than those in the high accuracy condition (M = 3.57, SD = 
1.44, p = .036), and those in the high had significantly more trust for the 
surveiller than those in the low (p = .047). No interaction between surveiller 
identity and accuracy was found, F(2, 238) = 2.01, p = .130, ηp2 = .017. 
The role of trust: Does surveiller identity predict recognition and 
privacy concern through trust? We also tested the indirect effect of surveiller 
social identity on recognition and privacy concerns via trust in a mediation 
analysis using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) for each 
outcome.  
Distinctiveness. Figure 11 illustrates that participants felt more trust 
when surveillance was conducted by the ingroup, compared to when it was 
conducted by the outgroup, p < .001, SE = .15, 95% CI [-1.26, -0.67]. In turn, 
greater feelings of trust predicted more perceived distinctiveness, p = .008, SE 
= .04, 95% CI [0.03, 0.20]. The indirect effect was also significant, b = -.11, SE 
= .04, 95% CI [-0.22, -0.03]. The direct effect of surveiller identity on 
distinctiveness was not significant, b = .18, p = .115, SE = .11, 95% CI [-0.04, 
0.40]. 
Understanding. Greater feelings of trust predicted more felt 
understanding, p < .001, SE = .06, 95% CI [0.27, 0.50] and the indirect 
relationship was significant, b = -.37, SE = .08, 95% CI [-0.54, -0.22]. No 
evidence was found for a direct relationship between surveiller identity and 
distinctiveness b = .15, p = .339, SE = .15, 95% CI [-0.15, 0.45]. 
Positivity. Greater feelings of trust predicted more perceived positivity, p 
< .001, SE = .04, 95% CI [0.14, 0.31], and a significant indirect relationship was 
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found, b = -.22, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.34, -0.12]. A significant direct relationship 
was found between surveiller identity and positivity, whereby outgroup 
surveillance predicted more perceived positivity than the ingroup, b = .22, p = 
.049, SE = .11, 95% CI [0.00, 0.45]. 
Privacy concern. More trust predicted less privacy concerns, p < .001, 
SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.59, -0.36]. The indirect effect was also significant, b = .46, 
SE = .09, 95% CI [0.29, 0.63]. A significant direct relationship was found 
between surveiller identity and privacy concern, whereby outgroup surveillance 
predicted less privacy concern, b = -.33, p = .026, SE = .15, 95% CI [-0.62, -
0.04].  
 
 
Figure 11. PROCESS path diagram for predicted model. Unstandardised 
regression coefficients and significance values are presented adjacent to each 
line that represents the relationship between variables. 
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Psychological outcomes on feelings towards surveillance. Two 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether privacy 
concerns, trust, and group-based recognition (positivity, distinctiveness, 
understanding) predicted feelings towards surveillance (positive and negative). 
Positive feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
significant and explained 33% of the variance (R2 adj = .33, F(5, 238) = 25.13, p 
< .001). Results are presented in Table 9.  
Of the recognition measures, only positivity uniquely (but marginally) 
predicted positive feelings towards surveillance, as greater perceptions of 
positivity predicted more positive feelings towards surveillance. Privacy 
concerns negatively predicted positive feelings towards surveillance, in that 
more concerns predicted less positive feelings. Trust also predicted positive 
feelings towards surveillance, as more trust predicted more positive feelings 
towards surveillance.   
 
Table 9. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and positive feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
-.16 -.17 -2.82  .005 
Distinctiveness -.01 -.01 -.15 .879 
Understanding .07 .07 1.20 .231 
Positivity .14 .11 1.96 .051 
Trust .36 .41 6.35 <.001 
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Negative feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
significant and explained 26% of the variance (R2 adj = .26, F(5, 238) = 17.87, p 
< .001). Results are presented in Table 10.  
Results mirrored those of positive emotion. Positivity was the only 
recognition dimension to uniquely predict negative feelings towards 
surveillance, as greater perceptions of positivity predicted less negative feelings 
towards surveillance. Privacy concerns positively predicted negative feelings 
towards surveillance, in that more concerns more negative feelings. Trust also 
predicted feelings towards surveillance; more trust predicted less negative 
feelings towards surveillance.   
 
Table 10. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and negative feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
.92 .31 4.87  <.001 
Distinctiveness .10 .08 1.30 .196 
Understanding -.07 -.07 -1.13 .259 
Positivity -.16 -.12 -2.07 .039 
Trust -.18 -.21 -3.00 .003 
 
Discussion 
In this study we aimed to improve participant engagement by recruiting a 
non-Psychology student sample in a more broadly-applicable context (national 
security surveillance). In turn, we hoped that the surveillance accuracy 
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manipulation would be stronger and have a greater effect on group-based 
recognition and privacy concerns. We also used government (rather than 
university) surveillance as the context for the study, as this context may be 
more consequential and generalisable to wider society.  
A positive pathway: Surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity affects 
feelings towards surveillance through recognition 
 More accurate surveillance is associated with more group-based 
recognition. Study 2c is the first of this chapter to clearly establish an effect of 
surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition. Whilst Studies 1, 2a and 2b 
demonstrated a relationship between surveillance accuracy perceptions and 
recognition, the current study demonstrates that surveillance accuracy can 
directly increase positive psychological outcomes in the form of group-based 
recognition. One implication of this is that for an association to be found 
between surveillance accuracy and recognition, identity concerns must be made 
salient (in this case through an intergroup context) and participants must be 
appropriately engaged with the study materials for the nuance of a surveillance 
accuracy manipulation to have a sufficient effect.  
Additionally, Study 2c finds greater support for the independent (rather 
than interactive) effects of surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy on 
group-based recognition: surveillance of greater accuracy led to greater feelings 
of distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding; and ingroup (vs. outgroup) 
surveillance led to more group-based recognition (through trust).  
 The current study also clearly further underlines the role of trust in 
intergroup surveillance contexts. We have replicated the mediating effect of 
trust between surveiller identity and group-based recognition. Participants 
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reported greater trust when the surveiller was described as ingroup (GCHQ) 
compared to when the surveiller was identified as outgroup (the NSA). In turn, 
greater trust was associated with more perceived group-based recognition, in 
the form of distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding.  
 Being perceived more positively predicts more positive and less 
negative feelings towards surveillance. The more individuals felt their group 
was perceived positively as a result of surveillance, the more positively and less 
negatively they felt towards surveillance. Positivity was the only recognition 
dimension to uniquely predict feelings towards surveillance. Distinctiveness and 
understanding were not significantly associated with feelings towards 
surveillance in the regression model, however understanding correlated with 
both positive and negative feelings. 
A negative pathway: Surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity affects 
feelings towards surveillance through privacy concern 
 Surveiller identity (but not surveillance accuracy) affects privacy 
concern. Mirroring the findings from Studies 2a and 2b, surveillance accuracy 
was not associated with privacy concern and no interaction was found between 
surveillance accuracy and group on privacy concern. However, as 
demonstrated in Studies 2a and 2b, there was evidence that trust mediated the 
relationship between surveiller identity and privacy concern. Ingroup 
surveillance was associated with more trust, which in turn predicted less privacy 
concern. This supports previous work by O’Donnell et al. (2010a), who found 
that surveillance from an ingroup elicited less privacy concern than surveillance 
from a superordinate group. In their work, the appraisal of surveillance as being 
for the purpose of safety mediated this effect. As the current study used the 
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context of government surveillance, it could be argued that ingroup surveillance 
was associated with more trust because it is assumed to be for the benefit of 
the group (safety), whereas individuals may interpret outgroup surveillance as 
an effort to control the ingroup (O’Donnell et al., 2010a). In addition to 
surveillance appraisal, the current study suggests that the association between 
surveiller identity and privacy concern may also be explained by trust in the 
surveiller.  
 The relationship between privacy concern and feelings towards 
surveillance. Privacy concerns in turn predicted less positive and more 
negative feelings towards surveillance. This differs slightly from Study 2b, which 
found an association between privacy concerns and positive feelings towards 
surveillance, but not negative.  
Summary 
Of the three studies in this chapter, the current study is the first to 
demonstrate the predicted causal effect of surveillance accuracy on group-
based recognition. We found that greater surveillance accuracy led to a greater 
perception of group-based recognition. However, group-based recognition 
dimensions did not have unique predictive effects on feelings towards 
surveillance, contrary to our expectations. Additionally, we did not find the 
expected effect of surveillance accuracy on privacy concern. Nevertheless, 
privacy concern did predict feelings towards surveillance in the expected way: 
greater privacy concerns were associated with less positive and more negative 
feelings towards surveillance.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The studies in this chapter aimed to replicate the findings from Study 1, 
whilst addressing some key limitations. Specifically, Study 1 provided evidence 
for the expected negative pathway, whereby more accurate surveillance was 
associated with more negative feelings towards surveillance through increased 
privacy concern – although the expected linear trend was only found for higher 
internet users between medium and high levels of accuracy. However, Study 1 
did not provide evidence for the predicted countervailing positive pathway, 
whereby more accurate surveillance is associated with more positive feelings 
towards surveillance through increased recognition.  
Importantly, Study 1 also did not test our predicted model in the context 
of social identity. We argued that the lack of association between surveillance 
accuracy and recognition in Study 1 may have been due to the fact that no 
specific social identity was made salient to participants and recognition referred 
to individual-based rather than group-based recognition. In each of Studies 2a-
2c, we therefore made a social identity salient using an intergroup context, 
meaning that each study tested the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-
based recognition when social identity concerns were salient. We predicted that 
surveillance accuracy would affect group-based recognition, particularly when 
the surveiller belonged to a relevant outgroup. Outgroup members are assumed 
to endorse negative meta-stereotypes (Finkelstein at al., 2013; Sigelman & 
Tuch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998), and are thus unlikely to be perceived as 
providing group-based recognition. Surveillance of greater accuracy may 
provide a vehicle for recognition when the surveiller is an outgroup, as baseline 
group-based recognition may be low. In contrast, group-based recognition is 
assumed from an ingroup surveiller, as recognition is implied through shared 
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group membership (individuals are less likely to believe ingroup members 
endorse negative stereotypes and/or attitudes towards the ingroup; Finkelstein 
at al., 2013; Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998). In turn, greater 
group-based recognition was assumed to predict more positive feelings towards 
surveillance.  
The positive pathway: More accurate surveillance is associated with more 
positive feelings towards surveillance through group-based recognition 
Surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on group-based 
recognition. Surveillance accuracy. A key aim of these studies was to make 
social identity concerns salient, and therefore strengthen the potential 
association between surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition. 
Indeed, the accuracy manipulation affected (Study 2c) and accuracy 
perceptions predicted (Study 2b) all three group-based recognition dimensions: 
the more accurate surveillance was described or perceived to be, the more 
distinct, positive, and understood participants felt their ingroup was. This 
suggests that irrespective of the surveiller’s identity, when surveillance is 
accurate it has the potential to increase group-based recognition.  
Previous research has suggested that personal/individual recognition 
may be achieved from accurate social-veillance (i.e. surveillance from other 
internet users). For example, individuals report feelings of personal recognition 
when they are accurately perceived by their online blog readership (de Laat, 
2008) and friends on social media platforms (Steeves & Bailey, 2016). The 
three studies presented in this chapter extend this research in several ways. 
Firstly, we demonstrate that group-based recognition is possible when one is 
perceived accurately by a relatively abstract (group) source, rather than 
identifiable internet users. This suggests that individuals only need to be believe 
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that their data will be assessed accurately by someone/something at some point 
in time for the potential to achieve group-based recognition. Therefore, as long 
as surveillance is accurate, direct contact may not be necessary to receive 
group-based recognition benefits.  
Secondly, by manipulating surveillance accuracy directly we highlight 
that having our personal data visible per se is not necessarily enough to foster 
group-based recognition. To achieve recognition, an individual must believe that 
their data are being processed accurately and that assumptions based on that 
data are also accurate. Indeed, previous literature has highlighted that 
metastereotypes must be made salient for group-based recognition needs to 
arise. Van Leeuwen and Täuber (2012) found that participants were more likely 
to engage in identity management strategies (helping the outgroup) if negative 
metastereotypes were made salient, compared to a positive metastereotype or 
no metastereotype. This highlights the importance of feedback; being privy to 
the assumptions made about our data and online behaviour may be necessary 
to increase group-based recognition. Thus, whilst the presence of surveillance 
(or an audience more generally) can raise identity-related concerns (Barreto et 
al., 2003), this chapter illustrates that a degree of feedback (in this case 
surveillance accuracy) is required for social identity concerns to be assuaged 
(or further magnified). Additionally, whilst the majority of research cited above 
relates to personal recognition, we demonstrate that individuals may achieve 
group-based recognition through accurate surveillance.  
Surveiller identity: Ingroup surveillance is associated with more 
group-based recognition via trust. An indirect effect of surveiller identity on 
group-based recognition through trust was consistently found across the three 
studies.  An ingroup surveiller was trusted to a greater extent than an outgroup 
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surveiller, which in turn predicted greater perceptions of group-based 
recognition.  
As discussed, previous literature suggests that individuals typically 
assume outgroup members hold negative beliefs about the ingroup (Finkelstein 
at al., 2013; Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; Vorauer et al., 1998). Our results support 
prior research, as participants were more likely to experience group-based 
misrecognition from an outgroup surveiller compared to an ingroup surveiller. 
Ingroup surveillance on the other hand was associated with more group-based 
recognition, as recognition may be implied through shared group membership. 
Our findings also build upon previous research by illustrating that individuals 
may assume negative or inaccurate metastereotypes because the outgroup is 
afforded less trust than an ingroup audience. Consequently, as an ingroup 
surveiller is afforded more trust, they may be assumed to manage and interpret 
personal data in a way that recognises the group’s identity. 
It could be argued that distrust and assumed misrecognition from an 
outgroup surveiller is due to the expectation that the outgroup may mishandle or 
manipulate ingroup data. When under outgroup surveillance personal data 
could be used to embolden pre-existing negative stereotypes. For example, 
Brighenti (2007) argues that visibility has two opposing outcomes: recognition or 
control. She suggests that visibility is sometimes necessary for recognition to 
occur; for example, those living in poverty and the homeless typically do not 
have access to public platforms whereby they can challenge misconceptions 
about their group or curate their own identity. As such, a lack of visibility denies 
these groups recognition. In other contexts, visibility can be used as a method 
of control and to further stigmatise a group. In this case, the representation of a 
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group can be warped through visibility. Brighenti gives the example of the 
media’s representation of migrants as criminals.  
Others have highlighted how the supra-visibility of women contributes to 
their sexualisation and commodification (Dubrofsky & Wood, 2014; Mason & 
Magnet, 2012; Skeggs, 1999). Our findings also demonstrate that being visible 
through surveillance can undermine group-based recognition when the 
surveiller is distrusted. However, our findings also illustrated that misrecognition 
is not an inevitable consequence of outgroup surveillance: when participants 
believe that surveillance and data processing is accurate, they experience an 
increase in group-based recognition. As such, outgroup surveillance can foster 
group-based recognition when it is accurate, despite the outgroup typically 
being afforded less trust.  
Does surveiller identity moderate the effect of surveillance accuracy 
on group-based recognition? Initially we predicted an interaction between 
surveiller identity and surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition. We 
anticipated that ingroup surveillance of varying accuracy would be unlikely to 
improve group-based recognition, as recognition needs are already met through 
shared group membership. On the other hand, we predicted that greater 
surveillance accuracy would be associated with more group-based recognition 
when the surveiller was an outgroup. Overall, our findings provide greater 
support for the independent rather than interactive effects of surveillance 
accuracy and surveiller identity. A moderation effect was only found in Study 2a 
with accuracy perceptions. In Study 2a we found that greater accuracy 
perceptions were associated with more group-based recognition for outgroup 
surveillance but not ingroup surveillance. However, we did not replicate this 
interaction in Study 2b nor Study 2c.   
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Group-based recognition and feelings towards surveillance. Results 
from Studies 2b and 2c were inconsistent regarding the association between 
group-based recognition and feelings towards surveillance. In Study 2b, two of 
the three recognition dimensions (distinctiveness and positivity) predicted 
positive feelings towards surveillance (distinctiveness was marginally 
significant). None of the recognition dimensions predicted negative feelings 
towards surveillance when adjusting for one another and for privacy concern 
and trust. In Study 2c, only positivity predicted positive and negative feelings 
towards surveillance. Therefore, the relationship between positivity and positive 
feelings towards surveillance was the only consistent finding across the two 
studies.  
One implication of this pattern is that there is a potential ambivalence 
towards surveillance; positive outcomes of surveillance (e.g., the belief that an 
ingroup is recognised by surveillance) may increase positive feelings towards 
surveillance yet not necessarily diminish negative feelings. This echoes Ball 
(2009), who suggested that individuals may feel a gratification from recognition 
and exhibitionism online, yet still feel uncomfortable about the scrutiny. 
However, the suggestion of ambivalence here is tentative, as only two of the 
three studies included feelings towards surveillance as a DV and results differed 
between these two studies. As such, results from the other chapters within this 
thesis must be considered before an assumption of ambivalence is made.  
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The negative pathway: More accurate surveillance is associated with more 
negative feelings towards surveillance through privacy concern 
 Surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on privacy concern. 
Surveillance accuracy. Overall, our results provide weak support for a main 
effect of surveillance accuracy on privacy concern. The studies in this chapter 
mostly replicated the findings from Study 1, as surveillance accuracy 
perceptions (but not the accuracy manipulation) were associated with privacy 
concern in two of the three studies. However, we have argued above that the 
weak effect of the surveillance accuracy manipulation in Studies 2a and 2b 
could be attributed to our student samples. As discussed earlier in the chapter, 
a lack of participant engagement may have reduced the effect of the 
surveillance accuracy manipulation. To rectify this, in Study 2c we recruited 
those from the general public and included a more familiar form of surveillance 
(government intelligence: NSA/GCHQ). Indeed, we found a strong effect of 
surveillance accuracy in Study 2c. Nevertheless, in Study 2c we still found no 
effect of the surveillance accuracy manipulation nor surveillance accuracy 
perceptions on privacy concern. The evidence from the three studies in this 
chapter does not suggest that surveillance accuracy is associated with privacy 
concern over and above the mere presence of surveillance. Instead, we found 
that surveiller identity (discussed below) was a stronger driver of privacy 
concern.  
Surveiller identity: Ingroup surveillance is associated with less 
privacy concern via trust. We predicted several possible outcomes regarding 
the effects of surveiller identity on privacy concern. O’Donnell and colleagues 
have found that ingroup surveillance may be perceived favourably (O’Donnell et 
al., 2010a) or unfavourably (O’Donnell et al., 2010b) in comparison to outgroup 
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surveillance. O’Donnell et al. (2010a) argues that surveillance from an ingroup 
may elicit fewer privacy concerns when it is thought to increase ingroup safety 
and is therefore considered necessary. Alternatively, surveillance from the 
ingroup in contexts where it is not considered necessary (e.g., in the workplace) 
may be perceived negatively (O’Donnell et al., 2012). In light of this, we 
predicted that surveillance by an ingroup (vs. an outgroup) may be associated 
with either greater privacy concern, or fewer privacy concerns.   
Our findings support the latter with an important caveat: surveillance by 
an ingroup predicted less privacy concern through an increase in trust in all 
three studies. This is consistent with O’Donnell et al.’s (2010a) findings that 
surveillance from a sub-group was associated with less privacy concern than 
surveillance from a superordinate group. However, in O’Donnell and colleagues’ 
study this relationship was explained by surveillance being perceived as safety 
promoting when conducted by the sub-group (compared to the superordinate 
group). Indeed, there are numerous studies that demonstrate that the public 
associate government surveillance with safety, and that safety-promoting 
surveillance is associated with less concern (Greenwald, 2013; Geiger, 2018).20 
However, O’Donnell et al. (2010a) did not measure surveiller trust in their study, 
therefore it is unclear whether trust may have played an important role.  
Other studies have found that surveiller trust is an integral predictor of 
concern and attitudes towards surveillance, even when surveillance is safety 
promoting. Davis and Silver (2004) found that individuals were only willing to 
exchange their civil liberties for greater security from government surveillance 
when the government was trusted. Thus, our findings build upon O’Donnell et 
 
20 However, after the Snowdon leaks in 2013, individuals’ felt surveillance went beyond safety and began 
to encroach on civil liberties, therefore government surveillance was seen as less safety promoting than 
before the Snowdon leaks (Greenwald, 2013; Geiger, 2018).  
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al.’s (2010a) results and support Davis and Silver’s (2004) study, whereby an 
organisation (ingroup or outgroup) is not necessarily more likely to elicit privacy 
concerns per se (irrespective of whether surveillance promotes safety), and the 
degree to which we trust the group by virtue of whether it is ‘us’ (ingroup) or 
‘them’ (outgroup) is a critical step in predicting the amount of privacy concern 
experienced.  
Does surveiller identity moderate the effect of surveillance accuracy 
on privacy concern? We also postulated the possibility that surveiller identity 
and surveillance accuracy may interact. Surveillance from an outgroup is 
typically expected (Simon & Oakes, 2006) and therefore participants’ privacy 
concern may be more sensitive to variations in surveillance accuracy when 
conducted by an outgroup. Additionally, inaccurate surveillance from an 
outgroup may be associated with more privacy concern, as the motives of the 
surveiller are assumed to be less positive (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). 
Surveillance accuracy may not be associated with privacy concern when 
conducted by the ingroup, as those surveilled may believe data will be used 
within the group’s best interest, irrespective of its accuracy. Alternatively, 
surveillance from the ingroup may be considered unexpected or unnecessary 
(O’Donnell et al., 2012) and therefore the mere presence of surveillance may 
overwhelm the nuance of surveillance accuracy.  
Our findings provided no indication of interactive effects between 
surveillance accuracy and surveiller identity on privacy concern. Instead, 
surveiller identity’s indirect effect through trust was the most consistent predictor 
of privacy concerns across the three studies in this chapter.  
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Privacy concerns predict feelings towards surveillance. We 
expected that greater privacy concerns would in turn predict more negative and 
less positive feelings towards surveillance. Studies 2b and 2c tested the 
relationship between privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance. Both 
studies found that privacy concerns did indeed predict feelings towards 
surveillance. Study 2b found that greater privacy concerns were associated with 
less positive (but not more negative) feelings towards surveillance, and Study 
2c found that more privacy concern predicted less positive and more negative 
feelings towards surveillance. This supports previous literature from Pavone 
and Esposti (2010), who found that those voicing privacy concerns about 
government surveillance were more likely to feel negatively towards it.  
Findings from Study 2b also illustrate the benefit of measuring positive 
and negative feelings independently, as privacy concern predicted positive and 
negative feelings in different ways. Whilst these results were not replicated in 
Study 2c, it suggests that future research should take a similar methodological 
approach, as this may help highlight contexts in which people feel apathy or 
ambivalence towards surveillance.  
The findings from this Chapter also contribute to the privacy paradox 
literature. Study 2a found that higher privacy concerns were associated with a 
greater intention to modify online behaviour. Whilst this was a measure of 
behavioural intentions rather than a direct behaviour measure, it demonstrates 
that despite research demonstrating no association between privacy concern 
and privacy-related behaviour, individuals may still have a desire to change 
their behaviour online. Indeed, some have argued that internet users may not 
change their online behaviour despite concerns for privacy because they do not 
know how to (Tene & Polonetsky, 2014) or they may feel social pressure to 
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continue online engagement (Welinder, 2012). Whilst we did not measure 
behavioural outcomes, our findings support previous research, whereby internet 
users may typically feel concerned for their privacy and have a desire to protect 
it in online spaces.   
In sum, the studies in this chapter provide some support for the negative 
pathway proposed in Chapters 1 and 2. We found evidence that increased 
privacy concerns predict less positive (and perhaps more negative) feelings 
towards surveillance. However, we did not find consistent evidence that 
surveillance accuracy leads to privacy concerns. We did, nevertheless find that 
the source of surveillance is important in explaining privacy concerns for online 
users: individuals are more likely to feel greater privacy concern when the 
surveiller is an outgroup, as the outgroup is trusted less compared to an ingroup 
surveiller. 
Limitations and future research 
In all three studies we used contexts in which surveillance could have 
been appraised as promoting the welfare of the ingroup: participants may have 
construed university and government surveillance as safety-promoting. As such, 
future research should endeavour to test our predicted model in a variety of 
intergroup surveillance contexts in which ingroup surveillance may be less 
trusted or the outgroup is more trustworthy. For example, surveillance 
conducted in the workplace may be perceived as within the employers’ best 
interest, rather than the employees (Ball, 2010). As such, (ostensible) ingroup 
surveillance in this case may be associated with less group-based recognition 
and more privacy concern, as the surveiller’s motive is distrusted.  
137 
 
Additionally, ingroup members who have low identification with the group 
may experience similar amounts of group-based recognition and privacy 
concern from ingroup surveillance and outgroup surveillance. Those who do not 
identify strongly with their ingroup have been shown to trust fellow ingroup 
members less than those that identify more strongly (Han & Harms, 2010). As 
trust mediated the relationship between surveiller identity and group-based 
recognition and privacy concern, low identifiers may experience less group-
based recognition benefits and more privacy concern when under ingroup 
surveillance than those identifying more strongly. These inter/intragroup 
contexts could be incorporated in future research that tests our proposed 
model.  
 Secondly, we did not find the expected interaction between surveiller 
identity and surveillance accuracy. One possibility is that we did not find this 
interaction as we did not make meta-perceptions salient in the three studies 
presented here. Van Leeuwen and Täuber (2012) found that negative group 
stereotypes must be made salient for impression management strategies to 
occur. Therefore, a key aim of the final study in this thesis (reported in Chapter 
5) was to directly manipulate misrecognition, by exposing participants to either 
positive or negative stereotypes about their group. We expect that when 
misrecognition is made salient, individuals will be more likely to receive 
recognition benefits from accurate surveillance, however surveillance accuracy 
will have no effect on recognition when individuals feel recognised, as their 
identity needs are already met.  
Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to test both the positive and negative 
pathway in the predicted model. Specifically, we aimed to strengthen the effect 
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of surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition by making identity 
concerns salient. We also predicted that this effect would be moderated by the 
identity of the surveiller. Evidence was found to support the positive pathway, 
whereby greater surveillance accuracy was associated with more group-based 
recognition, which in turn predicted more positive feelings towards 
surveillance.21 A second positive pathway was found, whereby ingroup 
surveillance was associated with more trust in the surveiller, and in turn more 
group-based recognition.  
Results partially supported the predicted negative pathway. In all three 
studies, surveillance accuracy was not associated with privacy concern. 
However, as expected, privacy concern predicted less positive and (in Study 2c) 
more negative feelings towards surveillance and stronger behaviour change 
intentions online (Study 2a). Additionally, a second negative pathway was found 
via an indirect effect of surveiller identity: outgroup surveillance was trusted 
less, which in turn predicted greater privacy concern.  
In the studies in the next chapter, we built upon these findings by testing 
the predicted model within different identity-relevant contexts. Whilst the studies 
in this chapter aimed to raise identity concerns through making an intergroup 
context salient, the studies in Chapter 4 sought to raise identity concerns by 
recruiting people from chronically-misrecognised groups: those identifying as 
gay (Study 3a) and those identifying as vegan (Study 3b). This enabled us to 
test our predictions within contexts of group-based stigma (unlike those 
examined in this chapter).  
 
21 Although it is important to note that positivity was the only group-based recognition dimension to 
consistently predict feelings towards surveillance.  
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We also hoped in the following studies to replicate the positive pathway 
results found in Study 2c, which was the only study thus far to find an effect of 
the surveillance accuracy manipulation on group-based recognition. 22 
Additionally, we aimed to further elucidate the relationship between group 
based recognition and feelings towards surveillance, as only positivity 
consistently predicted feelings towards surveillance in Studies 2b and 2c. We 
also addressed some of the methodological flaws in the studies in this chapter. 
As such, Chapter 4 did not exclusively recruit students and included those from 
more diverse demographic backgrounds. Furthermore, our sample sizes in 
Studies 2a and 2b were restricted to the number of students enrolled in the 
Psychology undergraduate programme at the time of data collection. Therefore, 
by recruiting those from the general population we were able to achieve larger 
sample sizes in both studies included in Chapter 4.  
 
22 Studies 2a and 2b found a relationship between surveillance accuracy perceptions and group-based 
recognition.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The studies reported in Chapter 3 tested the role of group identity-related 
concerns in reactions to algorithmic surveillance by manipulating the identity of 
the surveiller and surveillance accuracy. Chapter 4 takes a different approach; 
here, we aim to heighten recognition needs by making a stigmatised identity 
salient. In two studies, we test whether (accurate) algorithmic surveillance 
provides a vehicle for perceived group-based recognition for those belonging to 
stigmatised/chronically misrecognised groups, and whether recognition in turn 
predicts more positive and less negative feelings about surveillance. In keeping 
with the previous chapters, we also investigated the negative pathway, whereby 
more accurate surveillance is also expected to raise privacy concerns, which in 
turn encourages more negative and less positive feelings towards surveillance.  
 Stigma may be defined as ‘an identity-discrediting mark’ (Meisenbach, 
2010, p. 268), whereby an individual or group is ‘disqualified from full social 
acceptance’ (Goffman, 1963; p. 9). Stigma is not necessarily a static trait. One’s 
context or environment typically delineates the boundaries of stigma; a group 
may be considered (unfavourably) different in one context, but not another 
(Coleman, 1986). As stigma is often imposed on one group from another it has 
also been described as a communicative process intended to highlight 
intergroup difference, justify discrimination, and maximise group distinctiveness 
(Burke, 1969; Coleman, 1986; Falk, 2001).  
 Belonging to a stigmatised group is associated with negative outcomes. 
Mental health is often worse for those belonging to stigmatised groups; for 
example, women who experience greater sexism report more depression and 
anxiety symptoms than women who experience less sexism (Klonoff, Landrine, 
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& Campbell, 2000). Additionally, greater feelings of stigma are associated with 
lower levels of subjective wellbeing (Hutton, Misajon, & Collins, 2012), poorer 
social health (Doyle & Molix, 2016), and can reduce the quality of romantic 
relationships (Doyle & Molix, 2014). Stigmatised group members also show 
reduced performance (in identity relevant domains) compared to majority 
groups, which may in turn reduce the likelihood that stigmatised groups have 
equal opportunities for resources and career success (see Steele, Spencer, & 
Aronson, 2002 for a review). Therefore, belonging to a stigmatised group 
carries the risk of poorer life outcomes compared to those belonging to majority 
groups.  
 To avoid these negative outcomes, members of stigmatised groups often 
develop strategies to protect their sense of self and to enhance recognition. 
Indeed, people generally strive for ‘individual agency in the process of identity 
construction’ (Harding, 2003; p. 574), yet this is especially true for those with 
stigma, as the ability to curate one’s own identity is difficult or denied altogether 
(Snow & Anderson, 1987). Past research has described a range of identity-
protective strategies that those with stigma employ to reclaim agency over their 
identity (e.g., Chrobot-Mason, Button, DiClementi, 2001; Miller & Kaiser, 2001). 
Strategies include disengagement (i.e., downplaying the value or importance of 
domains in which they experience stigma; Major & Schmader, 1998; Major, 
Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998), identity concealment (Newheiser 
& Barreto, 2014), externalising blame (e.g., blaming negative outcomes on 
discrimination; Major, Kaiser, & McCoy 2003), and negative stereotype rejection 
(Luhtanen, 2002).  
The employment of identity protective strategies has led some to argue 
that perceiving group-based stigma can be protective against mental illness and 
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poor self-esteem (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989; Twenge & Crocker, 2002), as 
those with stigma become more resilient and empowered through strategies 
developed and mastered throughout their lives (Shih, 2004). However, others 
have argued that some strategies can worsen outcomes for stigmatised 
individuals, as it can impair social interactions and wellbeing (Ilic et al., 2012; 
Newheiser & Barreto, 2014). Whilst the outcomes of identity-management 
strategies may vary, this literature demonstrates that those experiencing stigma 
often seek opportunities to combat its deleterious effects and garner group-
based recognition. 
 We argue that stigmatised individuals may experience algorithmic 
surveillance as an additional vehicle for recognition. In the case of targeted 
material online, content will typically try to relate to (and affirm) an important 
aspect of one’s identity. Relevant targeted material is typically received more 
positively than adverts that do not contain identity-relevant content (Zeng, 
Huang, & Dou, 2009). The value of identity-relevant content was also 
demonstrated during the European Union (EU) referendum. For example, the 
Vote Leave campaign targeted those who supported animal rights with adverts 
warning of an increase in animal abuse if the United Kingdom remained in the 
EU (e.g. ‘the EU blocks our ability to speak out and protect polar bears! CLICK 
TO HELP THEM’; ‘Vote Leave’s targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook’, 
2018). In this case, those that identified as animal rights activists (or even 
animal lovers) were provided the opportunity to have a relevant identity 
recognised in a way that aligned with their own self-concept. Their group 
membership was accurately identified (subjectively at least) and their needs and 
interests as a member of that group were in turn recognised. Indeed, this 
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method of advertising has been argued to have contributed to the referendum 
result (‘Whistle-blower: Brexit vote part of Facebook data scandal’, 2018).  
 However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the potential for group-based 
recognition through algorithmic surveillance may only exist if surveillance is 
accurate. If surveillance is not accurate, those living with stigma are likely to 
experience further misrecognition in addition to what they already experience 
outside the surveillance context. For example, whilst all travellers are under 
surveillance in airports, Muslim travellers are often more likely to be categorised 
as a security threat (Blackwood et al., 2015); for example, Muslims reported that 
they were more likely to be stopped at airports compared to other travellers, and 
that they would experience less interference at airports if they dressed in a 
more stereotypically ‘western’ way. In this case, the inaccurate assumptions 
held by those conducting surveillance contributed to feelings of misrecognition 
for Muslim travellers.  
The variability of surveillance accuracy is also evident online. Cinnamon 
(2017) argues that corporations commonly make inaccurate judgements about 
individuals based on their online profiles. For example, when assessing 
financial reliability, individuals can be placed into ‘risk’ categories which 
‘produce new social categories of difference and restrict our ability to shape our 
own sense of self’ (p. 616). Therefore, whilst accurate algorithmic surveillance 
may afford stigmatised groups an opportunity for group-based recognition, less 
accurate surveillance may not provide the same recognition benefits and may 
instead further misrecognise an already stigmatised identity.  
 Based on this, the studies in the current chapter test whether those 
belonging to stigmatised groups may perceive greater group-based recognition 
144 
 
when surveillance is believed to be accurate (vs. less accurate). We also expect 
that greater perceptions of group-based recognition will predict more positive 
(and less negative) feelings towards surveillance (positive pathway). 
Conversely, we also expect more accurate surveillance to increase privacy 
concerns, which may in turn predict more negative (and less positive) feelings 
towards surveillance (negative pathway).  
In Study 3a we examine stigmatised identity in the context of sexual 
orientation. Those identifying as gay have historically experienced 
discrimination and persecution (Jukes, 2016). Despite civil rights advances, 
today those identifying as gay continue to experience discrimination socially, 
medically, and economically (Emlet, 2016). To test our model in this context, 
Study 3a deviated from those in Chapters 2 and 3, as surveillance accuracy 
perceptions were measured rather than manipulated. The second study in this 
chapter tested our model within the context of veganism: an identity that 
challenges the political and cultural status quo. As such, the increasing 
popularity and visibility of the vegan identity has brought with it an associated 
stigma and backlash (Cole, 2011). Indeed, vegans report hostility, rejection, and 
conflict within their professional and social relationships after becoming vegan 
(Hirschler, 2011). In our second study we manipulated surveillance accuracy 
perceptions directly. Participants were provided with an article ostensibly from 
the Vegan Society, which described surveillance as having either low, medium, 
or high accuracy. 
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STUDY 3A 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited through the online platform Prolific Academic. 
In total, 386 responses were recorded; however, four participants withdrew 
before reading the description of algorithmic surveillance, and 12 participants 
completed none of the measures. This left 369 participants for data analysis. Of 
these, 55% were men (42% women; 2% non-binary; 1% preferred not to 
answer) and the majority identified as White (82%; 7% mixed race; 5% Asian; 
4% Black, >1% Arab). Participants had a mean age of 31.44 years (SD = 
11.33).23 
 The study was a cross-sectional survey. The predictor variable was 
perceptions of surveillance accuracy and the dependent variables were feelings 
towards surveillance. Potential mediators included perceived group-based 
recognition (distinctiveness, positivity, understanding, identification as a group 
member) and privacy concern.  
Measures 
Unless otherwise stated, responses were recorded on 7-point scales (1 = 
Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree) and all negatively-phrased items were 
reverse scored. All measures may be found in Appendix K. 
 Identification. Four items were adapted from Doosje at al.’s (1995) 
identification scale to measure identification as gay. These items included ‘I see 
myself as gay’ and ‘I am glad to be gay’. Scores on all items were averaged to 
create the final scale (α = .82, M = 5.49; SD = 1.18). 
 
23 The age data of two participants were deleted, as they answered with their year of birth rather than their 
age.  
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 Perceived accuracy of surveillance. Four items measured how 
accurate participants believed algorithmic surveillance to be. Items included: ‘In 
my view, algorithmic surveillance is accurate at identifying people’ and ‘in my 
view, algorithmic surveillance does not provide an accurate impression of 
internet users’ (α = .88, M = 3.82; SD = 1.24). 
 Group-based recognition. The recognition measure was comprised of 
four sub-dimensions: distinctiveness, understanding, positivity, and identification 
as a group member. Identification as a group member was introduced in this 
study an additional recognition dimension. The measures referred to the extent 
to which participants felt that surveillance identified them as gay. A four-factor 
structure was supported by Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Appendix M). 
  Distinctiveness. This dimension measured the extent to which 
participants felt that their group was perceived as distinct. The measure 
included four items, such as ‘algorithmic surveillance enables society to 
recognise that gay people are a unique group’ and ‘from algorithmic 
surveillance, society recognises that gay people have distinct needs’ (α = .43, M 
= 3.62; SD = 0.9124). 
 Understanding. Four items assessed the degree to which participants 
felt that surveillance enabled their group to be understood. These items 
included ‘algorithmic surveillance helps society appreciate gay people’s values’ 
and ‘algorithmic surveillance provides society with a good understanding of 
what gay people believe’ (α = .81, M = 2.95; SD = 1.04).  
 Positivity. Four items measured the extent to which participants felt their 
group was perceived positively. Items included ‘Algorithmic surveillance helps 
promote the positive impact of gay culture within society’ and ‘gay people are 
 
24 Whilst reliability for this scale was low, we retained all items to preserve the a priori scale structure.  
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valued positively through algorithmic surveillance (α = .82, M = 3.57; SD = 
0.98). 
 Identification as a group member. The degree to which participants felt 
surveillance identified them as gay was measured with two items: ‘Through 
algorithmic surveillance, I believe I am identified as a gay individual’ and 
‘Algorithmic surveillance does not identify me as gay’ (r = .74; M = 4.44; SD = 
1.54). 
 Privacy concern. Four items measured the extent to which surveillance 
made participants concerned for their privacy. These included ‘surveillance 
online is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘people have a right to use the internet 
without being surveilled’ (α = .76, M = 5.25; SD = 1.29). 
Feelings towards surveillance. Identical to studies 2b and 2c, feelings 
towards surveillance were measured with two scales assessing positive 
emotion and negative emotion. Participants were asked, ‘Algorithmic 
surveillance makes me feel…’ and were then presented with 14 emotion items 
(seven items per scale).  
 Positive feelings. Scores on seven items, such as ‘happy’ and 
‘pleased’, were averaged to form the positive feelings scale (α = .94, M = 2.75; 
SD = 1.18). 
Negative feelings. Scores on seven items, such as ‘angry’ and ‘anxious’ 
were averaged to create the negative feelings scale (α = .90, M = 4.57; SD = 
1.22). 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, gender, 
and nationality. Participants were also asked if they were openly gay; if they 
selected ‘yes’ or ‘to some people, but not others’, they were asked how many 
years and months they had been open about their sexuality. 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited via Prolific Academic. The site’s screening 
tool was used to ensure that the study was only advertised to those who 
identified as gay. Once the survey was opened, participants were presented 
with a consent form that described the broad aims of the study. It also reiterated 
that the study was for those who identified as gay only. Once consent was 
given, participants were asked to write three things that were believed to be 
important to their sexuality, based on the method used by Haslam et al. (1999). 
This measure was included to increase the salience of participant’s sexuality 
and was not analysed. Participants then completed the identification scale, 
before being presented with a brief description of algorithmic surveillance 
(Appendix L). The description outlined the various sources of surveillance (both 
private and state) and how information is shared between platforms. The social 
consequences of surveillance were also outlined, such as identifying people as 
security risks and what products and services people may be offered compared 
to others.  
Once participants acknowledged that they had read the article (by 
clicking ‘I have read the information above and wish to continue’) they were 
presented with the remaining measures. Participants were given the opportunity 
to withdraw from the study on each page of the survey with a ‘withdraw’ button. 
On completion or withdrawal, participants were taken to a debrief page, which 
outlined the aims of the study in detail. At this point, they were also provided 
with links to websites that advise on personal data and privacy protection 
online, should they have felt concerned following the study. All participants were 
financially compensated at an hourly rate of £9.34.  
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Results 
Missing data treatment 
 Missing data analysis revealed 0.04% of values were missing across all 
measures.25 The expectation maximisation (EM) method was used in SPSS to 
impute the missing values, of which all fell within the scale range.  
Structural models: Predicting feelings towards surveillance 
 A path analysis with manifest variables only was performed using the 
AMOS v24 package along with bootstrapping with 5000 samples and a 95% 
confidence interval. Correlations between variables can be found in Table 11.  
Table 11. Summary of Pearson correlations between variables in the predicted 
model. 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.  
1. Accuracy -       
2. Distinctiveness .45*** -      
3. Positivity .36*** .42*** -     
4. Understanding .39*** .53*** .70*** -    
5. Group 
identification 
.27*** .18*** .15** .17*** -   
6. Privacy concern -.21*** -.26*** -.36*** -.38*** -.08 -  
7. Positive feelings .10* .23*** .45*** .49*** >.01 -.48*** - 
8. Negative feelings -.07 -.14** -.36*** -.33*** -.03 .51*** -.63*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
25 This did not include the measures that asked participants to estimate the months/years they had been 
openly gay, as there were 64 missing cases for these measures. Additionally, participants had commented 
that this was too difficult to estimate so either guessed or skipped the measures entirely. Consequently, 
these measures were excluded from analyses. 
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The predicted model demonstrated an adequate fit to the data, χ24 = 
51.06, p < .001, χ2/df = 12.77, TLI = .649, CFI = .950, RMSEA = .179, AIC = 
115.06.26 Although the predicted model demonstrated an adequate at best fit, 
the primary aim of the analysis was to test countervailing paths rather than an 
overall model against a null.  
 
26 Whilst the chi-square test and its associated p-value is significant (suggesting poor fit) it is well 
documented that this test is sensitive to sample size, thus larger samples can often produce a statistically 
significant chi-square value (Vandenberg, 2006). 
Figure 12. Path model illustrating the predicted model. Rectangles represent 
observed scale variables. Standardised coefficients for each relationship are depicted 
above path arrows along with significance values. Group-based recognition 
dimensions were covaried, as were positive and negative feelings towards 
surveillance.  Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition and 
privacy concerns. The effect of accuracy was positive and significant for all 
group-based recognition dimensions. Perceiving surveillance as more accurate 
was associated with greater perceptions of distinctiveness (β = .45, p < .001), 
positivity (β = .36, p < .001), understanding (β = .39, p < .001), and being 
perceived as a group member (β = .27, p < .001).  
Accuracy also had a significant effect on privacy concern: perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate was associated with less privacy concern, β = -
.21, p < .001. This was in the opposite direction to what we expected, as we 
predicted that perceiving surveillance as more accurate would be associated 
with greater privacy concerns.  
 Effect of surveillance accuracy on feelings towards surveillance. 
Within the model, the direct effect of surveillance accuracy on positive feelings 
towards surveillance was significant, β = -.13, p = .023. More accurate 
surveillance was associated with less positive feelings towards surveillance. 
The direct effect of surveillance accuracy on negative feelings towards 
surveillance was marginally significant, β = .10, p = .057, in that more accurate 
surveillance predicted marginally more negative feelings towards surveillance.  
 Indirect effects. To examine the indirect effect for each potential 
mediator, the regression weights of all pathways between the independent 
variable and mediators were set to 0, aside from the mediator being examined. 
Summaries of indirect effects for positive and negative feelings towards 
surveillance are presented in Tables 12 and 13 respectively.  
 Positive feelings. There was a significant indirect path between 
surveillance accuracy and positive feelings towards surveillance through privacy 
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concern. Contrary to our expectations, surveillance of higher accuracy predicted 
less privacy concern. This in turn predicted more positive feelings towards 
surveillance. A marginally-significant indirect path was found through perceived 
positivity; perceiving surveillance as more accurate predicted more perceived 
positivity which in turn predicted more positive feelings towards surveillance. 
The indirect pathway of understanding and group identification approached 
significance and no indirect pathway was found through perceived 
distinctiveness.  
 Negative feelings. A significant indirect pathway was found between 
surveillance accuracy and negative feelings towards surveillance through 
privacy concern; less privacy concern predicted less negative feelings towards 
surveillance. A marginally-significant indirect pathway was found through 
perceived positivity: greater perceptions of positivity predicted less negative 
feelings towards surveillance. The indirect pathways through understanding, 
distinctiveness, and group identification were non-significant.   
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Table 12. Summary of indirect effects for positive feelings through each 
mediator variable in the predicted model. 
Measure β p 95% CI (lower 
bound) 
95% CI (upper 
bound) 
Distinctiveness -.01 .575 -0.04 0.02 
Positivity .01 .057 0.00 0.04 
Understanding .02 .090 -0.00 0.06 
Group identification -.02 .076 -0.04 0.00 
Privacy concern .07 .001 0.04 0.12 
 
Table 13. Summary of indirect effects for negative feelings through each 
mediator variable in the predicted model. 
Measure β p 95% CI (lower 
bound) 
95% CI (upper 
bound) 
Distinctiveness .02 .180 -0.01 0.05 
Positivity -.02 .056 -0.05 0.00 
Understanding -.01 .111 -0.03 0.00 
Group identification .003 .674 -0.02 0.03 
Privacy concern -.09 .001 -0.15 -0.04 
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Discussion 
The present study tested positive and negative pathways from perceived 
algorithmic surveillance accuracy to feelings towards surveillance amongst 
stigmatised group members. For the positive pathway, we tested whether 
perceiving surveillance as more accurate predicts greater group-based 
recognition, which in turn predicts more positive and less negative feelings 
towards surveillance. For the negative pathway, we tested whether perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate is associated with more privacy concern, which in 
turn predicts more negative and less positive feelings towards surveillance. The 
findings support the majority of these predictions.  
The positive pathway 
 Surveillance accuracy perceptions are associated with group-based 
recognition. Perceptions of surveillance accuracy predicted all group-based 
recognition dimensions. Individuals felt greater group-based recognition when 
surveillance was perceived as more accurate. This tallies with previous social-
veillance literature, which finds that individuals use digital platforms to curate 
their own identity and achieve recognition by either dispelling misconceptions or 
exaggerating desirable characteristics (Marwick, 2012; Steeves & Bailey, 2016). 
Our findings also go beyond this by demonstrating that recognition benefits can 
be experienced for group identities, as well as individual identities. It also 
supports the argument that individuals do not create a disconnect between their 
offline and online selves. As argued by Kennedy (2006), our identities online 
typically mirror those we embody in our offline lives. Therefore, groups that 
struggle for recognition in offline contexts may experience similar group-based 
recognition concerns when online. As discussed, stigmatised groups often seek 
opportunities to cultivate recognition during social interactions (Chrobot-Mason 
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et al., 2001; Miller & Kaiser, 2001). The present study provides cross-sectional 
evidence that accurate surveillance may satisfy the need for group-based 
recognition in an online context.  
 Group based recognition is associated with feelings towards 
surveillance. Positive feelings. Positivity and felt understanding were both 
associated with more positive feelings towards surveillance. However, it is worth 
noting that none of the group-based recognition dimensions have a strong 
unique predictive role in the model. When included together in the model the 
recognition dimensions appear to weaken or cancel out the effect of one 
another. Despite this, each dimension has a significant zero-order correlation 
with positive feelings towards surveillance, which suggests that the group-based 
recognition measure as a whole is more strongly associated with feelings 
towards surveillance rather than one specific dimension. As such, the following 
discussion relates to group-based recognition as a whole, rather than the 
individual dimensions. 
Those that felt more group-based recognition were more likely to report 
positive feelings towards surveillance. Therefore, those that perceive 
surveillance as more accurate are more likely to feel group-based recognition, 
and in turn, more positive feelings towards surveillance. This supports research 
in marketing, which finds that people typically prefer online advertising that 
relates to their identity, attitudes, and interests (Campbell & Wright, 2008; 
McDonald & Cranor, 2010; Ur et al., 2012). Our findings extend this by 
highlighting the role of group identities in this process, suggesting that accurate 
surveillance has an intrinsic value through offering group-based recognition 
beyond the potential utility of relevant advertising (e.g. better product 
suggestions and discounts). 
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 Whilst we have highlighted that each recognition dimension may have 
weakened the effect of the other dimensions in the model, it is worth exploring 
another possible reason as to why distinctiveness did not predict positive 
feelings towards surveillance. It could be argued that those identifying as gay 
may not want to be perceived as distinct. For example, the gay pride and 
LGBTQ+ movement have often coined the phrase ‘love is love’ to draw 
attention to the similarity between heterosexual and non-heterosexual 
relationships (Frumin, 2013). As such, group distinctiveness may not be a 
central component of the gay identity; therefore, participants may have felt 
ambivalent towards being perceived as distinct in this context. 
 Negative feelings. Positivity was the only recognition dimension to be 
uniquely associated with negative feelings towards surveillance, despite each 
dimension having a significant zero-order correlation with feelings towards 
surveillance: greater group-based recognition predicted less negative feelings 
towards surveillance in each case. Yet, when included together in the model 
each dimension weakened the effect of the others. As such, the group-based 
recognition measure as a whole may consistently predict feelings towards 
surveillance in a way that is not attributable to one particular dimension.  
Whilst this may be the most likely explanation based on the findings, it 
could be suggested that although group-based recognition can encourage more 
positive feelings towards surveillance, recognition is not sufficient to undermine 
negative feelings. Indeed, a subset of literature has highlighted how those under 
surveillance often feel ambivalence towards surveilling systems. Typically, 
individuals report ambivalence from a heightened sense of security from 
surveillance yet a simultaneous invasion of privacy. For example, Ellis et al. 
(2013) found that participants felt surveillance was necessary to protect them 
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from crime (specifically terrorism), yet they also reported that surveillance felt 
like ‘Big Brother’ (p. 721). Our findings also indicate ambivalence, in that group-
based recognition predicted positive feelings towards surveillance, yet this may 
not be sufficient to undermine negative feelings from privacy concern.  
The negative pathway 
 Surveillance accuracy perceptions are associated with privacy 
concern. Those who perceived surveillance as more accurate reported less 
privacy concern than those who perceived surveillance as less accurate. This 
was contrary to our predictions and the findings from Study 1, whereby more 
accurate surveillance was associated with more privacy concern. It may be that 
surveillance of higher accuracy is simply more concerning when it relates to 
personal/individual identity (as demonstrated in Study 1) than when it pertains 
to the group. Results from Chapter 3 found no association between surveillance 
accuracy and privacy concern in Studies 2a and 2c, and found that perceiving 
surveillance as more accurate predicted less privacy concern in Study 2b. This 
suggests that in surveillance contexts, group privacy may be less concerning 
than individual privacy. Indeed, individuals typically report feeling safer in 
groups or crowds (Kern, 2005) and research has demonstrated that individuals 
are objectively safer in numbers (Jacobsen, 2015). Thus, it is possible that 
those under accurate surveillance feel better protected by the group from any 
consequences of surveillance accurate and therefore feel less concerned.   
Privacy concern is associated with feelings towards surveillance. 
As expected, increased privacy concern was associated with more negative and 
less positive feelings towards surveillance. This is a key contribution to 
surveillance literature, as most research in this field includes privacy concern as 
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a dependent variable from which feelings or attitudes towards surveillance are 
inferred but rarely tested (e.g. O’Donnell et al., 2010a) or behavioural outcomes 
are assessed without the appraisals and affect that shape them (e.g., privacy 
paradox literature). Whilst perhaps intuitive, this research addresses this gap in 
the literature and demonstrates that when individuals feel an invasion of privacy 
they are more likely to feel negatively (and less positively) towards those 
surveillance systems.  
Summary  
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether members of a 
stigmatised group would appraise surveillance as a vehicle for group-based 
recognition when it was perceived as accurate. In turn, we expected these 
participants to feel more positively towards surveillance. On the other hand, we 
also expected stigmatised individuals to feel more negatively towards 
surveillance of greater accuracy, due to privacy concerns. The study provides 
support for the positive pathway through recognition, and suggests that the 
group-based recognition construct as a whole may have more predictive power 
than individual dimensions of recognition.  
We also we found partial support for the negative pathway: privacy 
concern was associated with feelings towards surveillance. Contrary to our 
predictions, though, more accurate surveillance was associated with less 
privacy concern. Future research should explore whether privacy concern 
differs (i.e., is less concerning) when accurate surveillance is ostensibly 
focussed on the group compared to the individual. Additionally, it would be 
worth exploring whether conceptions of privacy and recognition differ across 
different social groups. Study 3b aims to address the latter point by testing the 
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predicted model within a vegan sample. We also manipulated surveillance 
accuracy directly.  
STUDY 3B 
 In this second study, we focus on veganism, which is an identity with a 
less toxic history of discrimination and prejudice than is associated with sexual 
orientation, but with a current and contemporary sense of being stigmatised for 
a lifestyle choice.   
Historically, vegans have experienced different social pressures than 
those identifying as gay. Vegans typically strive for outgroup equal treatment 
(non-human animals), whereas LGBT+ movements strive for ingroup equal 
treatment (e.g., those identifying as gay). Furthermore, those identifying as gay 
are often at greater risk of physical violence and danger from others (Hunter, 
1990), whereas vegans have not historically faced the same intergroup threat. 
Nevertheless, vegans are also subject to misrecognition: they are commonly 
stereotyped as preachy (Linquist, 2013), hyper-feminine (Rothgerber, 2012) and 
are perceived more negatively than asexuals, homosexuals, immigrants, and 
atheists (MacInnis & Hodson, 2015).  
In line with the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3, the study employed 
an experimental design, whereby surveillance accuracy was manipulated to 
have three levels: low, medium, and high. Three treatment levels were chosen 
so that both linear and non-linear effects could be examined.27 Our predictions 
remain the same as for Study 3a. We predicted that participants would report 
more recognition and privacy concerns when surveillance is described as 
 
27 For example, prior research suggests that individuals may feel more privacy concern as surveillance 
accuracy increases (Oulasvirta et al., 2012), whereas others suggest that concern may peak at low and 
high levels of surveillance accuracy (Ur et al., 2012). Three treatment levels enable us to explore both 
these possibilities.  
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having higher accuracy (vs. medium or low accuracy). In turn, we predicted that 
higher levels of group-based recognition would in turn predict more positive and 
less negative feelings towards surveillance. On the other hand, we expected 
higher levels of privacy concern to be associated with more negative and less 
positive feelings towards surveillance. 
Method  
Participants and design 
Through purposive sampling, data were collected from 781 vegan 
individuals belonging to vegan Facebook groups online. Three hundred and 
seventy-one responses were deleted, as they had at least one measure with 
100% missing data. This left 410 participants for the main analyses. The 
majority of participants were women (77%), while 20% were men, 3% identified 
as non-binary, and 1% preferred not to indicate their gender. Participants’ mean 
age was 32.27 years (SD = 12.17) and most participants identified as White 
(91%; 3% mixed ethnicity, 3% Asian, 2% other, and < 1% Black or Arab). A 
sensitivity analysis using g*power indicated that the sample is sufficient to 
detect an effect using regression (four predictors), of f = 0.14 (partial r = .14) 
with 80% power for each of the effects of surveillance accuracy, distinctiveness, 
positivity, and privacy concern. The sample of the current study is also sufficient 
to detect an effect size using ANOVA of f = 0.15 (ηp2 = .02) with 80% power for 
the main effect of surveillance accuracy (dfnum = 2). 
 The study had a one-way between-participants experimental design. 
Accuracy was manipulated to have three levels: low, medium, and high. 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of these three conditions. Feelings 
towards surveillance (positive and negative) were included as the dependent 
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variable. Perceived group-based recognition (distinctiveness and positivity28) 
and privacy concern were measured as mediators. The study included 
additional measures that were not included in the final analysis.29  
Measures 
Unless otherwise stated, response scales used a 7-point format (1 = 
Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree) and responses on all negatively-
phrased items were reverse scored. 
 Manipulation. Participants were first asked to read an article ostensibly 
from the Vegan Society titled ‘Being vegan online’ (Appendix N). There were 
three versions of the article, which varied in how accurate they reported 
algorithmic surveillance to be. In the high accuracy condition, the article 
explained that products of online surveillance (targeted advertising) often 
suggested identity-relevant content (e.g., vegan cookbooks). In the low 
accuracy condition, the article argued that products of online surveillance rarely 
suggested identity-relevant content, and mostly provided non-vegan-related 
suggestions relating to dietary intolerance (e.g., gluten-free breaded meat). The 
medium accuracy condition reported that suggested material online was 
sometimes accurate but also sometimes inaccurate. 
 To reinforce the accuracy manipulation, participants were then presented 
with two fabricated screenshots of a Facebook news feed, which were 
described as being provided by vegan internet users. The screenshots depicted 
a large central suggested page/product and a smaller sidebar advert. In the 
high accuracy condition, both adverts were vegan related. In the low accuracy 
 
28 Following CFA (Appendix P), a two-dimension structure of recognition was considered superior to a 
three-factor solution in this study. Therefore, the distinctiveness dimension also includes the items from the 
understanding measure.  
29 Additional measures included: levels of identification, perceived motivation of surveiller, chilling effects, 
time spent online, and pre-manipulation measures of perceived recognition. All measures may be found in 
Appendix O.  
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condition both adverts were orientated towards a non-vegan restrictive diet 
(e.g., gluten-free). In the medium condition, one advert was related to 
veganism, whereas the other was associated with the non-vegan diet (location 
of the accurate/inaccurate adverts were counterbalanced). 
 Dependent measures. Manipulation check. Two items assessed 
whether participants understood the content of the article, and their perceptions 
of surveillance accuracy. Firstly, understanding of the article’s content was 
measured with the item ‘The Vegan Society article suggests that algorithmic 
surveillance is…’, on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all accurate to 7 = Extremely 
accurate). The second item related to participants’ perception of surveillance 
accuracy: ‘After reading the article, in my opinion algorithmic surveillance is…’, 
answered on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all accurate to 7 = Extremely accurate). 
The two items were averaged to create the final scale (r = .67, M = 3.77; SD = 
1.29). 
 Group-based recognition. Recognition from algorithmic surveillance 
was then assessed. Despite theorising three separate group-based recognition 
dimensions (positivity, distinctiveness, understanding), distinctiveness and 
understanding items loaded onto the same factor. Therefore, the items from 
both these scales were combined. This produced two recognition dimensions 
for subsequent analyses: perceived intergroup distinctiveness and perceived 
positive group identity.  
Distinctiveness. Intergroup distinctiveness was measured with eight 
items, such as ‘Targeted adverts and webpage suggestions imply that my diet is 
the same as ‘clean eating’, ‘Algorithmic surveillance enables omnivores to 
recognise that my beliefs towards food are distinct from those following other 
diets’ and ‘Algorithmic surveillance could help omnivores appreciate vegan 
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cultural values’. All items were included in the final scale (α = .77, M = 3.34; SD 
= .87). 
Positivity. Perceived positive group identity measured how positively 
participants felt their group was viewed by other groups. This was measured 
with two items, including ‘The results of algorithmic surveillance offer a positive 
image of veganism’. Both items were averaged to create the final scale (r = .58, 
M = 4.04; SD = 1.11).  
 Feelings towards surveillance.  Identical to studies 2b, 2c and 3a, 
feelings towards surveillance was measured on two scales assessing positive 
emotion and negative emotion respectively. Participants were asked, 
‘Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel…’ and were then presented with 14 
emotion items (seven items per scale). Responses on all seven positive 
emotion items, such as ‘happy’, ‘pleased’, ‘hopeful’ and ‘optimistic’ were 
averaged to form the positive emotion scale (α = .93, M = 3.33; SD = 1.05), and 
responses on all seven negative emotion items, such as ‘worried’, ‘annoyed’, 
‘uncomfortable’ and ‘angry’ were averaged to create the negative emotion scale 
(α = .90, M = 4.00; SD = 1.09). 
 Privacy concern. Privacy concerns were assessed using four items 
including ‘Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘People’s online data 
is not private information’. Scores were averaged to produce the final scale (α = 
.73, M = 4.90; SD = 1.21). 
 Demographics. Participants were asked to give their demographic 
information, including their age, gender, and ethnicity. Participants were also 
asked how many years and months they had been vegan. 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited via social media groups related to veganism. 
A link to the survey along with a brief description of the study was posted on 
each group. Once the link was opened, participants were asked to provide their 
consent before being randomly allocated to one of the three accuracy 
conditions. Once participants had read the article they were shown the two 
Facebook screenshots. After completing the remaining measures, participants 
were fully debriefed and provided with online sources concerning internet 
privacy.  
Results 
Missing data treatment 
 Analysis of missing data revealed that only 0.7% of values were missing 
across all measures. Missing values were imputed using the expectation-
maximisation (EM) method in SPSS (Graham, 2009) and estimated values fell 
within the scale range.  
Manipulation check 
 A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant 
effect of surveillance accuracy on the perceived accuracy of surveillance F(2, 
407) = 199.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .495. Pairwise comparisons revealed that those in 
the high accuracy condition (M = 5.16, SD = 0.92) reported higher accuracy 
perceptions than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 3.75, SD = 0.84), 
F(1, 407) = 154.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .276, 95% CI [1.19, 1.64]. Additionally, those 
in the medium accuracy condition reported greater accuracy perceptions than 
those in the low accuracy condition (M = 2.60, SD = 1.05), F(1, 407) = 111.70, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .215, 95% CI [-1.36, -0.93]). Consequently, the manipulation was 
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considered successful. Correlations between all dependent measures may be 
found in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Summary of zero-order correlations between variables in the 
analyses. 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Accuracy perceptions -     
2. Distinctiveness .49*** -    
3. Positivity .50*** .49*** -   
4. Privacy concern -.09 -.08 -.01 -  
5. Positive emotion .27*** .29*** .21*** -.31*** - 
6. Negative emotion -.24*** -.30** -.27*** .33*** -.44*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
 
Hypothesis testing: Mediation analysis 
 Mediation analysis was conducted using the SPSS PROCESS macro 
(Model 4; Hayes, 2013) to test the effect of surveillance accuracy on feelings 
towards surveillance (positive and negative) through group-based recognition 
(positivity and distinctiveness) and privacy concern. Sequential coding of the 
three-level accuracy manipulation was used, whereby surveillance accuracy 
was tested as two dummy variables: low versus medium and medium versus 
high.30  
 
30 Whilst this statistical technique does not allow the comparison of low and high accuracy, this comparison 
was not relevant to our predictions. We predicted linear findings, meaning a significant linear relationship 
between low versus medium and medium versus high intuitively demonstrates a linear relationship 
between low and high.  
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 Positive emotion. Low versus medium accuracy. As shown in Figure 
13, participants felt more recognised on both the positivity (b = .68, p < .001, SE 
= .12, 95% CI [0.45, 0.90]) and distinctiveness (b = .45, p < .001, SE = .09, 95% 
CI [0.27, 0.63]) dimensions when surveillance was described as being of 
medium accuracy compared to when it was described as low in accuracy. 
However, there was no effect of medium vs. low surveillance accuracy on 
privacy concern (b = .05, p = .710, SE = .14, 95% CI [-0.23, 0.34]). In turn, 
positive feelings towards surveillance were positively predicted by group 
distinctiveness (b = .25, p < .001, SE = .06, 95% CI [0.12, 0.38]), and negatively 
by privacy concerns (b = -.26, p < .001, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.33, -0.18]). 
Believing that their group was perceived positively did not predict positive 
feelings toward surveillance (b = .08, p = .146, SE = .05, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.18]).  
The indirect effect of surveillance accuracy through distinctiveness was 
significant, b = 0.11, SE = .04, 95% CI [0.04, 0.21], but was not significant 
through positivity, b = 0.05, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.14], or privacy concern b 
= -0.01, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.09, 0.06]. The direct effect of surveillance 
accuracy on positive feelings towards surveillance was also significant: more 
positive feelings towards surveillance were reported when surveillance was 
described as being of medium accuracy compared to low accuracy, b = 0.26, 
SE = .12, p = .029, 95% CI [0.02, 0.49]. 
 Medium versus high accuracy. Figure 13 illustrates that participants 
felt more recognition on both dimensions (positivity: b = .86, p < .001, SE = .12, 
95% CI [0.62, 1.09]; distinctiveness: b = .58, p < .001, SE = .10, 95% CI [0.39, 
0.77]) when surveillance was described as being of high accuracy compared to 
medium accuracy. Surveillance accuracy did not affect concern for privacy (b = 
-.10, p = .501, SE = .15, 95% CI [-0.40, 0.19]).  
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The indirect effect of surveillance accuracy on positive feelings towards 
surveillance was significant through perceived distinctiveness b = 0.15, SE = 
.05, 95% CI [0.05, 0.26], but not through positivity b = 0.06, SE = .05, 95% CI [-
0.03, 0.04], or privacy concern b = 0.03, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.10]. The 
direct effect of surveillance accuracy was also not significant, b = -.09, SE = .13, 
p = .478, 95% CI [-0.34, 0.16].  
 
 Negative emotion. Low versus medium accuracy. As shown in Figure 
13, perceived distinctiveness (b = -.22, p = .001, SE = .07, 95% CI [-0.35, -
0.09]) and positivity (b = -.15, p = .006, SE = .05, 95% CI [-0.25, -0.04]) 
predicted less negative feelings towards surveillance. On the other hand, 
greater privacy concern predicted more negative feelings towards surveillance 
(b = .28, p < .001, SE = .04, 95% CI [0.20, 0.36]).  
The indirect effects of surveillance accuracy on negative feelings towards 
surveillance through both positivity, b = -0.10, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.02] 
and distinctiveness, b = -0.10, SE = .04, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.03] were significant. 
Figure 13. PROCESS path diagram for predicted model. Unstandardised 
regression coefficients and significance values are presented adjacent to each 
line that represents the relationship between variables. 
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There was no significant indirect effect through privacy concern b = 0.02, SE = 
.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.10], and the direct effect of surveillance accuracy was also 
not significant, b = -0.10, SE = .12, p = .395, 95% CI [-0.34, 0.13].  
 Medium versus high accuracy. The indirect effect of surveillance 
accuracy was significant through positivity, b = -0.12, SE = .05, 95% CI [-0.23, -
0.02] and distinctiveness, b = -0.13, SE = .06, 95% CI [-0.26, -0.03], but not 
through privacy concern b = -0.03, SE < .01, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.05]. There was 
also no direct effect of surveillance accuracy on negative feelings towards 
surveillance, b = -0.08, SE = .13, p = .520, 95% CI [-0.34, 0.17]. 
Discussion 
Building upon Study 3a, the current study manipulated surveillance 
accuracy directly (low, medium, and high) and tested the predicted model in a 
different identity context (vegan identity) to ascertain whether our prior results 
are replicated within another stigmatised social group. Consistent with the 
previous studies in this thesis, the present study tested two opposing pathways 
that may explain feelings towards surveillance. A negative pathway was tested, 
whereby more accurate surveillance predicts more negative (and less positive) 
feelings towards surveillance through increased privacy concerns. A positive 
pathway was also tested: more accurate surveillance gives rise to greater 
feelings of group-based recognition, which in turn predicts more positive (and 
less negative) feelings towards surveillance.  
Positive pathway: Accurate surveillance as a vehicle for group-based 
recognition 
 Overall, the majority of our predictions were supported. Recognition 
provided a positive pathway through which perceived accuracy of surveillance 
made members of a stigmatised group feel more favourably towards 
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surveillance. Specifically, surveillance accuracy indirectly predicted both 
positive and negative feelings towards surveillance through perceived 
distinctiveness. Additionally, an indirect path was also found through perceived 
positivity on negative feelings towards surveillance. Together, this suggests that 
when a group feels chronically misrecognised, members may receive 
recognition benefits through algorithmic surveillance when it is perceived as 
more accurate. In turn, group members are more likely to respond favourably 
towards those surveillance systems. These results highlight that despite the 
current negative rhetoric surrounding surveillance, positive psychological 
outcomes in the form of group-based recognition are possible when surveillance 
is perceived as accurate.  
Negative pathway: Privacy concern 
 Contrary to expectations, we did not find an effect of surveillance 
accuracy on privacy concern: neither surveillance accuracy nor accuracy 
perceptions were associated with more privacy concern. However, higher 
privacy concerns did predict more negative and less positive feelings towards 
surveillance, as expected. The predicted negative pathway was therefore only 
partially supported.  
It could be argued that for some groups, surveillance accuracy does not 
have a consistent effect on privacy concern over and above the presence of 
surveillance. For example, minorities such as Muslims often experience supra-
visibility, whereby the mere presence of surveillance becomes a form of 
discrimination (Brighenti, 2007). Indeed, participants in Almuhumedi et al.’s 
(2015) study had concern over the fact that apps were accessing their data, 
rather than concern for any outcomes of gathering that data: ‘[I turned it off] 
because I can’t think of a reason why Inkpad needs my location.’ (p. 10); ‘…why 
170 
 
do you have to access my location thousands of times in [a] few days?’ (p. 15). 
Whilst vegans have not historically been under social scrutiny, a surge in 
veganism over the last decade has prompted both the interrogation and 
criticism of the vegan movement (Cole & Morgan, 2011). Furthermore, animal 
rights activists continue to experience intense surveillance from government 
intelligence agencies (Boyer, 2017; Walby & Monaghan, 2011). For these 
groups, the issue of data access may be more of a concern than the 
subsequent accuracy of assumptions made from data collection. The same may 
not be said for those who do not experience supra-visibility. 
As such, future research would benefit from testing both the positive and 
negative pathways in different group contexts. Whilst we theorised that 
recognition benefits from accurate surveillance would be more pronounced for 
those within chronically-misrecognised groups, it would be prudent to test this 
effect within groups who do not typically experience misrecognition. One 
possible outcome is that individuals may not experience any recognition 
benefits from surveillance, as their recognition needs have already been met – 
in other words, perceived surveillance accuracy will have little or no effect on 
perceived recognition. Indeed, this would tally with the findings from Study 2a, 
whereby surveillance accuracy perceptions predicted more group-based 
recognition when surveillance was conducted by the outgroup, but not the 
ingroup (as recognition needs are already met in this context).  
Alternatively, inaccurate surveillance could raise misrecognition concerns 
in historically-recognised groups and function as a form of identity threat, 
meaning that the effect of surveillance accuracy on recognition will also be 
evident in less stigmatised groups. Future research could explore both these 
possibilities. Indeed, Study 2c explored the effects of surveillance accuracy 
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within a (typically non-stigmatised) British sample and found that inaccurate 
surveillance was indeed associated with misrecognition. Additionally, Study 4 of 
this thesis (reported in Chapter 5) directly manipulates group-based recognition 
to test whether accurate surveillance remedies a reduction in group-based 
recognition (and whether no recognition benefits are evident for those who 
already believed their group to be recognised).   
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We argued in Chapter 2 that one reason why no association was found 
between surveillance accuracy and recognition in Study 1 is because 
recognition needs were not made salient. The aim of the studies in this chapter 
were to test the association between surveillance accuracy and recognition 
more precisely by making group-based recognition needs salient by recruiting 
those from stigmatised/chronically misrecognised groups and examining their 
feelings towards algorithmic surveillance at a group level. We expected that 
surveillance of greater accuracy would provide stigmatised individuals the 
opportunity for group-based recognition, and that this would in turn predict more 
positive (and less negative) feelings towards surveillance (positive pathway). 
Simultaneously, we also predicted that surveillance of greater accuracy would 
increase privacy concerns, and that this would produce countervailing effects on 
feelings towards surveillance (negative pathway).  
 Together, the two studies presented in this chapter provide varying levels 
of support for the positive and negative pathways in our predicted model. 
Surveillance accuracy (Study 3b) and surveillance accuracy perceptions 
(Studies 3a and 3b) were associated with greater perceived group-based 
recognition. In turn, more group-based recognition predicted more positive 
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feelings towards surveillance and (although less consistently) fewer negative 
feelings. For the negative pathway, Study 3a demonstrated an association 
between surveillance accuracy perceptions and privacy concerns, but this was 
in the opposite direction to what was expected; perceiving surveillance as more 
accurate predicted fewer privacy concerns. Additionally, Study 3b did not find 
an association between surveillance accuracy and privacy concern, which 
corroborates the findings from Chapter 3. However, both studies demonstrated 
that greater privacy concern does predict more negative and less positive 
feelings towards surveillance. 
Positive pathway (1): Surveillance of greater accuracy is associated with 
more perceived group-based recognition  
Both studies in this chapter provide evidence that stigmatised group 
members may perceive recognition benefits from accurate surveillance. 
Surveillance accuracy perceptions (Study 3a) and surveillance accuracy (Study 
3b) predicted greater feelings of group-based recognition on all dimensions: 
distinctiveness, understanding, and positivity. As discussed, those belonging to 
stigmatised groups typically have a greater need for group-based recognition 
(Snow & Anderson, 1987) and will seek opportunities in which to increase 
recognition (Chrobot-Mason et al., 2001; Miller & Kaiser, 2001). Past research 
typically cites social interaction (often face-to-face) as an opportunity to bolster 
group-based recognition opportunities for these groups to achieve recognition 
(e.g., Newheiser & Barreto, 2014). The findings presented in this chapter 
suggest that accurate algorithmic surveillance may provide a further, 
unorthodox opportunity for stigmatised groups to achieve recognition benefits. 
  For example, the studies presented in this chapter suggest that 
recognition processes are also present in surveillance contexts which do not 
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involve friends and/or familiar others. Outside of peer groups and social 
networks, individuals may also receive benefits of recognition from corporate or 
government institutions. Recognition in these contexts is perhaps less 
expected, as these organisations are typically less trusted (Ellis et al., 2013).  
It could also be argued that these contexts may provide a less pressured, 
potentially safer avenue for recognition than face-to-face interaction. For 
example, stigmatised individuals often conceal problematic identities in social 
contexts (Goffman, 1963; Newheiser & Barreto, 2014) or avoid social 
interactions and spaces from fear of harassment or even violence (Corteen, 
2002). Whilst algorithmic surveillance can pose a threat to personal security and 
opportunity when mishandled (O’Neil, 2016), it arguably does not present the 
same immediate threat and anxiety that personal interaction may present for 
those that are stigmatised. As such, algorithmic surveillance may provide a 
safer avenue for stigmatised groups to enhance group-based recognition 
compared to traditional yet more dangerous face-to-face interaction.  
In common with Studies 2a-2c, the studies in this chapter also illustrates 
the importance of social identity within surveillance contexts. Previous research 
has predominantly explored how individuals might achieve identity recognition 
online from platforms that emphasise individual rather than group-based 
characteristics. For example, prior work on participatory surveillance has found 
that surveillance from peers on social media, and subsequent accurate 
feedback, increases perceptions of interpersonal recognition (Albrechtslund, 
2008; Steeves & Baily, 2016; Toma & Hancock, 2013). However, shared group 
characteristics are often unexplored within these contexts; individuals are 
thought to seek recognition for more personal experiences and attributes: ‘like a 
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personal ad…I do, actually [think of my Facebook profile as a store about 
myself]’ (Steeves & Baily, 2016, p. 8).  
A small amount of prior research has acknowledged the concern for 
group-based recognition online. For instance, Stuart and Levine (2017) 
conducted focus group interviews exploring attitudes towards surveillance in 
which group identity concerns emerged. One participant spoke of having her 
gender on Facebook misrecognised as male and was in turn exposed to gay 
dating advertisements, which made her feel unfavourably towards the platform: 
‘But then I started getting adverts for gays all around [location]…and I was like 
no thanks I am really not interested in that…I was like ah!’ (p. 701). This 
suggests that individuals are aware of the groups that they are assumed to 
belong to and appraise surveillance based on these assumptions. The studies 
in this chapter build on this by providing an experimental test of the group-
based identity concerns that are present within surveillance contexts and how 
these concerns can shape how we feel towards surveillance systems online 
(discussed below).  
Positive pathway (2): Greater perceptions of group-based recognition 
predict more positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance 
In turn, those who perceived greater group-based recognition from 
algorithmic surveillance were generally more likely to feel positively (and less 
negatively) towards the surveillance system. However, there are some caveats. 
In Study 3a, positivity was the only recognition dimension to uniquely predict 
negative feelings towards surveillance. Group-based recognition more 
consistently predicted positive feelings towards surveillance. This mirrors the 
findings from Studies 2b and 2c, whereby none of the recognition dimensions 
uniquely predicted negative feelings towards surveillance. As discussed earlier 
175 
 
in this chapter, our findings suggest that each recognition dimension does not 
have a consistent, unique predictive role in our model; instead, group-based 
recognition as a whole is the basis for feelings towards surveillance. 
 Whilst less likely, we have also suggested that these findings suggest 
ambivalence towards surveillance, whereby increased group-based recognition 
may encourage people to feel more favourably towards surveillance, yet these 
identity benefits do not mitigate negative feelings towards surveillance. Indeed, 
ambivalence towards surveillance has been documented elsewhere. For 
example, in Ellis et al.’s (2013) research, participants reported some positive 
feelings towards surveillance, as they believed it to enhance public safety: ‘I 
quite like them cause I feel safe’ (p. 721). However, the same participant also 
described feeling negatively because of privacy infringements: ‘I mean it is big 
daddy they know exactly really what you buy’ (p. 721). Another participant also 
reported safety benefits but also felt conflicted: ‘…it’s invasion I just don’t like 
it…this is where I get conflicts you see’ (p. 721). Koskela (2000) also highlights 
the public’s ambivalence towards surveillance, as surveillance systems can 
inspire feelings of both safety and mistrust. Our findings support these 
positions, but also suggest that positive feelings may also arise from group-
based recognition. Therefore, together with the literature cited above, it could be 
argued that ambivalence towards surveillance may be predicted by safety 
concerns, privacy concerns and perceived recognition.31  
 Distinctiveness did not uniquely predict positive or negative feelings 
towards surveillance in Study 3a. Distinctiveness refers to a central motive 
 
31 It is important to note that Study 3b demonstrated a relationship between group-based recognition and 
negative feelings towards surveillance. Nevertheless, as this finding is not consistent amongst our studies 
further research is necessary to establish the circumstances where group-based recognition has the 
potential to mitigate negativity towards surveillance. 
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described in SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), whereby individuals strive for their 
group to be seen as positively distinct from others. The results presented in this 
chapter suggest that the degree to which individuals appraise surveillance 
based on recognition may depend on the group to which they belong. It could 
be argued that those identifying as gay do not prioritise distinctiveness. For 
example, the gay rights movement has historically fought for equal treatment 
and respect. It was only in 1973 that the American Psychiatric Association 
removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses (Kozuch, 2017) and gay 
marriage was only legalised in the UK in 2014 (‘Gay Marriage Legalised at 
Midnight in England and Wales’, 2014). Therefore, the gay rights movement has 
typically advocated the similarities between homosexual and heterosexual love, 
and as such argued that both deserve equal treatment. Consequently, gay 
individuals may not perceive difference to be an important facet of a gay 
identity, and may therefore be unlikely to feel differently towards algorithmic 
surveillance on the basis that it provides group-based distinctiveness.  
 The same may not be true for those identifying as vegan (Study 3b). The 
vegan movement typically strives for the vegan lifestyle to be considered 
positively, but also as distinct. For example, on the Vegan Society’s website in a 
section titled ‘Why go vegan?’ the site lists benefits for animal welfare, the 
environment, and health as reasons why an individual might choose veganism. 
The group may also equally value distinctiveness. Veganism is typically 
confused with ‘plant-based’ (The Happy Pear, n.d.) and other restrictive diets 
such as those that eliminate lactose and gluten (Radical Preachy Vegan, 2015). 
This suggests that both distinctiveness and positivity may be central to the 
recognition needs raised by a vegan identity. As such, whilst distinctiveness did 
not play a (unique) role in predicting feelings towards surveillance in Study 3a, 
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this may not be the case for other social groups where distinctiveness is of 
higher importance to the self-concept. Consequently, future research should be 
mindful of the content of identity concerns when examining group-based 
recognition.  
Negative pathway (1): Surveillance of greater accuracy is not associated 
with more privacy concern  
The findings from this chapter mirror those from Chapter 3, in that 
surveillance accuracy was not consistently associated with privacy concern. In 
fact, whilst surveillance accuracy perceptions predicted privacy concern in 
Study 3a, this was in the opposite direction to what was expected; when 
surveillance was perceived as having greater accuracy participants reported 
less privacy concern. Additionally, the manipulation of surveillance accuracy 
and surveillance accuracy perceptions in Study 3b were not associated with 
reported privacy concern. 
 In Study 3a it could be argued that perceiving surveillance as highly 
accurate was associated with fewer privacy concerns because individuals 
perceive their privacy as a fair trade when accurate surveillance may benefit the 
group. This phenomenon was demonstrated by Pavone and Esposti (2010), 
who found that individuals either felt a surveilling institution enhanced their 
security without compromising their privacy or compromised their privacy 
without security benefits. Our findings may mirror those from Pavone and 
Esposti, as those who perceived surveillance as highly accurate perceived 
greater benefits from surveillance (in the form of group-based recognition) and 
fewer disadvantages (in the form of less privacy concern).  
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 However, it is worth noting that a negative association between 
surveillance accuracy perceptions and privacy concern was only found in Study 
3a (and Study 2b) and does not replicate the findings from Studies 1, 2a, 2c, or 
3b. It is unclear why those identifying as gay may experience accurate 
surveillance as wholly advantageous, when other groups do not demonstrate 
the same reduction of privacy concern. As such, future research should 
endeavour to replicate these findings to establish whether this was anomalous 
or a unique phenomenon to those identifying as gay and this should in turn be 
unpacked.  
Study 3b replicates the findings from Chapter 3, as no association was 
found between surveillance accuracy and privacy concern. The results also 
closely replicate those from Study 2c, as neither surveillance accuracy nor 
surveillance accuracy perceptions were associated with privacy concern. As 
discussed above, it is likely that the presence of surveillance per se (versus its 
absence) affects privacy concern separately from its accuracy. Therefore, it 
could be that vegan participants felt surveillance itself was a privacy 
infringement, irrespective of its accuracy. Indeed, the mean level of privacy 
concern across conditions was 4.90 (on a 7-point scale), which suggests that 
privacy concern was generally high for participants. Additionally, Sylvestre 
(2009) suggests an association between veganism and anti-establishment 
views; therefore, vegans in particular may express a greater opposition (and 
concern for privacy) towards governing institutions and surveillance systems 
generally. 
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Negative pathway (2): Greater privacy concern is associated with less 
positive and more negative feelings towards surveillance  
Both studies in this chapter supported our predictions that greater privacy 
concern would be associated with less positive and more negative feelings 
towards surveillance. These findings mirror those from Chapter 3. 
Little previous research has examined the relationship between privacy 
concern and feelings towards surveillance. Typically, negative (or less positive) 
feelings are assumed if an invasion of privacy has been experienced. Whilst this 
association is perhaps intuitive, little empirical research exists to support this 
association. Qualitative evidence has suggested a relationship between privacy 
concern and feelings towards surveillance. For example, in Stuart and Levine’s 
(2017) study, one participant reported that surveillance from Google was ‘really 
weird and I don’t like them doing that’ (p. 699) and another participant drew an 
association between privacy concerns and feelings towards surveillance in 
relation to Google Glass ‘glasses that are recording everything…I don’t really 
like it…a bit big brothery’ (p. 700). This chapter substantiates this research by 
providing empirical evidence that greater privacy concern increases more 
negative and less positive feelings towards surveillance technologies.  
These findings also speak to the complex relationship internet users 
have with surveillance systems. For example, in privacy paradox research, 
individuals who feel high levels of privacy concern may continue to engage with 
a surveilling site or do little to alter their online behaviour (see Gerber, Gerber, & 
Volkamer, 2018 for a review). Whilst we did not measure behavioural outcomes, 
our research suggests that individuals may continue interacting with a 
surveilling platform whilst experiencing privacy concern and feeling negatively 
towards the platform itself. This highlights the potential strength of positive 
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outcomes associated with these platforms (or negative outcomes associated 
with disengagement); despite privacy concern and a relative dislike for a 
platform, individuals may continue to engage with it.   
Future research 
 Future research should endeavour to further examine the association 
between surveillance accuracy and privacy concern. Studies 2b and 3a 
suggests that for some groups, more accurate surveillance may indeed reduce 
privacy concerns, whereas Study 3b found no association between surveillance 
accuracy and privacy concern. In cases where no association is found, future 
research could examine whether the presence or amount of surveillance is a 
bigger driver of perceived invasion of privacy, over and above variation in the 
perceived accuracy of that surveillance.  
Future research should also test the association between surveillance 
accuracy and privacy concern within social groups that differ in terms of social 
position, including different social status. As discussed, the effect of surveillance 
accuracy on privacy concerns may be stronger in groups who do not experience 
supra-visibility and persecution through surveillance. Members of groups that do 
have a negative history with surveillance and persecution through surveillance, 
such as groups that have been victimised by aggressive and/or chronic 
surveillance techniques, may be less sensitive to variations in surveillance 
accuracy. Therefore, by testing the model within different group contexts the 
boundaries of our current model may be clarified. 
 Thus far, we have argued that accurate surveillance may only provide 
recognition benefits when identity needs are made salient. To make identity 
needs salient, we employed intergroup contexts in Chapter 3, and recruited 
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those from stigmatised groups in Chapter 4. By doing this, both chapters 
provide converging evidence of the association between surveillance 
accuracy/surveillance accuracy perceptions and group-based recognition. The 
following chapter aims to directly test our assumption that the association 
between surveillance accuracy and recognition is due to a need for group-
based recognition. We do so by manipulating group-based (mis)recognition 
directly within Welsh participants to test whether the effect of surveillance 
accuracy on group-based recognition is more pronounced when an ingroup is 
believed to be historically misrecognised (vs. recognised).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
STUDY 4 
One limitation of the studies reported in Chapters 3 and 4 is that group-
based (mis)recognition concerns were assumed (by making intergroup 
comparisons salient in Chapter 3; and sampling from stigmatised groups in 
Chapter 4), rather than directly manipulated. In light of this, the study reported in 
this chapter not only replicates the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-
based recognition (and in turn the relationship between group-based recognition 
and feelings towards surveillance), but also orthogonally manipulates 
historical/chronic group-based (mis)recognition. This allowed us to test whether 
the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition evident in 
Chapter 4 was indeed stronger when individuals experience identity 
threat/misrecognition (an accuracy X chronic-misrecognition interaction), or 
whether the effect of accuracy is evident regardless of chronic-misrecognition (a 
main effect of accuracy, unmoderated by chronic-misrecognition).  
The current study tests these possibilities by manipulating both 
chronic/historic (mis)recognition and surveillance accuracy. A Welsh 
demographic was chosen for the purposes of this study, as Wales and Welsh 
people experience both national celebration and prejudice. Welsh people and 
culture are currently and historically stigmatised in an English context (e.g., 
frequent negative portrayals by public figures and in the media; Cosslett, 2018). 
However, there are also countless examples of Welsh achievements that have 
also been recognised worldwide (e.g. Baroness Tanni Grey-Thompson’s 
athletic achievements; Breen, 2018). As such, we drew upon examples of 
recognition of Welsh pride and achievement for the recognition condition, and 
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examples of disregard or misunderstanding of the Welsh for the misrecognition 
condition. A sample of people who identify as Welsh were presented with an 
article that either described Wales as being recognised and celebrated globally 
(recognition condition), or an article that described Wales as globally 
misrecognised and overlooked (misrecognition condition). The surveillance 
accuracy manipulation was then presented.  
We aimed to test between two possible effects: a main effect of 
surveillance accuracy only, or an interactive effect between surveillance 
accuracy and (mis)recognition. For the former, we predicted that surveillance of 
greater accuracy would be associated with more perceived group-based 
recognition, irrespective of (mis)recognition condition. For the latter, we 
predicted that an association would be found between surveillance accuracy 
and group-based recognition only when they perceived their group to be 
chronically misrecognised (misrecognition condition). Conversely, we did not 
predict those in the recognition condition would perceive recognition benefits 
from accurate surveillance, as their recognition needs are ostensibly met.  
 Based on our overall model, we predicted that more accurate 
surveillance would lead to greater privacy concern (the negative pathway). In 
turn, we anticipated that greater privacy concern would predict more negative 
and less positive feelings towards surveillance. A main effect of (mis)recognition 
was not expected, nor do we expect an interaction. To our knowledge, there is 
no evidence (empirical nor theoretical) that would suggest (mis)recognition is 
conceptually related to privacy concern. As discussed throughout this thesis, 
stronger predictors of privacy concern are the presence (compared to absence) 
of surveillance and the presentation of surveillance (e.g. the source of 
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surveillance, its potential consequences, and its accuracy; please refer to 
Chapters 1 and 3 for an overview). 
Method 
Participants and design 
Participants were recruited via Prolific Academic. A total of 417 
participants took part in the study; however 23 cases were deleted, as at least 
one dependent measure scale was incomplete. Therefore, a total of 394 
participants were included in the final sample. Of these, 68% were women (32% 
men) and one individual identified as non-binary. Participants’ mean age was 
36.46 years (SD = 13.13), and the majority of participants identified as White 
(95%; 2% mixed race, 2% Asian, >1% Black). A sensitivity analysis using 
g*power indicated that the sample of 394 is sufficient to detect an effect size 
using MANOVA of f = 0.15 (ηp2 = .02) with 80% power for the main effects of 
and interaction between surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition (two 
predictors; six groups). When using regression (four predictors), the current 
study is sufficient to detect an effect size of f = 0.14 (partial r = .14) with 80% 
power for each of the effects of distinctiveness, understanding, positivity, and 
privacy concern. 
 The study had a 2 (chronic (mis)recognition: recognised vs. 
misrecognised) X 3 (accuracy of surveillance: low, medium, and high) factorial 
between-participants design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
six conditions (manipulation material may be found in Appendix Q). Dependent 
variables were feelings towards surveillance (positive and negative) and 
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potential mediators included recognition (positivity, distinctiveness, 
understanding) and privacy concern.32  
Measures 
Unless otherwise stated, responses were recorded on a 7-point scale (1 
= Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree). Negatively-phrased items were 
reverse coded. 
Identity salience. Participants were asked to write three things that they 
felt made Welsh people different from those belonging to other nationalities 
(based on Haslam et al., 1999). This was included to ensure that the Welsh 
identity was salient at the time of completing the survey.   
Identification. Four items were adapted from Doosje et al.’s (1995) 
identification scale to measure identification as Welsh. Items included ‘I identify 
with other Welsh people’ and ‘I am glad to be Welsh’. All items were used for 
the final identification scale (α = .83, M = 5.44; SD = 0.84).  
Recognition manipulation. Participants were shown an article extract 
ostensibly from a popular online news website. The extract was titled either: 
‘Wales – a celebrated nation’ (recognition condition) or ‘Wales – an invisible 
nation?’ (misrecognition condition). The extract described Wales as being either 
recognised globally, or not. In the recognition condition, examples of St David’s 
Day (the patron saint day of Wales; a national day of celebration) ‘Google 
Doodles’33 were included to reinforce the manipulation. For the misrecognition 
 
32 Other measures were included in the survey but were not part of the analyses. All measures may be 
found in Appendix R.   
33 Google Doodles are variations in how the Google logo is portrayed on the Google home page. The logo 
is often artistically reimagined to reflect significant historic anniversaries or dates.  
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condition, a picture of the UK with Wales missing was included to reinforce the 
manipulation (a genuine image from a European Union reference book34).  
Recognition manipulation check. Seven items were included to check 
the effectiveness of the recognition manipulation. Five items were positively 
worded items adapted from the recognition measure (below).35 One item was 
included to check that participants understood the content of the article: ‘the 
article suggests that Welsh people are well recognised by wider society’. An 
additional item measured perceived discrimination: ‘Welsh people are 
mistreated by wider society’. All seven items were included to form the final 
scale (α = .88, M = 4.06; SD = 1.40).  
Accuracy manipulation. Participants were shown a second, ostensibly 
genuine article extract supposedly from the same news website. The article first 
described algorithmic surveillance before explaining that 89% of Welsh people 
found it accurate (high accuracy condition), 50% found it accurate (medium 
accuracy condition), or 89% of Welsh people found it inaccurate (low accuracy 
condition). Specifically, the article stated that Welsh people were 
rarely/sometimes/frequently miscategorised as English and provided English 
content. To reinforce the manipulation, examples of targeted Facebook material 
were shown (high accuracy: four adverts containing Welsh content; medium 
accuracy: two adverts containing Welsh content, two adverts containing English 
content; low accuracy: four adverts containing English content).  
Accuracy manipulation check. Five items were included to assess the 
effectiveness of the accuracy manipulation (e.g., ‘In my view, algorithmic 
 
34 BBC (2004). 
35 The recognition manipulation referred to how participants felt Wales and Welsh people were recognised 
generally (independent of surveillance). This differed from the main recognition measure, which related to 
(mis)recognition as a result of algorithmic surveillance.  
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surveillance creates an accurate impression of internet users’). Scores on the 
five items were averaged to create the final scale (α = .88, M = 3.57; SD = 
1.33). 
Perceived group-based recognition. Recognition was divided into 
three dimensions: positivity, distinctiveness, and understanding. Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis supported a three-factor structure (Appendix S).  
Positivity. Four items measured how positively participants felt Welsh 
people were perceived by others (e.g. ‘Welsh people are valued positively 
through algorithmic surveillance’). All four items were averaged to create the 
final scale (α = .88, M = 4.00; SD = 1.14). 
Distinctiveness. Four items measured the extent to which participants 
felt surveillance recognised Welsh people as a distinct nationality. Items 
included ‘Algorithmic surveillance enables society to recognise that Welsh 
people are a unique nationality’. Scores on all four items were averaged to 
create the final scale (α = .73, M = 3.55; SD = 1.23). 
Understanding. Four items measured the extent to which participants 
felt surveillance led to good understanding of the Welsh identity, such as 
‘Algorithmic surveillance helps wider society appreciate Welsh people’s values’. 
All four items were used to create the final scale (α = .88, M = 3.35; SD = 1.22). 
Feelings towards surveillance. Identical to our previous studies, 
feelings towards surveillance were measured with two scales: positive emotion 
and negative emotion. Participants were asked, ‘Algorithmic surveillance makes 
me feel…’ and were then presented with fourteen emotion items (seven items 
per scale).  
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 Positive feelings. All seven items, such as ‘happy’ and ‘pleased’ were 
averaged to form the positive feelings scale (α = .89, M = 4.96; SD = 1.00). 
Negative feelings. All seven items, such as ‘angry’ and ‘anxious’ were 
averaged to create the negative feelings scale (α = .89, M = 2.91; SD = 1.20). 
Privacy concern. Four items measured the extent to which participants 
felt surveillance compromised their privacy. Items included ‘Surveillance online 
is an invasion of privacy’ and ‘people have a right to use the internet without 
being surveilled’. All items were used to create the final scale (α = .63, M = 4.88; 
SD = 1.13). 
Demographics. Participants were asked to provide their age, gender, 
and ethnicity. They were also asked how long they spent online, whether they 
belonged to closed/private groups online, and how aware they were of 
surveillance online (1 = Not at all aware to 10 = Very aware). 
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through Prolific Academic, an online research 
participation system. The site’s screening tool was used to ensure that the study 
was only made accessible to those who identified as Welsh. Participants were 
presented with a brief description of the study before continuing to the consent 
form. After giving their informed consent, participants completed the pre-
manipulation measures before being randomly allocated to one of the six 
conditions. They were then shown the article relating to recognition of the Welsh 
identity before being asked to complete the recognition manipulation check 
measure. They were then presented with the article relating to surveillance 
accuracy, after which they were asked to complete the accuracy manipulation 
check and remaining dependent measures. On completion or withdrawal, 
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participants were fully debriefed and provided with online sources pertaining to 
internet privacy online should they feel concerned. Participants were financially 
compensated at a rate of £7.52 per hour. 
Results 
Missing data treatment 
 Analysis of missing data revealed that only 0.2% of values were missing 
across all measures. Missing values were imputed using the expectation-
maximisation (EM) method in SPSS (Graham, 2009) and all estimated values 
fell within the scale range.  
Manipulation checks 
Accuracy. A two-way ANOVA was used to test whether the surveillance 
accuracy manipulation affected participants’ perception of surveillance 
accuracy. A significant effect of surveillance accuracy was found on perceptions 
of surveillance accuracy, F(2, 388) = 177.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .477. Those in the 
high accuracy condition (M = 4.78, SD = 0.99) perceived surveillance as more 
accurate than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 3.38, SD = 0.95; p 
< .001). Additionally, those in the medium accuracy condition perceived 
surveillance as significantly more accurate than those in the low accuracy 
condition (M = 2.57, SD = 0.95; p < .001). Those in the high accuracy condition 
reported significantly higher accuracy perceptions than those in the low 
accuracy condition (p < .001). Therefore, the accuracy manipulation was 
considered successful. The (mis)recognition manipulation did not affect 
surveillance accuracy perceptions (F(1, 388) = 0.16, p = .692, ηp2 < .001), and 
there was no evidence of an interaction between (mis)recognition and 
surveillance accuracy (F(2, 388) = 1.32, p = .267, ηp2 = .007).  
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Recognition. A similar two-way ANOVA was used to test whether the 
(mis)recognition manipulation affected participants’ feelings of group-based 
recognition. A significant effect of (mis)recognition was found for perceived 
recognition, F(1, 388) = 514.09, p < .001, ηp2 = .570. Those in the 
misrecognised condition (M = 3.01, SD = 0.92) perceived significantly less 
recognition than those in the recognised condition (M = 5.12, SD = 0.93). 
Consequently, the recognition manipulation was considered successful. 
Surveillance accuracy was not associated with chronic group-based recognition 
(F(2, 388) = 0.85, p = .427, ηp2 = .004), and there was no evidence of an 
interaction between surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition (F(2, 388) = 
0.02, p = .984, ηp2 < .001). Table 15 presents the correlations between the 
measured (dependent) variables in the study. 
 
Table 15. Summary of Pearson correlations between dependent variables in the 
predicted model. 
Measure 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Accuracy check -       
2. Recognition check .13* -      
3. Positivity .69*** .30*** -     
4. Understanding .65*** .26*** .73*** -    
5. Distinctiveness .76*** .18*** .76*** .74*** -   
6. Privacy Concern -.11* -.01 -.14** -.21*** -.14** -  
7. Positive feelings .13** .15** .17** .13* .12* -.07 - 
8. Negative feelings -.10* -.15** -.13* -.08 -.09 -.06 -.71*** 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Hypothesis testing 
Feelings towards surveillance. A 2(chronic (mis)recognition: 
recognised, misrecognised) x 3 (surveillance accuracy: low, medium, and high) 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with positive and 
negative feelings entered as dependent variables. The multivariate main effect 
of (mis)recognition was not significant, Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F = 0.75, p = 
.472, ηp2 = .004. The multivariate main effect of surveillance accuracy was not 
significant, Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F = 0.35, p = .847, ηp2 = .002. There was no 
evidence of a multivariate interaction between (mis)recognition and surveillance 
accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = 1.00, F = 0.38, p = .825, ηp2 = .002. 
Positive feelings. No main effects were found of surveillance accuracy, 
F(2, 388) = 0.46, p = .635, ηp2 = .002, or chronic (mis)recognition, F(1, 388) = 
0.004, p = .949, ηp2 < .001, on positive feelings towards surveillance. 
Additionally, the interaction between surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition 
on positive feelings towards surveillance was not significant, F(2, 388) = 0.56, p 
= .576, ηp2= .003. 
Negative feelings. No main effect was found for surveillance accuracy 
on negative feelings towards surveillance, F(2, 388) = 0.45, p = .638, ηp2 = .002, 
nor chronic (mis)recognition, F(1, 388) = 0.83, p = .362, ηp2 = .002. No 
interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition on 
negative feelings towards surveillance, F(2, 388) = 0.31, p = .735, ηp2 = .002. 
Positive psychological outcomes: Group-based recognition. A 
second 2(chronic (mis)recognition: recognised, misrecognised) X 3 
(surveillance accuracy: low, medium, and high) MANOVA was conducted with 
distinctiveness, positivity, and understanding entered as dependent variables. 
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The multivariate main effect of (mis)recognition was significant, Wilks’ Lambda 
= .96, F = 5.55, p = .001, ηp2 = .041. A significant multivariate main effect was 
also found for surveillance accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = .55, F = 45.37, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .261. There was no indication of a multivariate interaction between chronic 
(mis)recognition and surveillance accuracy, Wilks’ Lambda = .98, F = 1.40, p = 
.212, ηp2 = .011.  
Distinctiveness. A significant main effect of surveillance accuracy was 
found on distinctiveness, F(2, 388) = 135.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .411, with those in 
the low accuracy condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.92) reporting significantly less 
distinctiveness than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 3.37, SD = 
0.93, p < .001). Additionally, those in the medium accuracy condition reported 
significantly less distinctiveness than those in the high accuracy condition (M = 
4.60, SD = 1.00, p < .001). The high accuracy condition was also associated 
with significantly more distinctiveness than the low accuracy condition (p < 
.001).  
There was no main effect of chronic (mis)recognition on perceived 
distinctiveness, F(1, 388) = 0.002, p = .965, ηp2 < .001, and no interaction was 
found between surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition, F(2, 388) = 2.27, p = 
.105, ηp2 = .012. 
Understanding. A significant main effect was found for surveillance 
accuracy on felt understanding, F(2, 388) = 58.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .233. Those in 
the low accuracy condition (M = 2.67, SD = 0.94) reported significantly less 
understanding than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 3.31, SD = 
1.10, p < .001). Those in the medium accuracy condition reported significantly 
less understanding than those in the high accuracy condition (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.17, p < .001). Highly accurate surveillance was also associated with 
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significantly more felt understanding than surveillance of low accuracy (p < 
.001). 
No main effect was found for chronic (mis)recognition on felt 
understanding, F(1, 388) = 0.36, p = .551, ηp2= .001. The interaction between 
(mis)recognition and surveillance accuracy approached significance, F(2, 388) 
= 2.72, p = .067, ηp2 = .014, however the effect of accuracy was significant for 
both the recognition, F(2, 388) = 23.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .106 and misrecognition 
groups , F(2, 388) = 38.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .164 (see Figure 14).  
 
 
Positivity. A significant main effect was found for surveillance accuracy 
on perceived positivity, F(2, 388) = 108.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .358. Those in the 
low accuracy condition (M = 3.17, SD = 0.95) reported significantly less 
positivity than those in the medium accuracy condition (M = 4.02, SD = 0.94, p 
< .001). Surveillance of medium accuracy was associated with significantly less 
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Figure 14. The conditional effect of surveillance accuracy on felt 
understanding at the two levels of recognition. 
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understanding than high (M = 4.83, SD = 0.87, p < .001). Highly accurate 
surveillance was associated with significantly more perceived positivity than low 
(p < .001).  
 Additionally, a main effect of chronic (mis)recognition was found for 
perceived positivity, F(1, 388) = 9.52, p = .002, ηp2 = .024. The misrecognised 
group reported significantly less perceived positivity (M = 3.84, SD = 1.15) than 
the recognised group (M = 4.16, SD = 1.12). 
No interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and chronic 
(mis)recognition on perceived positivity, F(2, 388) = 0.23, p = .795, ηp2= .001.  
Privacy concern. A 2(chronic (mis)recognition: recognised, 
misrecognised) X 3 (surveillance accuracy: low, medium, and high) ANOVA 
was conducted with privacy concern as the dependent variable. No main effect 
was found for surveillance accuracy on privacy concern, F(2, 388) = 0.87, p = 
.422, ηp2 = .004. The main effect of chronic (mis)recognition on privacy concerns 
approached significance, F(1, 388) = 2.80, p = .095, ηp2 = .007. Those in the 
misrecognised condition (M = 4.79, SD = 1.11) reported marginally less privacy 
concern than those in the recognised condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.13).  
No interaction was found between surveillance accuracy and 
(mis)recognition on privacy concern, F(2, 388) = 1.93, p = .147, ηp2 = .010. 
Psychological outcomes on feelings towards surveillance. Two 
multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate whether privacy 
concerns and group-based recognition (positivity, distinctiveness, 
understanding) predicted feelings towards surveillance (positive and negative). 
Positive feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
significant and explained 2% of the variance (R2adj = .02, F(4, 389) = 2.97, p = 
.019). Results are presented in Table 16.  
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Of the recognition measures, positivity was the only dimension to predict 
positive feelings towards surveillance. Greater perceptions of positivity 
predicted more positive feelings towards surveillance. Privacy concerns did not 
predict positive feelings towards surveillance.    
 
Table 16. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and positive feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
-.04 -.05 -0.90  .367 
Distinctiveness -.02 -.02 -0.27 .787 
Understanding .01 .02 0.19 .851 
Positivity .14 .16 1.98 .049 
 
Negative feelings towards surveillance. The overall model was 
marginally significant and explained 1% of the variance (R2 adj = .01, F(4, 389) 
= 2.32, p = .057). Results are presented in Table 17.  
Perceived positivity approached significance, with more perceived 
positivity predicting marginally less negative feelings towards surveillance. 
Privacy concern did not significantly predict negative feelings towards 
surveillance.  
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Table 17. Multiple regression analysis investigating the relationship between 
psychological outcomes and negative feelings towards surveillance 
IV b β t p 
Privacy 
concern 
-.09 -.08 -1.61  .109 
Distinctiveness .01 .01 0.09 .928 
Understanding .01 .01 0.15 .878 
Positivity -.16 -.15 -1.85 .065 
 
Discussion 
In Chapters 3 and 4 we argued that evidence of an association between 
surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition was found (whereas they 
were not in Study 1) because identity needs were salient (i.e., participants 
experienced identity threat/misrecognition). However, we did not directly 
manipulate identity threat/recognition. To address this, the current study 
manipulated recognition directly by informing Welsh participants that Welsh 
people were either misrecognised (e.g., perceived as English and national 
achievements ignored/erased in media and literature) or recognised (e.g., 
Wales is a celebrated nation that is globally lauded).  
If the association between surveillance accuracy and group-based 
recognition was in turn dependent on salient misrecognition, then the effect of 
accuracy should have been weaker in the recognition condition (compared to 
the misrecognition condition), as recognition needs are already met. In contrast, 
the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition in the 
misrecognition condition should have been stronger, as participants in this 
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condition would not have their recognition needs met and would therefore 
experience more accurate surveillance as an opportunity to bolster group-based 
recognition.  
The positive pathway: (Mis)recognition does not moderate the association 
between surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition  
The results provided little evidence for an interaction between 
surveillance accuracy and (mis)recognition. No interaction was found between 
surveillance accuracy and chronic (mis)recognition on group-based recognition. 
Instead, we found stronger support for the model proposed in Chapter 1, 
whereby surveillance of greater accuracy is associated with more group-based 
recognition per se. This effect was found for all recognition dimensions and was 
irrespective of whether participants believed their group was chronically 
recognised or misrecognised.    
 The current results support our broader prediction that accurate 
surveillance may function as an opportunity for recognition for those who are 
stigmatised or chronically misrecognised. On the other hand, inaccurate 
surveillance has the potential to undermine or threaten recognition for groups 
that already feel recognised. For those in the recognition condition, believing 
that their group was recognised was not protective against the effects of 
inaccurate surveillance. As a result, inaccurate surveillance may still function as 
an identity threat for otherwise well-recognised groups. Indeed, Branscombe et 
al. (1999) identified four categories of identity threat: categorisation threat, 
distinctiveness threat, threats to the value of social identity, and acceptance 
threat. These forms of threat may all be experienced to varying degrees in 
surveillance contexts. For example, surveillance may inaccurately identify a 
user as belonging to a specific social group (categorisation threat). This was 
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illustrated in Stuart and Levine (2017) by a participant who reported unease 
when mistakenly identified as a gay male: ‘But then I started getting adverts for 
gays all around [location]…and I was like no thanks I am really not interested in 
that…I was like ah!’ (p. 701).  
Additionally, research by Patel (2012) highlights the potential for 
individuals to feel distinctiveness and value threat through inaccurate 
surveillance. For example, one participant (Alana) found that others perceived 
her headscarf to signal a terrorist identity: “‘oh, she must be a terrorist or hiding 
something’…for me it’s a positive thing and it’s about modesty” (p. 228). Here, 
inaccurate surveillance from the public contributes to both distinctiveness and 
value threat, whereby Alana felt the Muslim identity was considered 
synonymous with terrorism (distinctiveness threat) and that a positive aspect of 
her identity was perceived negatively by others. The current study provides 
quantitative evidence to support this, as those who believed surveillance was 
less accurate reported less group-based recognition, suggesting that individuals 
may experience less accurate surveillance as identity threatening. Thus, the 
accuracy of surveillance may have the ability to shape group-based recognition, 
regardless of a group’s prior levels of recognition.  
 Group-based recognition may predict feelings towards surveillance. 
In turn, we predicted that greater perceptions of group-based recognition would 
predict more positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance. This was 
only partially supported by our findings. As expected, a greater belief that one’s 
group was perceived positively by surveillance predicted more positive and 
(marginally) less negative feelings towards surveillance. However, 
distinctiveness and understanding did not predict feelings towards surveillance, 
contrary to expectations.  
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 These findings are not necessarily at odds with the results from previous 
chapters. For example, in Study 3a understanding did not uniquely predict 
negative feelings towards surveillance and distinctiveness predicted neither 
positive nor negative feelings towards surveillance. Additionally, in Study 2c, 
neither distinctiveness nor understanding uniquely predicted feelings towards 
surveillance. However, in these studies there were nevertheless strong (and 
modest yet significant) zero-order correlations between the group-based 
recognition dimensions and feelings towards surveillance. Therefore, whilst 
each dimension may not (consistently) uniquely predict feelings towards 
surveillance, the potential predictive power of the measure as a whole is worth 
noting here and in the studies mentioned above.  
 As suggested elsewhere in this thesis, it could be argued that each 
recognition dimension may vary in importance depending on the group’s 
recognition needs at that time. For example, a prominent stereotype of Welsh 
people is that they are of lesser intellect and ability compared to other British 
people, specifically the English. This was illustrated in a survey conducted by 
the magazine Maxim, in which nearly half of non-Welsh British men perceived 
Welsh people as the least intelligent nationality in the United Kingdom (“Special 
report Welsh men are ‘most stupid’”, 1999). Therefore, it could be argued that 
Welsh people may value positivity to a greater extent than the other recognition 
dimensions.  
It is also worth noting that during data collection the United Kingdom had 
invoked Article 50 following the European Union referendum and was in the 
process of leaving the EU. Whilst speculative, it could be argued that during this 
period the Welsh identity was less central to Welsh people compared to the 
superordinate British Identity. Therefore, whilst individuals may have still been 
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susceptible to variations in Welsh recognition, the consequences of feeling 
more or less recognised (as Welsh) may differ. It is possible that whilst 
surveillance of greater accuracy increased feelings of distinctiveness, 
individuals may have felt more apathetic towards such increases in group 
distinctiveness, as their Welsh identity was less salient compared to their British 
identity at the time of data collection. As this is speculative, further research is 
needed to explore whether group-based recognition dimensions vary in their 
psychological consequences depending on the socio-political context.   
 Alternatively, it could be that participant fatigue may have accounted for 
some of the null findings here. Participants were asked to read two separate 
pieces of substantial text before completing the survey. Additionally, the 
measures pertaining to feelings towards surveillance approached the end of the 
survey. It could be argued that participants lost interest or struggled to maintain 
their attention towards the latter half of the survey. This may also account for 
the null finding between privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance 
(outlined below). 
The negative pathway: Surveillance of greater accuracy was not 
associated with increased privacy concern  
As predicted in our model presented in Chapter 1, we expected more 
accurate surveillance to be associated with greater privacy concern. Whilst we 
also manipulated the level of group-based recognition in this study, we did not 
expect an interaction between surveillance accuracy and recognition, nor a 
main effect of recognition. No main effect was found for (mis)recognition on 
privacy concern (although this approached significance) and no interaction was 
found. However, contrary to our expectations, no main effect was found for 
surveillance accuracy on privacy concern. It is worth noting that accuracy 
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perceptions were associated with privacy concern, yet this was in the opposite 
direction to what was expected; perceiving surveillance as more accurate 
predicted less privacy concern.  
 A negative association between surveillance accuracy perceptions and 
privacy concerns was also found in Studies 2b and 3a. As with Study 3a, it 
could be that as Welsh people are historically stigmatised, accurate 
representation through surveillance may be considered a fair trade for their 
privacy. As a result, individuals who perceive a fair trade may experience less 
concern for their privacy. This was illustrated by Pavone and Esposti (2010), 
who found that individuals who perceive surveillance as providing some benefit 
(e.g., safety) are less likely to report privacy concern. In these cases, as 
surveillance is perceived to serve a purpose and provide benefits to the group, 
individuals may be less likely to experience privacy concern and instead 
perceive surveillance as less privacy infringing.  
 Privacy concern did not predict feelings towards surveillance. We 
predicted that greater privacy concern would be associated with more negative 
and less positive feelings towards surveillance. Results did not indicate a 
significant association between privacy concern and positive nor negative 
feelings towards surveillance. This does not support our findings from the other 
studies included in this thesis, all of which indicated a consistent association 
between privacy concern and feelings towards surveillance.  
 As mentioned above, it could be that respondent fatigue may account for 
these null findings. The current study was comparatively longer than the other 
studies presented in this thesis, as there were two manipulation texts and an 
additional manipulation check. It could be suggested that as the privacy concern 
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measure appeared late in the survey, participants may have experienced 
survey fatigue. Additionally, as the study was conducted online via Prolific 
Academic, participants were not in the presence of the researcher, which may 
have reduced investment in participation, particularly towards the end of the 
survey. Consequently, as our other studies presented in this project have 
consistently demonstrated an association between privacy concern and feelings 
towards surveillance, the null result in this case (and elsewhere in the study, as 
discussed above) may not indicate the absence of an effect. 
Limitations and future research 
 There was no evidence of an interaction between surveillance accuracy 
and chronic (mis)recognition on group-based recognition. Additionally, Studies 
2b and 2c found no interaction between surveiller identity and surveillance 
accuracy. Together, this indicates that the positive pathway in the predicted 
model may be true for – and not limited to – groups that already perceive group-
based recognition. Nevertheless, as we found some evidence that surveillance 
accuracy may not provide recognition benefits when recognition needs are met 
(Study 2a), future research may still benefit from testing the positive pathway 
within additional group-based contexts where recognition needs vary.    
 Additionally, positivity was the only recognition dimension to uniquely 
predict feelings towards surveillance. It is likely that the recognition dimensions 
cancelled out the effects of one another (at least for positive feelings, as all 
group-based recognition dimensions had positive and significant zero-order 
correlations with positive feelings towards surveillance). However, as argued 
above, positivity may also be comparatively more important for Welsh people 
than the other dimensions due to the content of Welsh stereotypes and the 
political climate during data collection. As such, future research should test our 
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assumptions by recruiting those from other social groups who have different 
social identity needs compared to the participants in the current study. For 
example, Hopkins (2011) found British Muslims felt their dual identity was rarely 
recognised. Participants in this case often reported feelings of misrecognition, 
as they were often miscategorised as Muslim, which was often synonymous 
with being foreign. For these individuals, distinctiveness was a salient 
component of what is meant to experience group-based recognition. Therefore, 
as different social groups have various identity needs, future research may find 
that the group-based recognition dimensions have a different relationship with 
feelings towards surveillance than those found in the current study.    
Summary 
This study tested whether surveillance accuracy and chronic 
(mis)recognition have an interactive or additive effect on group-based 
recognition. Our results did not find evidence for an interaction. Instead, 
surveillance of greater accuracy was associated with more group-based 
recognition, irrespective of (mis)recognition condition. These findings build upon 
those from previous chapters in several important ways. These will be 
discussed in the following chapter, along with a discussion of potential 
limitations of the present thesis, avenues for future research, and real-world 
implications of our findings.    
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CHAPTER 6 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This thesis has examined the processes behind variation in people’s 
feelings towards algorithmic surveillance. We have provided a social 
psychological perspective on algorithmic surveillance that contributes to both 
psychological and digital technology literature. Specifically, we investigated 
whether surveillance accuracy (i.e., the extent to which those surveilled believe 
surveillance mirrors their own self-concept, including salient social identities) 
helps to explain variation in feelings towards surveillance through two 
competing pathways: a positive pathway through group-based recognition, and 
a negative pathway through privacy concern.  
Summary of findings 
 In Chapter 1 we argued that whilst previous research has explored the 
negative consequences (both psychological and social) of surveillance, little 
research has investigated potential positive consequences that may help 
explain the variation in people’s feelings towards surveillance. As surveillance 
aims to identify aspects of our self which are central to our identity, we argued 
that (group-based) recognition may serve as a positive outcome of surveillance. 
Additionally, we highlighted that previous research typically approaches 
surveillance as a binary concept; the consequences of surveillance are 
compared to those where surveillance is absent. Whilst this distinction is useful, 
the current ubiquity of surveillance suggests a more nuanced approach may be 
more relevant. Specifically, surveillance can vary in its accuracy, whereby the 
assumptions surveillance makes about users’ characteristics may be more or 
less accurate. Thus, Chapter 1 argued that more accurate surveillance would 
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be associated with greater privacy concern and (group-based) recognition, and 
that these would predict more negative and more positive feelings towards 
surveillance respectively.  
 The empirical investigation presented in Chapter 2 examined the effects 
of surveillance at three levels of accuracy (high, medium, and low) on 
recognition and privacy concern, and whether these psychological outcomes 
predicted feelings towards surveillance. It is important to note that our first 
empirical study focussed on individual-based recognition; our approach evolved 
after Study 1 to explore the effects of surveillance accuracy on group-based 
recognition for reasons that will be explored further below. In Chapter 2 we 
found some support for the negative pathway: surveillance of high accuracy 
was associated with more privacy concern than surveillance of medium 
accuracy; however, this was only true for those who used the internet to a 
greater extent. Additionally, greater privacy concerns predicted more negative 
feelings towards surveillance. We also found partial support for the positive 
pathway; surveillance accuracy was not associated with greater recognition, yet 
greater recognition predicted more positive feelings towards surveillance.  
 We concluded in Chapter 2 that our experimental design did not raise 
specific social identity-related concerns, and in turn did not make group-based 
recognition needs salient. We argued that this could have accounted for the null 
effect of surveillance accuracy on recognition, as participants may have 
believed their recognition needs were met. As such, following Study 1 we aimed 
to make a specific identity salient by focussing on social identity and group-
based recognition. Consequently, Chapters 3 and 4 aimed to make group-
based recognition needs salient by (1) making the identity of the surveiller 
known as either the ingroup or outgroup (Chapter 3), and (2) recruiting samples 
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from chronically-misrecognised groups (Chapter 4). Thus, from Chapter 3 
onwards we measured group-based recognition rather than individual-based 
recognition.  
 Positive pathway: Positive feelings towards surveillance through 
group-based recognition. In Chapter 3, we investigated whether the 
surveiller’s social identity would moderate the association between surveillance 
accuracy and group-based recognition. We anticipated a linear association 
between accuracy and group-based recognition when the surveiller belonged to 
an outgroup, as outgroup audiences typically prompt identity related concerns 
(Hopkins et al., 2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012). In this 
instance, accurate surveillance may function as a communicative tool through 
which to garner recognition. We expected the association between surveillance 
accuracy and group-based recognition to be weaker when the surveiller 
belonged to the ingroup, as recognition is already implied through shared group 
membership and therefore surveillance cannot provide any further group-based 
recognition benefits. In turn, we predicted that greater group-based recognition 
would predict more positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance.  
Chapter 3 provided some support for these predictions. Study 2a found 
that surveiller identity moderated the relationship between surveillance accuracy 
and group-based recognition; the linear association between surveillance 
accuracy and group-based recognition was only present for those surveilled by 
the outgroup. However, this finding was not replicated by the remaining 
empirical work in Chapter 3. Instead, we found greater support for independent 
effects of accuracy and surveiller identity. Surveillance of greater accuracy 
(either the manipulation itself or accuracy perceptions) was associated with 
more group-based recognition. Surveiller identity was also associated with 
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group-based recognition indirectly through trust: the ingroup surveiller was 
trusted to a greater extent, and greater trust was associated with more group-
based recognition. Therefore, Chapter 3 provided evidence for the positive 
pathway, whereby surveillance of greater accuracy and ingroup surveillance 
was associated with more group-based recognition, which predicted more 
positive feelings towards surveillance.  
 Chapters 4 and 5 also provided support for the positive pathway from 
accurate surveillance. In Chapter 4 we aimed to make group-based recognition 
needs salient by recruiting samples from chronically misrecognised groups 
(surveiller social identity was not manipulated). Study 3a (which sampled people 
who identified as gay) found that those who perceived surveillance as more 
accurate were more likely to feel that their group was better recognised. 
Additionally, Studies 3b and 4 found that participants who believed surveillance 
was of greater accuracy were also more likely to report greater group-based 
recognition. In sum, this thesis provides strong evidence that accurate 
surveillance can bolster perceptions of group-based recognition when social 
identity is salient.  
 The indirect relationship between surveillance accuracy and feelings 
toward surveillance through group-based recognition was somewhat less 
consistent, yet encouraging. Study 3a found an indirect effect between 
surveillance accuracy and feelings towards surveillance through the positivity 
dimension of group-based recognition: believing that surveillance was more 
accurate predicted more perceived group positivity, which in turn predicted 
more positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance. No indirect 
effects were found through understanding nor distinctiveness. Study 3b then 
found an indirect relationship between surveillance accuracy and feelings 
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towards surveillance through distinctiveness.36 Surveillance of greater accuracy 
was associated with a greater perception that one’s group is perceived as 
distinct. In turn, more perceived distinctiveness was associated with more 
positive and less negative feelings towards surveillance. An indirect relationship 
was also found through positivity on negative feelings: more accurate 
surveillance was associated with a greater feeling that one’s group is perceived 
positivity, which in turn predicted less negative feelings towards surveillance. No 
indirect effect was found through positivity on positive feelings towards 
surveillance. Therefore, despite some inconsistencies, our findings lend some 
support to our prediction that surveillance of greater accuracy predicts more 
positive (and less negative) feelings towards surveillance through increased 
group-based recognition.  
 Negative pathway: Negative feelings towards surveillance through 
privacy concern. This thesis does not provide strong support for the negative 
pathway, whereby more accurate surveillance was expected to predict more 
negative and less positive feelings towards surveillance through privacy 
concern. In Chapter 4, Study 3a found an indirect relationship between 
surveillance accuracy perceptions and feelings towards surveillance through 
privacy concern; however, this was in the opposite direction to what was 
expected. Perceiving surveillance as more accurate predicted fewer privacy 
concerns, which in turn predicted more positive and less negative feelings 
towards surveillance. Additionally, no direct association was found between 
surveillance accuracy and privacy concern in the studies in Chapter 3,37 Study 
3b, or in Chapter 5. Consequently, our findings do not support the full negative 
 
36 In this study the distinctiveness and understanding dimension items were combined. 
37 Studies 2a and 2b found an association between surveillance accuracy perceptions and privacy 
concern, but no effect was found for the accuracy manipulation itself. 
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pathway of our predicted model. Instead, our findings suggest that surveillance 
accuracy may have little effect on privacy concern over and above the effect of 
the presence of surveillance 
 However, we found stronger support for the latter part of the predicted 
negative pathway; our findings suggest that those who experience greater 
privacy concern surrounding surveillance are more likely to feel less positively 
and more negatively towards surveillance. Privacy concern consistently 
predicted feelings towards surveillance in the expected direction in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4. However, the study presented in Chapter 5 did not replicate these 
findings, as privacy concern did not predict positive nor negative feelings 
towards surveillance. Nevertheless, the empirical work presented in this thesis 
overall provides strong support for the predicted association between privacy 
concern and feelings towards surveillance.   
 Are group-based recognition benefits through accurate surveillance 
contingent on misrecognition? In Chapter 2 we found no association 
between surveillance accuracy and recognition. Here, we suggested that no 
association was found because social identity concerns were not made salient, 
and as such, participants may have felt their recognition needs were already 
met. Our argument was supported by the findings from Chapters 3 and 4, where 
an association was more consistently found between surveillance accuracy and 
group-based recognition in contexts where social identity concerns were salient.  
It is also important to note that the two studies in Chapter 3 that found a 
weaker association between surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition 
(Studies 2a and 2b) relied on psychology student samples. When recruiting 
students from psychology, it is possible that participants may attempt to guess 
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the aims of the study or display less engagement with study materials, as they 
are encouraged to participate in research throughout their studies and thus may 
experience participation fatigue. In our studies that included samples from the 
general population, we found the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-
based recognition to be stronger. Thus, taken together we argued that social 
identity concerns may need to be salient for those surveilled to achieve group-
based recognition benefits.  
To test whether group-based recognition from accurate surveillance is 
indeed contingent on social identity concern (misrecognition), in Study 4 
(Chapter 5) we manipulated chronic (mis)recognition directly before presenting 
participants with the surveillance accuracy manipulation. We predicted that an 
association between accuracy and group-based recognition would only be 
found for those who believed their group was already misrecognised. We did 
not predict an association for those who believed their group was recognised, 
as accurate surveillance was unlikely to provide any further recognition benefits. 
Contrary to our expectations, chronic (mis)recognition was not found to 
moderate the association between surveillance accuracy and recognition. 
Instead, surveillance of greater accuracy led to more group-based recognition 
for those in both recognition conditions.  
Additionally, in Chapter 3, only Study 2a found any evidence that 
surveiller identity moderated the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based 
recognition. Specifically, only those surveilled by the outgroup (and not the 
ingroup) perceived group-based recognition benefits from accurate surveillance. 
Studies 2b and 2c did not find that surveiller identity moderated the relationship 
between surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition. Together this may 
suggest that chronic misrecognition/social identity concern is not necessary for 
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individuals to experience group-based recognition through accurate 
surveillance. Instead, the effect of surveillance accuracy on group-based 
recognition may be more pervasive than we first anticipated. Individuals may 
simply require a social identity to be salient to achieve group-based recognition, 
and group-based recognition benefits may be achieved irrespective of a group’s 
perceived status or appraisal.  
Contributions of the present thesis 
 Previous research has established a body of evidence that suggests 
individuals experience negative outcomes from surveillance, predominantly in 
the form of privacy concern (e.g. Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Dinev & Hart, 2004; 
Möllers & Hälterlein, 2013). Whilst the negative outcomes of surveillance are 
well researched, there is little evidence that addresses the ambivalence 
individuals often feel towards surveillance (Ellis et al., 2013; Graham & Wood, 
2003). As discussed in Chapter 1, public reactions towards surveillance 
systems are typically variable, such as the recent example of the public 
response to Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and the subsequent sharing of 
data (Tech Crunch, 2016). Public outcry followed the acquisition, yet 
Facebook’s users continued to rise (a phenomenon identified as the privacy 
paradox; Barnes, 2006; Norberg et al., 2007). In this thesis we aimed to explore 
the processes underlying this variation in four key ways: (1) by manipulating 
surveillance accuracy; (2) examining positive outcomes of surveillance in the 
form of group-based recognition; (3) examining the role of social identity within 
surveillance contexts (rather than individual/personal identity-based 
approaches); and (4) by examining the link between surveillance accuracy and 
privacy concern.  
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The role of accuracy. Firstly, we have gone beyond the binary 
distinction of surveillance as either present or absent by manipulating 
surveillance accuracy. As discussed earlier in this thesis, surveillance accuracy 
here pertains to the extent to which individuals believe surveillance mirrors 
one’s own self-concept, including salient social identities. Therefore, 
surveillance accuracy is the subjective appraisal of the user (and may thus 
deviate from the surveiller’s concept or measurement of accuracy). Previous 
literature has typically explored the consequences of surveillance by comparing 
its effects to contexts without surveillance (e.g. Blackwood et al., 2015; Dawson 
et al., 2005; Marthews & Tucker, 2017; McDonald & Cranor, 2010; Oulasvirta et 
al., 2012; Pavone & Esposti, 2010). In this thesis we have argued that 
surveillance – particularly algorithmic surveillance – is more nuanced and its 
perceived accuracy can be highly consequential. In Chapter 1 we outlined how 
the quantity of data analysed can contribute to variations in surveillance 
accuracy (Maass, 2015) and that individuals are often aware of – and have 
opinions towards – surveillance accuracies and inaccuracies (Ur et al., 2012). 
Thus, we explored how variations in surveillance accuracy affect psychological 
outcomes and subsequent feelings towards surveillance. Indeed, here we have 
demonstrated that surveillance accuracy is quite consistently associated with 
positive psychological outcomes in the form of group-based recognition 
benefits. 
 Additionally, we found evidence that surveillance accuracy is not 
consistently associated with more privacy concern. Conversely, we found that 
surveillance of higher accuracy led to fewer privacy concerns in some cases. As 
a result, we demonstrate in this thesis the importance of going beyond the 
present/absent distinction in surveillance literature, as nuance in surveillance 
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accuracy may determine how people respond to surveillance technologies. This 
also highlights that the negative outcomes of surveillance already highlighted in 
the literature, such as chilling effects (Marthews & Tucker, 2017; Penney, 2016; 
Stoycheff, 2016), lack of perceived control (Eslami et al., 2015; Garrido, 2015) 
and privacy concern (Almuhimedi et al., 2015; Möllers & Hälterlein, 2013) may 
be worth revisiting within the context of surveillance accuracy, as our findings 
suggest that outcomes may differ depending on how accurate participants 
believe surveillance to be. 
Positive psychological outcomes in the form of group-based 
recognition. Secondly, we have examined potential positive outcomes of 
surveillance in the form of group-based recognition. Within this thesis we have 
found that accurate surveillance has the potential to provide groups with 
increased recognition. In The presentation of self in everyday life, Goffman 
argues that individuals strive to be considered in a way that aligns with their 
own self concept, and that we engage in identity performances in order to 
achieve this. Indeed, research has found that individuals who do not feel 
recognised will engage in behaviour to address these misconceptions (Klein & 
Azzi, 2001). Our findings here extend this literature by demonstrating that 
perception accuracy (i.e. the alignment of others’ perceptions with one’s self 
concept) is an integral antecedent of group-based recognition, and that 
recognition is less likely if individuals believe they are perceived inaccurately.  
Additionally, this thesis has highlighted that group-based recognition 
online may be possible outside of peer-to-peer networks. Previous literature has 
highlighted the use of online media to garner recognition from peers. For 
example, Kennedy (2006) found that disadvantaged women perceived their 
personal online homepages as a platform on which to gain recognition from 
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other online users. This mirrors users’ perceptions of social media sites, such 
as Facebook. Steeves (2016) found that adolescents use Facebook to curate 
their image in a way that increases recognition from their social network. The 
current thesis extends this by illustrating that surveillance may provide internet 
users with an additional vehicle to bolster recognition, even when surveillance is 
not conducted by a peer or when the identity of the surveiller is unknown. 
Additionally, whilst social media sites such as Facebook require users to 
actively build their profile, algorithmic surveillance is unique in that an 
individual’s profile is built indirectly through their general engagement online. 
Consequently, our findings suggest that (accurate) surveillance can provide 
individuals with group-based recognition from an abstract or unknown audience, 
which is comparatively passive to the more active ‘performance’ that is required 
in other social contexts.  
Furthermore, this thesis demonstrates that the degree to which 
individuals experience group-based recognition from surveillance may 
contribute to their feelings towards it. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, the 
processes underlying people’s feelings towards surveillance are rarely 
examined. Positivity and/or negativity is often assumed from the outcomes 
under investigation (e.g., Dinev et al., 2008). Whilst intuitive, we demonstrate 
here that greater perceptions of group-based recognition have the potential to 
increase positive (and reduce negative) feelings towards surveillance.  
It is important to note, though, that certain dimensions of recognition 
appeared to more consistently predict feelings towards surveillance, namely 
positivity. Indeed, previous literature has argued that aspects of one’s group 
identity are more central/salient than others depending on the context or social 
pressures (Kelman, 2004). For example, in Barreto et al.’s (2003) research, 
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dual nationality (Dutch-Portuguese) participants were more likely to express 
their Dutch identity when anonymous to a Dutch audience compared to when 
they were identifiable. The authors argued that their claim to the Dutch identity 
was weakened when identifiable to a Dutch audience, as the legitimacy of this 
claim is more likely to be questioned than when anonymous. Thus, contextual 
pressures – in this case, identifiability to the assumed audience – modified 
which aspects of participant’s identity were salient or appropriate to display.  
Our findings also suggest that identity needs may vary between groups 
and contexts. For example, in Study 3a we found that positivity (but not 
distinctiveness) predicted more positive feelings towards surveillance. It could 
be argued that for those identifying as gay, being perceived positively is more 
central to their identity than being considered distinct. As such, increases in 
distinctiveness may be less likely to affect feelings towards surveillance, as it is 
less central to their social identity. Here, it is possible that increased group-
based recognition does not always predict feelings towards surveillance, as 
groups may value each recognition dimension differently depending on the 
context, and certain recognition dimensions may be more fundamental 
generally to the group’s identity than others. However, as discussed elsewhere 
in this thesis, an alternative and perhaps more likely explanation may be that 
the dimensions of group-based recognition cancelled out the effects of one 
another. Instead, group-based recognition overall may consistently predict 
feelings towards surveillance in ways that are not attributable to any given 
dimension of recognition. Returning to the SIT perspective, the importance is 
being seen as positively distinct, and not just as distinct.  
Chapters 3 and 5 also suggest that accurate surveillance may provide 
recognition benefits even in contexts where recognition needs are already met. 
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In Studies 2b and 2c, group-based recognition was increased by accurate 
surveillance (or was predicted by perceptions of surveillance accuracy; Study 
2b), even when surveillance was conducted by the ingroup. Additionally, in 
Chapter 5 we found that individuals who felt that their ingroup was recognised 
still received recognition benefits from accurate surveillance. This contradicts 
previous research which finds individuals are more receptive to opportunities 
which allow them to challenge outgroup perceptions, as individuals wish to 
challenge negative metastereotypes (van Leeuwen and Täuber, 2012).  
Conversely, when in the presence of the ingroup, individuals are less 
likely to engage in behaviour that might strengthen recognition (Hopkins et al., 
2007; Klein & Azzi, 2001; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012), as the ingroup is not 
assumed to hold negative stereotypes about the group (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997; 
Vorauer et al., 1998 Finkelsteinet al., 2013). Instead, the ingroup is often a 
fundamental source of group-based recognition; this was evidenced by Neville 
and Reicher (2011), who found that football supporters received high levels of 
group-based recognition from fellow fans. For example, one participant 
explained that ‘[in the crowd] you’re not alone…there are other people that 
believe in what you believe in and which clearly is always a reassuring thing’ (p. 
385). Another participant described being part of an ingroup as ‘everyone 
around you is singing from the same hymn sheet’ (p. 384).  
Together, this suggests that recognition needs are already met when in 
the presence of the ingroup, whereas recognition is not assumed from outgroup 
audiences. Whilst our findings do not necessary align with this literature, it could 
be argued that group-based recognition can be possible from more accurate 
ingroup surveillance, as the ingroup is trusted to a greater extent. For example, 
Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of trust, as trust mediated the association 
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between surveiller identity and group-based recognition. The ingroup was 
typically trusted to a greater extent, and greater trust predicted more group-
based recognition. Trust is a central concept in algorithmic surveillance 
research, as data can easily be manipulated or misinterpreted (O’Neil, 2016). 
Therefore, group-based recognition may still be possible through accurate 
surveillance from the ingroup, as the ingroup is afforded greater trust when 
handling and interpreting personal data.  
Conceptualising group-based recognition. Thirdly, this thesis 
contributes to both psychology and technology literature by examining group-
based recognition in surveillance contexts. Previous literature exploring 
recognition online has typically focussed on individual-based recognition or 
looks at recognition generally without focussing on a specific aspect of an 
individual’s identity. For example, Steeves and Bailey (2016) talk broadly about 
recognition of an individual’s ‘persona’, where participants refer generally to 
‘you’ and ‘yourself’ when discussing peer-to-peer surveillance and recognition. 
 Whilst it is important to explore how individuals conceptualise and 
present themselves more generally online, the role of social identities may be 
especially prominent in online contexts. According to the SIDE model, 
individuating characteristics may become less salient in online settings (Lea & 
Spears, 1991; Reicher et al., 1995). As such, social identities are emphasised, 
which can heighten stereotyping and group-normative behaviour (Postmes & 
Spears, 2002; Spears et al., 2002). Consequently, group-based processes may 
be more pronounced in online settings, as individuating information is obscured. 
Our findings support the importance of a social identity approach in online 
research, as the extent to which individuals believed their group identity was 
recognised in part determined their feelings towards surveillance. This 
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illustrates that internet users are sensitive to group-based processes online, and 
that this in turn can inform how they appraise online platforms and technologies.  
Additionally, we have laid the foundations for conceptualising group-
based recognition more generally. As discussed in Chapter 1, recognition (both 
individual and group-based) is rarely defined in previous research (Bartelson, 
2013). A key aim of this thesis was to present a clear definition of group-based 
recognition so that it may be more reliably assessed within this thesis and going 
forward. Whilst our definition and measurement of group-based recognition 
evolved throughout this project, we encourage others examining group-based 
recognition to continue to develop our measure presented in this thesis.  
Negative psychological outcomes in the form of privacy concern. 
Lastly, our predicted model suggested that surveillance of greater accuracy 
would be associated with higher privacy concern. Our findings presented in this 
thesis do not provide strong support for this prediction. Only Study 1 found an 
association between surveillance accuracy and privacy concern (for high 
internet use), as greater accuracy predicted more concern. However, Studies 
2b, 3a and 4 found that perceiving surveillance as more accurate predicted less 
privacy concern. The remaining studies also found no association between 
accuracy nor accuracy perceptions on privacy concern. Whilst these findings 
are encouraging and suggest surveillance accuracy may be associated with 
privacy concern in some contexts, we suggest that the presence of surveillance 
per se is likely to be a stronger predictor of privacy concern in comparison to 
surveillance accuracy.  
At first glance, our inconsistent findings here do not support previous 
literature. In Chapter 1 we presented research which would suggest individuals 
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may feel more concerned for their privacy when surveillance is highly accurate. 
For example, in Ur et al. (2012) a participant expressed that ‘…I notice that 
when I look at an email, the ad at the top seems to cater to what I’m looking at, 
and I just think that might be an invasion of privacy.’ (p. 5). However, it could be 
argued that the accuracy of surveillance noted by participants in these studies 
may merely reflect their awareness of it. Many individuals do not identify adverts 
online as a form of surveillance or behavioural monitoring unless those adverts 
are clearly tailored to them or they are explicitly informed (Ur et al., 2012). 
Indeed, in Almuhumedi et al.’s (2015) study, individuals only reported concern 
for their privacy when they received nudges each time an app on their phone 
accessed sensitive personal data. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish the 
potential differing effects of surveillance presence and surveillance accuracy in 
these studies. In these cases, surveillance accuracy and presence are not 
experimentally manipulated, thus any effects of accuracy and salience may be 
confounded.  
By contrast, the presence of surveillance was constant between 
accuracy conditions across the studies in this thesis. Our studies also illustrated 
a trend whereby privacy concern did not differ across surveillance accuracy 
conditions. Therefore, this thesis suggests that surveillance accuracy may have 
little effect on privacy concern over and above the presence of surveillance. 
Previous literature that suggests an effect of surveillance accuracy may instead 
demonstrate that it is a heightened awareness of surveillance that results in 
greater privacy concern.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, we found strong evidence that increased privacy 
concern predicts less positive and more negative feelings towards surveillance. 
Research exploring the privacy paradox finds that despite privacy concern, 
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individuals continue to engage with surveilling online platform (Barnes, 2006; 
Norberg et al, 2007; Spiekermann et al., 2001). Our findings add to this body of 
work, as we demonstrate that individuals who feel concern for their privacy and 
in turn feel more negatively towards it may also continue to engage with 
surveilling organisations.38 Thus, individuals may feel animosity towards 
platforms yet maintain online engagement.  
Additionally, this thesis demonstrates that those who feel a concern for 
their privacy have greater intentions to change their online behaviour (Study 
2a), and feel more negatively towards surveillance (Studies 1, 2c, 3a, and 3b). 
This challenges privacy paradox research, which suggests that individuals are 
not motivated to change their online behaviour despite privacy concern, as 
users feel mostly apathetic towards surveillance (Hargittai & Marwick, 2016). 
Instead, the findings from this study suggest that there are other explanations 
for why individuals do not protect their online data. For example, previous 
research has shown that people are unlikely to change their online behaviour 
(despite privacy concern) because they lack technical knowledge (Tene & 
Polonetsky, 2014) or social and economic pressures discourage 
disengagement (Welinder, 2012; Acquisti et al., 2012). Therefore, as we found 
that those concerned for their privacy feel negativity towards surveillance and 
intend to change their behaviour online, the failure to do so would suggest 
reasons other than user apathy.  
Strengths, limitations and directions for future research 
 The studies presented in this thesis have several key strengths. Firstly, 
we have taken a novel approach by examining the positive outcomes of 
 
38 Whilst we did not take a behavioural measure of online engagement, privacy paradox literature strongly 
suggests that people do not change their behaviour despite concern for privacy. 
221 
 
algorithmic surveillance, as well as the more established negatives outcomes. 
By doing so, we have been able to develop a clearer picture as to why feelings 
towards algorithmic surveillance may vary. Secondly, we have gone beyond the 
distinction of surveillance as merely either present or absent by examining the 
effects of surveillance accuracy. Arguably, this makes our current work more 
relevant considering the current digital landscape, whereby the ubiquity of 
surveillance suggests a more nuanced approach is necessary. Additionally, we 
have tested our predicted model within a variety of social groups and identities. 
As social groups may have different relationships with surveillance and may 
also have varying recognition needs, our approach allowed us to identify ways 
in which groups’ perspectives on surveillance may differ.  
 Despite this, it is prudent to identify some general limitations within this 
project. Whilst Chapter 3 did not find strong evidence for a moderating effect of 
surveiller identity, we predominantly relied on intergroup contexts that were 
relatively benign. Studies 2a and 2b in Chapter 3 described surveillance as 
being conducted by either the Psychology or the Biosciences Department. This 
intergroup context may not have produced the degree of identity threat 
necessary for a moderating effect of surveiller identity to occur, for instance. We 
may therefore have found greater evidence of a moderating effect of surveiller 
identity if the outgroup represented a greater threat to one’s identity. 
Consequently, future research exploring surveillance processes within an 
intergroup context should endeavour to recruit those belonging to groups with 
historically contentious relations. 
Furthermore, prior research has found that identity concerns and 
impression management only occur when metastereotypes are made salient 
(van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012). Making metastereotypes explicit may have 
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strengthened the effect of surveiller identity and its potential moderator role. 
Thus, future work examining whether surveiller identity moderates the effect of 
surveillance accuracy on group-based recognition may benefit from making 
metastereotypes salient. Lastly, future replications should avoid psychology 
student samples, as this increases the likelihood of participants second-
guessing the study aims and predictions. We may be more confident in our 
findings that surveiller identity does not appear to moderate the association 
between surveillance accuracy and recognition when these limitations have 
been addressed.  
 Based on the findings from Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5 aimed to test 
our assumption that misrecognition was necessary for surveillance accuracy to 
improve group-based recognition; however, our findings did not support this. 
This suggests that the positive pathway (more accurate surveillance predicts 
more positive (and less negative) feelings towards surveillance through group-
based recognition) is true for both chronically-recognised and misrecognised 
groups. Nevertheless, future research may benefit from strengthening the 
recognition manipulation to further test this. To explore the potential moderating 
effect of (mis)recognition, future work could employ a quasi-manipulation of 
group-based recognition. This may be operationalised by comparing the effects 
of surveillance accuracy between two different pre-existing social groups: a 
chronically recognised group and a chronically misrecognised group, rather 
than manipulating (mis)recognition within the same social group. However, it is 
also worth noting that quasi-manipulations such as these may introduce 
confounds that are typically avoided with a direct manipulation, which was the 
main reason a direct manipulation was adopted in Study 4. Future work 
adopting a quasi-manipulation approach should endeavour to control for 
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potential confounds to provide a valid test of whether misrecognition is 
necessary to experience recognition benefits from accurate surveillance.  
 Additionally, whilst this project recruited participants from a variety of 
social groups, future work should endeavour to explore these processes within 
groups that have different societal experiences than those examined here. For 
example, none of the groups included in this project have historically 
experienced supravisibility. Other social groups, such as those identifying as 
Muslim, may have a different relationship with surveillance and visibility. Since 
9/11, those identifying as Muslim have been subject to intense surveillance 
practices by both the media and government agencies (Spalek & Lambert, 
2007). For groups that experience supravisibility in this way, an association 
between surveillance accuracy and group-based recognition may be weaker, as 
the source of surveillance is distrusted (Ali, 2016).  
 Furthermore, within this project we predominantly focussed on 
algorithmic surveillance in general and did not compare/contrast the outcomes 
of government versus commercial surveillance, for instance. This was not the 
focus of the present thesis, and data streams are often shared between various 
sources of surveillance (including state and commercial). However, evidence 
suggests that some individuals may have a greater trust in government 
surveillance, as only those considered criminals are assumed to be under 
scrutiny (Ellis et al., 2013; Pavone & Esposti, 2010). Therefore, future work may 
benefit from comparing the outcomes of surveillance conducted by government 
and commercial sources. 
 Future work may also benefit from going beyond the model presented 
here by exploring the implications of group-based recognition online aside from 
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feelings towards surveillance. For example, increased group-based recognition 
from accurate surveillance may reinforce one’s social identity. In turn, 
individuals may be more likely to behave in ways that correspond with their 
social identity. For example, Summers, Smith and Reczek (2016) found that 
participants who were shown adverts for green products subsequently 
considered themselves more environmentally friendly than those not shown 
green adverts. Therefore, future work could explore the implications of 
increased group-recognition online and how this affects self-perception and 
behaviour.  
Practical implications 
Aside from the theoretical contributions of this thesis, here we offer some 
real-world implications of our empirical findings. Notable works such as those by 
Cathy O’Neil (2016) and Shoshana Zuboff (2019) highlight how social groups 
are affected by those conducting algorithmic surveillance, in that current 
surveillance practices (surveillance/data capitalism) have contributed - and are 
likely to continue to do so - to social inequality and injustice (West, 2017). Whilst 
O’Neil and Zuboff focus on the social and economic consequences of 
surveillance, we extend this by demonstrating the psychological consequences 
of data surveillance. Perhaps the most novel finding of this thesis is the 
potential for accurate surveillance to foster group-based recognition. From this, 
we add to the responsibilities held by those who program and conduct 
algorithmic surveillance. Considering the ubiquity of algorithmic surveillance 
(Lee, 2015), our findings suggest that those conducting surveillance online take 
into consideration how accurately their targeted material represents social 
groups. The accuracy of surveillance and the resulting targeting material has 
the potential to impact how groups believe they are perceived, and in turn how 
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they feel towards online platforms and systems. This may have broader 
implications for groups’ collective self-esteem, wider intergroup relations, and 
how certain groups engage digitally. Indeed, regulating bodies have begun to 
take these processes into account. In June 2019, the UK’s advertising 
watchdog introduced a ban on adverts featuring gender stereotypes (“‘Harmful’ 
gender stereotypes in adverts banned”, 2019), which included those shown 
online and on social media. Based on the findings of this thesis we encourage 
further consideration of the role of psychological processes in targeted material, 
and specifically encourage organisations to consider the implications of how 
accurately social groups are presented in targeted content. 
Additionally, our findings suggest that an increase in algorithm accuracy 
(in the specific sense of whether the portrayal of a group aligns with the group 
members’ self concepts) is unlikely to increase negative psychological 
outcomes in the form of privacy concern over and above the concern already 
felt by the presence of surveillance. Therefore, our findings suggest that 
organisations consider the appropriateness and value of surveillance in online 
contexts, as the mere presence of surveillance is likely to heighten privacy 
concern and in turn increase animosity towards those systems. As our findings 
suggest that this is irrespective of how accurately social groups are presented in 
targeted material, surveilling organisations may benefit from considering 
whether the perceived benefits of surveillance outweigh the cost of increased 
privacy concern. 
We have illustrated in this thesis that an increase in group-based 
recognition without a simultaneous increase in privacy concern may lead 
individuals to feel more favourably towards surveillance. This may initially raise 
ethical concerns for some, as approaches that encourage favourability towards 
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surveillance may resemble the manipulation techniques surveillance is often 
criticised of (Costa & Halpern, 2019). An alternative perspective is that 
surveillance which results in less privacy concern and greater group-based 
recognition offers a fairer exchange, whereby the interests of both surveillance 
capitalism and the consumer are met. For example, some internet users 
perceive tangible benefits from targeted material in the form of shopping 
discounts (Ur et al., 2012). It is important to note that our findings do not 
delineate the differences between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ surveillance, and we do not 
claim that our results aid in qualifying surveillance practices. Instead, we take a 
techno-positive perspective, whereby surveillance is neither inherently good nor 
bad. It is the duty of those using technology that harnesses psychological 
processes to do so responsibly.  
 In light of this, whilst we frame group-based recognition as a positive 
psychological outcome of accurate surveillance, we do not deny that there may 
be negative social consequences of group-based recognition in online contexts. 
For example, an increase in group-based recognition within the current 
framework of surveillance may produce long-term negative consequences that 
have not been explored in this thesis. For example, Neville and Reicher (2015) 
demonstrated that individuals feel that their beliefs and attitudes are 
emboldened when experiencing group-based recognition: “you’re not alone in 
your struggle basically for what you believe in…you realise to yourself ‘yes, I 
probably am actually right’” (p. 385). This is particularly true when targeted 
material extends to political and cultural propaganda.  
Highly-accurate surveillance that fosters group-based recognition in this 
context may also contribute to filter bubbles, whereby belief systems become 
ever-more entrenched (Bozdag & van den Hoven, 2015). Indeed, filter bubbles 
227 
 
are believed to contribute to the zeitgeist, social division, and interfere with 
national elections and referendums (Cadwalladr, 2019). This is an issue that is 
far too broad and complex to be addressed here. However, some research 
suggests that the social issues resulting from filter bubbles may be mitigated 
when users are given the option to opt in or out of such systems. When given 
the choice to receive non-filtered content, individuals consume an equal amount 
of belief-affirming and disconfirming information (Gladfelter, 2018). Using this 
approach, individuals may harness the potential benefits of targeted filtered 
material if they wish, yet maintain the freedom to diversify their content at any 
given time. Alternatively, individuals may choose to opt out of behavioural 
tracking altogether. This gives those online the choice to consume targeted 
material when there is a preference for it, without the totalitarian filtering of their 
content. 
  Additionally, as with many theoretical models, the positive pathway 
outlined in this thesis may not be generalisable to all groups and contexts. For 
example, it is necessary for some groups to conceal their social identity for 
safety reasons and to avoid discrimination (Kelly & McKillop, 1996; Rossman, 
Salamanca, & Macapagal, 2017), even if doing so can result in poorer 
psychological outcomes (Newheiser & Barreto, 2014). As such, individuals may 
be less likely to experience positive psychological outcomes or feel positively 
towards surveillance when accurate surveillance makes users feel as though a 
concealed identity is exposed. In this instance, an individual may feel their 
personal safety is jeopardised. For example, in October of 2019, Ugandan 
members of parliament petitioned for homosexual acts to be punishable by 
death (Burke & Okiror, 2019). Those identifying as gay in Uganda (and in other 
countries where homosexuality is criminalised) would be unlikely to experience 
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accurate surveillance more positively (or less negatively), as accurate 
surveillance poses a significant risk to one’s safety. In sum, there may be some 
circumstances where the positive pathway may not be as strong when its ability 
to recognise someone as a member of that group makes them vulnerable to 
negative consequences.  
However, it is also important to distinguish between how an individual 
may feel towards the exposure of their group membership, and the collective 
experience of group-based recognition as part of a social movement or 
campaign. Surveillance accuracy as we define it here may still be part of a 
movement or solution that strives to change society’s perceptions of the 
ingroup. The struggle for rights at a collective level typically requires accuracy 
as a basis of recognition (Blackwood et al., 2013; Hopkins, 2011) precisely 
when the recognition of individuals’ stigmatised identity is highly threatening. As 
such, if a social movement is already established, in which individuals feel 
greater personal safety and support as a collective, accurate surveillance may 
be an effective component of a broader campaign which aims to change 
attitudes towards the ingroup.  
It is also worth noting that the findings of this thesis and the implications 
discussed here may only occur if individuals are aware of surveillance. Within 
each of our studies we provided participants with an explicit description of 
algorithmic surveillance and online surveillance practices. However, without 
explicit notification, individuals are often unaware of surveillance practices and 
those that are aware may be unsure how surveillance affects them (Ur et al., 
2012). Even when users are informed of surveillance through terms and 
conditions, the length and complexity of these terms mean that users maintain 
low comprehension of surveillance implications (Felt, Ha, Egelman, Haney, 
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Chin, & Wagner, 2012). As such, the predicted model in this thesis may only 
apply in contexts where individuals are aware of surveillance and its outcomes. 
Results may differ in circumstances where participants are less aware; for 
example, individuals are unlikely to perceive variation in surveillance accuracy if 
they are not aware of surveillance in the first place, and are unlikely to perceive 
surveillance accuracy as consequential if they do not believe they are under 
surveillance.  
Conclusion 
 Current narratives surrounding surveillance centre on its negative 
outcomes, such as those relating to privacy concern. Whilst vital, this approach 
fails to explain the variability in the public’s attitude towards surveillance. This 
thesis has elucidated some of the processes that may account for this variation; 
specifically, we find that accurate surveillance can provide groups with 
increased group-based recognition. Whilst previous research argues that the 
continued use of surveilled platforms is due to user apathy, we propose an 
alternative explanation that users may be less likely to withdraw from these 
platforms, as they may provide social identity-related benefits. Our work has 
also highlighted the utility of exploring the nuance of surveillance by going 
beyond the dichotomy of surveillance as either present or absent. By doing so, 
we have been able to illustrate identity-related processes that contribute to the 
publics’ perception of algorithmic surveillance. By gaining a better 
understanding of the identity-related processes surrounding surveillance we are 
able to further highlight the responsibility of those that collect our data. It is the 
role of the scientific community to equip society with a better understanding of 
these systems. Only then can we effectively challenge these models and hold 
the panoptic gaze accountable.  
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Appendix A: Study 1 manipulation article 
Page 1 (consistent between studies)  
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Page 2: Low surveillance accuracy 
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Page 2: Medium surveillance accuracy 
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Page 2: High surveillance accuracy 
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Appendix B: Study 1 full list of measures 
 
Manipulation check: 
In my view, algorithmic surveillance is… 
1. … accurate in identifying people  
2. … usually unable to predict what internet users will do 
3. … usually unable to identify people’s characteristics 
4. … able to predict behaviour accurately 
5. …able to access many aspects of people’s lives 
6. …limited in what types of information it can gather on people 
 
Feelings towards surveillance: 
Algorithmic surveillance (i.e. the tracking and analysis of my behaviour and 
personal information online) makes me feel: 
1. Worried/Calm 
2. Anxious/Relaxed 
3. Angry/Happy 
4. Annoyed/Pleased 
5. Disinterested/engaged 
6. Unsafe/Safe 
7. Frightened/Reassured 
8. Uncomfortable/Comfortable 
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9. Repressed/Free 
10. Powerless/In control 
11. Visible/Invisible 
12. Identifiable/Anonymous 
13. Observed/Unobserved 
14. Known/Unknown 
15. Misinterpreted/Understood 
16. Judged/Not judged 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Internet surveillance is an invasion of privacy 
2. Internet users have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. When online, it is fair to exchange your privacy for the use of a website 
4. You shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
 
Safety concern: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel less safe using the internet 
2. If you have nothing to hide, then algorithmic surveillance shouldn’t 
concern you 
3. There is little to suggest that surveillance online makes society safer 
4. Algorithmic surveillance can help prevent crime 
 
Consumer opportunity: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance can bias what we are exposed to online 
2. Algorithmic surveillance does not benefit consumers 
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3. Targeted adverts online resulting from algorithmic surveillance are often 
useful 
4. Algorithmic surveillance can help consumers save money 
 
Behaviour change intentions: 
1. I feel concerned about what I do online because of surveillance 
2. I have or will censor what I do online because of surveillance 
3. Algorithmic surveillance would not make me change what I do online 
4. Algorithmic surveillance doesn’t make me concerned about what I do 
online 
 
Surveiller motive/trust: 
1. If organisations use algorithmic surveillance, they do not respect internet 
users 
2. Organisations that use algorithmic surveillance do not care about internet 
users 
3. Algorithmic surveillance is used to help internet users 
4. Organisations that use algorithmic surveillance have internet users’ best 
interests at heart 
 
Perceived value of surveillance: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance shouldn’t be used to make decisions about 
people’s lives 
2. Algorithmic surveillance is a useful way to sort and manage people’s 
data 
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Recognition: 
Accuracy: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance can accurately portray everything about me 
2. It is unlikely that algorithmic surveillance has built an accurate picture of 
who I am 
 
Discrimination: 
3. Internet users could be treated unfairly because of algorithmic 
surveillance 
4. Algorithmic surveillance does not discriminate against me 
5. I could be treated unfairly as a result of algorithmic surveillance 
6. Algorithmic surveillance by its nature is always unbiased 
 
Scrutiny: 
7. The use of algorithmic surveillance makes me feel analysed 
8. The use of algorithmic surveillance makes me feel judged 
 
Distinctiveness: 
9. Algorithmic surveillance is unable to recognise the ways that I am 
different from others 
10. Algorithmic surveillance can accurately distinguish me from others 
 
Depth: 
11. Someone using algorithmic surveillance could know me better than I 
know myself 
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12. Someone using algorithmic surveillance would have no idea who I truly 
am 
 
Perceived online control (adapted from Reid and Ware’s (1974) three-factor 
internal-external scale): 
 
Self-control: 
1. I often give in to pressure to disclose my personal information online 
2. I always feel in control of my personal information online 
3. Controlling who has your online data is always possible 
4. I often give in to pressure to sign up to things online 
 
Social control: 
5. People will always be tracked online, no matter how much we try and 
stop it 
6. The flow of my data online is entirely governed by others 
7. If enough people tried to stop algorithmic surveillance, it could be 
stopped 
8. Where my data goes online is mostly under my control 
 
Fatalism: 
9. The harder you try, the more likely you are to gain control over your data 
10. If your data leaks online, it is often due to a mistake you have made 
11. There is no point trying to control what happens to your data 
12. Whether you want it to or not, your data can accidentally leak to areas of 
the internet 
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Free will (adapted from Nadelhoffer et al.’s (2014) The Free Will Inventory): 
 
Free will:  
1. I always have free will 
2. If I click on a link/website, it is because I want to and not because I feel 
influenced to 
3. Nothing influences my behaviour online 
4. I have free will even when my choices are limited by external forces 
5. Only I can know the reasons behind my actions 
6. I am not very predictable online 
 
Determinism: 
7. What I do is completely determined by prior events 
8. If an algorithm knows what I have done up until this point, it could 
calculate everything that I would do in the future 
9. My decisions and actions are dictated by my experiences and/or biology 
10. If you know which websites I have previously visited, you can predict 
which websites I will visit in the future 
11. I am often influenced to click on links/websites I didn’t initially intend on 
visiting 
12. I don’t think it would be difficult to predict my future attitudes, behaviour, 
and choices 
 
Hours spent online (in hours; open ended question) 
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Minutes/hours spent online in a single session (open ended question) 
Time spent on different social platforms (7-point Likert Scale: 1 = very little time, 
7 = a lot of time) 
1. Social media (e.g. Facebook) 
2. News websites 
3. Blogs 
4. Forums 
5. Emails 
6. Instant messaging 
7. Studying (e.g. Google Scholar) 
8. Online gaming 
9. Online banking 
10. Online shopping 
11. Other (participants were asked to specify) 
 
Awareness of algorithmic surveillance: 
When I’m online I… 
1. …notice that pop-ups are related to sites I have previously visited 
2. …feel aware that the website I visit have access to my internet history 
3. …believe my online data is being shared with other companies and 
organisations 
4. …think that companies profit from selling my online data 
5. …notice that even when using the same search term as a friend, we 
can have completely different search results 
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6. …notice that the websites I am advertised online are often of a similar 
theme (e.g. of one type of politics) 
7. …notice that website recommendations are related to my gender 
8. …feel as though advertisers have made assumptions about who I am 
9. …do not feel that I am being tracked 
10. …am not aware my private information is being stored 
11. …trust organisations to keep my data private from other companies 
12. …do not believe organisations share my data 
13. …believe I see the same websites advertised online as everyone else 
14. …feel my news feed has a wide variety of recommended pages 
15. …do not feel that adverts are tailored to certain aspects of myself 
16. …do not believe that websites have made judgments on who I am 
 
5. Computer experience (0 = no experience, 10 = a lot of experience). 
a. Coding 
b. Hacking 
c. Analytics 
d. Diagnostics 
e. Programming 
f. Program installation 
 
Demographics (open ended questions) 
a. Age 
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b. Gender 
c. Nationality 
d. Occupation  
 
Article trustworthiness (7-point Likert Scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree) 
1. The article was trustworthy 
2. I believe the article came from a reliable source 
3. The information in the article was not believable 
4. I would not necessarily believe the news I read from this source 
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Appendix C: Study 2a manipulation university news bulletin 
Condition: Ingroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Ingroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Ingroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy 
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Appendix D: Study 2a full list of measures 
Accuracy manipulation check: 
In my view, the surveillance conducted by the (x) department is… 
1. …accurate in identifying students 
2. …accurate at determining which sites a student visits online  
3. …usually unable to identify students’ characteristics 
4. …usually unable to know which sites a student visits online 
 
Identification as a psychology student: 
1. Overall, being a psychology student has very little to do with how I feel 
about myself 
2. Being a psychology student is an important reflection of who I am 
3. In general, being a psychology student is an important part of my self-
image 
4. Being a psychology student is unimportant to my sense of what kind of 
person I am 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance from the (x) department is an invasion of student privacy 
2. Psychology students have a right to use the University Wi-Fi without 
being surveilled 
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3. It is fair for Psychology students to exchange their online data for the use 
of University Wi-Fi. 
4. Psychology students shouldn’t expect privacy when using the University 
Wi-Fi 
 
Behaviour change intentions online: 
Data surveillance from the (x) department would… 
1. …make me concerned about what I did while using the University Wi-Fi 
2. ...make me censor what I do online while using the University Wi-Fi 
3. …not change how I felt about using the University Wi-Fi 
4. …not affect what I did online while using the University Wi-Fi 
 
Group-based recognition: 
Accuracy: 
1. By using psychology student data, the (x) department will accurately 
understand what a prototypical psychology student is like 
2. From analysing psychology student data, it is unlikely that the (x) 
department would get an accurate picture of what a typical psychology 
student is like 
 
 
 
289 
 
Distinctiveness: 
3. The surveillance program could distinguish how psychology students are 
unique from students in other departments 
4. I do not think psychology student online data could recognise how we are 
unique from other students 
 
Depth: 
5. No matter how much data the (x) department collects, only psychology 
students understand what it truly means to be a psychology student 
6. By using psychology student data, the (x) department could understand 
psychology students better than I could 
 
Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust the intentions of the (x) department 
2. Surveillance conducted by the (x) department will be for psychology 
students’ benefit 
3. I do not believe the (x) department have good intentions with my data 
4. The (x) surveillance programme will not help psychology students 
 
Demographics: 
Age (open ended) 
Gender: 
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1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Other 
Nationality: 
1. British 
2. Other 
3. European 
 
Days per week logged on to University Wi-Fi (open ended) 
Time in hours logged on to University Wi-Fi per session (open ended) 
Trustworthiness of University Bulletin (7-point Likert Scale: 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree): 
1. The university news bulletin was trustworthy 
2. The information in the news bulletin was not believable  
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Appendix E: Study 2b manipulation university news bulletin 
Condition: Ingroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
Condition: Ingroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Ingroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy 
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Condition: Outgroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy 
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Appendix F: Study 2b full list of measures 
Accuracy manipulation check: 
In my view, algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department... 
1. ...is accurate at identifying people 
2. ...creates an accurate impression of people 
3. ...does not identify people's characteristics accurately 
4. ...does not create an accurate impression of people 
 
Group-based recognition 
Distinctiveness: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance will enable the (x) Department to recognise that 
we are a unique discipline 
2. Algorithmic surveillance will not recognise our unique characteristics 
3. From using algorithmic surveillance, the (x) Department will recognise 
that we are unique from those belonging to other disciplines 
4. Algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department would imply 
that we are indistinguishable from other academic communities 
 
Perceived stereotyping: 
1. From using algorithmic surveillance, the (x) Department would recognise 
that we are a diverse community 
2. The surveillance programme would suggest that we are all the same 
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Positivity: 
1. The results of algorithmic surveillance from the (x) Department would 
offer a positive image of us 
2. Algorithmic surveillance conducted by the (x) Department would not 
portray us positively 
3. The surveillance programme will help promote the positive impact we 
have within the University 
4. We will be valued positively through the surveillance programme 
 
Understanding: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance will not provide the (x) Department with an 
accurate understanding of our culture 
2. Algorithmic surveillance will help the (x) Department understand our 
values 
3. Algorithmic surveillance will provide the (x) Department with a good 
understanding of what we think 
4. Algorithmic surveillance will not provide a better understanding of our 
views 
 
Identification as a group member: 
1. Through algorithmic surveillance, I believe I would be identified as 
belonging to Psychology 
2. Algorithmic surveillance would not identify me as part of Psychology 
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Feelings towards surveillance: 
The (x) Department’s surveillance programme makes me feel: 
1. Worried 
2. Calm 
3. Anxious 
4. Relaxed 
5. Angry 
6. Happy 
7. Annoyed 
8. Pleased 
9. Uncomfortable 
10. Comfortable 
11. Hopeful 
12. Dejected 
13. Optimistic 
14. Discouraged 
 
Visibility (participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between the 
adjectives to indicate which best described how the surveillance programme 
made them feel): 
1. Invisible/Visible 
2. Anonymous/Identifiable 
3. Unobserved/Observed 
4. Unknown/Known 
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Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust the (x) Department to gather our online data 
2. Surveillance conducted online by the (x) Department is for our benefit 
3. I do not believe the (x) Department have good intentions with our data 
4. The surveillance programme will not benefit us 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy 
2. People have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. People’s online data should not be private information 
4. People shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
 
Behaviour change intentions: 
Algorithmic surveillance would… 
1. …make me concerned about what I do online 
2. …make me censor what I do online 
3. …not change how I use the internet 
4. …not affect what I do online 
 
Demographics: 
Current course of study 
1. Psychology 
2. Clinical Psychology 
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3. Flexible combined honours (with Psychology) 
4. Other Psychology course 
5. Non-Psychology course 
 
Hours per week spent online (open ended) 
Age (open ended) 
Gender 
1. Man 
2. Woman 
3. Non-binary 
4. Prefer not to say 
 
Ethnicity 
1. White 
2. Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups 
3. Asian/Asian British 
4. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
5. Arab 
6. Other (open ended) 
 
Membership to closed or private groups/forums online 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Awareness of algorithmic surveillance (1-10: 1 = not at all aware, 10 = very 
aware) 
 
Trustworthiness of news bulletin (7-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) 
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Appendix G: Confirmatory factor analysis for the group-based recognition scale 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare the 
hypothesised three-dimension structure (Model 1) with two variants of a more 
parsimonious two-dimension structure (Model 1a and Model 1b). Reverse 
coded items were covaried within each dimension to account for shared method 
variance. 
Model 1 was tested as a baseline that could be compared with the two-
dimension models. Model 1 demonstrated acceptable fit, χ249 = 183.4, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 3.74, TLI = .783, CFI = .839, RMSEA = .117, AIC = 241.38. Model 1a 
was then tested, which demonstrated poor fit, χ251 = 265.22, p < .001, χ2/df = 
5.20, TLI = .668, CFI = .743, RMSEA = .145, AIC = 319.22, and had 
significantly worse fit when compared with Model 1, Δχ22 = 81.82, p < .001, 
ΔAIC = 77.84.  
Model 1b was then tested and demonstrated poor fit, χ251 = 232.10, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 4.55, TLI = .719, CFI = .783, RMSEA = .134, AIC = 286.10. This 
was significantly poorer than the three-dimension Model 1, Δχ22 = 48.70, p < 
.001, ΔAIC = 44.72. As such, Model 1 was considered the superior model. 
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Model 1a 
Model 1b 
Model 1 
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Appendix H: Study 2c manipulation article 
Page 1. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy  
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Page 1. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, low surveillance accuracy  
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Page 1. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy  
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Page 1. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, medium surveillance accuracy  
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Page 1. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Ingroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy  
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Page 1. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy  
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Page 2. Condition: Outgroup surveiller, high surveillance accuracy 
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Appendix I: Study 2c full list of measures 
Accuracy manipulation: 
1. The Wired article suggests that algorithmic surveillance is… 
2. After reading the article, in my opinion algorithmic surveillance is… 
 
Group-based recognition: 
Distinctiveness: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance enables (x) to recognise that British people's 
beliefs are distinct from those of other nationalities 
2. Algorithmic surveillance from (x) suggests that the characteristics of 
British people are the same as those from other nationalities 
3. From using algorithmic surveillance, (x) recognises that British people 
have distinct characteristics 
4. Algorithmic surveillance conducted by (x) does not suggest that the 
British are unique 
 
Positivity: 
1. The results of algorithmic surveillance by (x) offers a positive image of 
British people 
2. Algorithmic surveillance conducted by (x) is very unlikely to portray 
British people positively 
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Understanding 
1. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide (x) with an accurate 
understanding of British culture 
2. Algorithmic surveillance helps (x) to understand British cultural values 
3. Algorithmic surveillance provides (x) with a good understanding of what 
British people think 
4. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide (x) with a better understanding 
of British people’s views 
 
Feelings towards surveillance: 
Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel: 
1. Worried 
2. Calm 
3. Anxious 
4. Relaxed 
5. Angry 
6. Happy 
7. Annoyed 
8. Pleased 
9. Uncomfortable 
10. Comfortable 
11. Hopeful 
12. Dejected 
13. Optimistic 
14. Discouraged 
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Visibility (participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between the 
adjectives to indicate which best described how algorithmic surveillance made 
them feel): 
1. Invisible/Visible 
2. Anonymous/Identifiable 
3. Unobserved/Observed 
4. Unknown/Known 
 
Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust (x) to gather British people’s online data 
2. Surveillance conducted online by (x) is for the benefit of British people 
3. I do not believe (x) have good intentions with British people’s data 
4. Surveillance online from (x) will not benefit British people 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy 
2. People have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. People’s online data should not be private information 
4. People shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
 
Behaviour change intentions: 
Algorithmic surveillance would… 
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1. …make me concerned about what I do online 
2. …make me censor what I do online 
3. …not change how I use the internet 
4. …not affect what I do online 
 
Demographics: 
Hours per week spent online (open ended) 
Age (open ended) 
Gender 
1. Man 
2. Woman 
3. Non-binary 
4. Prefer not to say 
Ethnicity 
1. White 
2. Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups 
3. Asian/Asian British 
4. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
5. Arab 
6. Other (open ended) 
Membership to closed or private groups/forums online 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Awareness of algorithmic surveillance (1-10: 1 = not at all aware, 10 = very 
aware).  
Trustworthiness of article (7-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree): 
1. The article was trustworthy 
2. The information in the article was not believable 
 
 
  
322 
 
Appendix J: Confirmatory factor analysis for the group-based recognition 
measure 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare the 
hypothesised three-dimension structure (Model 1) with two variants of a more 
parsimonious two-dimension structure (Model 1a and Model 1b). Reverse 
coded items were covaried within each dimension to account for shared method 
variance. 
Model 1 was tested as a baseline that could be compared with the two-
dimension models. Model 1 demonstrated acceptable fit, χ230 = 99.31, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 3.31, TLI = .828, CFI = .885, RMSEA = .098, AIC = 149.31. Model 1a 
was then tested, which demonstrated poor fit, χ232 = 180.38, p < .001, χ2/df = 
5.64, TLI = .655, CFI = .754, RMSEA = .138, AIC = 226.38, and had 
significantly worse fit when compared with Model 1, Δχ22 = 81.08, p < .001, 
ΔAIC = 77.07.  
Model 1b was then tested and demonstrated adequate fit, χ232 = 114.14, 
p < .001, χ2/df = 3.57, TLI = .809, CFI = .864, RMSEA = .103, AIC = 160.14. 
This was significantly poorer than the three-dimension Model 1, Δχ22 = 14.83, p 
< .001, ΔAIC = 10.83. As such, Model 1 was considered the superior model. 
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Model 1b 
Model 1 Model 1a 
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Appendix K: Study 3a full list of measures 
 
Perceived algorithmic surveillance accuracy: 
In my view, algorithmic surveillance… 
1. ... is accurate at identifying people 
2. ... creates an accurate impression of internet users 
3. ... does not identify people's characteristics accurately 
4. ... does not provide an accurate impression of internet users 
 
Group-based recognition: 
Distinctiveness: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance enables society to recognise that gay people are 
a unique group 
2. Algorithmic surveillance does not recognise the unique characteristics of 
gay people 
3. From algorithmic surveillance, society recognises that gay people have 
distinct needs 
4. Targeted adverts and web page suggestions often conflate my sexuality 
with my gender identity 
 
Perceived stereotyping: 
1. From using algorithmic surveillance society recognises diversity within 
the gay community 
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2. Targeted adverts and web page suggestions imply all gay people are the 
same 
 
Positivity: 
1. Results of algorithmic surveillance offer a positive image of gay people 
2. Targeted material from algorithmic surveillance does not portray gay 
people positively 
3. Algorithmic surveillance helps promote the positive impact of gay culture 
within society 
4. Gay people are valued positively through algorithmic surveillance 
 
Understanding: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide society with an accurate 
understanding of gay culture 
2. Algorithmic surveillance helps society appreciate gay people's values 
3. Algorithmic surveillance provides society with a good understanding of 
what gay people believe 
4. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide a better understanding of gay 
people's views 
 
Recognition as a group member: 
1. Through algorithmic surveillance I believe I am identified as a gay 
individual 
2. Algorithmic surveillance does not identify me as gay 
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Feelings towards surveillance: 
Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel: 
1. Worried 
2. Calm 
3. Anxious 
4. Relaxed 
5. Angry 
6. Happy 
7. Annoyed 
8. Pleased 
9. Uncomfortable 
10. Comfortable 
11. Hopeful 
12. Dejected 
13. Optimistic 
14. Discouraged 
 
Visibility (participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between the 
adjectives to indicate which best described how algorithmic surveillance made 
them feel): 
1. Invisible/Visible 
2. Anonymous/Identifiable 
3. Unobserved/Observed 
4. Unknown/Known 
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Degree to which algorithmic surveillance is perceived to contribute to 
discrimination (Participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between 
the adjectives to indicate which best described how they felt) 
The use of algorithmic surveillance could made society’s behaviour towards gay 
people… 
1. Worse/Better 
2. More hostile/More friendly 
3. More intolerant/More tolerant 
4. Colder/Warmer 
5. More unfair/More fair 
 
Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust the organisations gathering my data online  
2. Surveillance conducted online is for the benefit of the gay community 
3. I do not believe those gathering my data online have good intentions 
4. Surveillance online will not benefit the gay community 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy 
2. People have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. People’s online data should not be private information 
4. People shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
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Behaviour change intentions: 
Algorithmic surveillance would… 
1. …make me concerned about what I do online 
2. …make me censor what I do online 
3. …not change how I use the internet 
4. …not affect what I do online 
 
Demographics: 
Hours per week spent online (open ended) 
Age (open ended) 
Gender 
5. Man 
6. Woman 
7. Non-binary 
8. Prefer not to say 
Nationality (open ended) 
Ethnicity 
7. White 
8. Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups 
9. Asian/Asian British 
10. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
11. Arab 
12. Other (open ended) 
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Membership to closed or private groups/forums online 
3. Yes 
4. No 
Awareness of algorithmic surveillance (1-10: 1 = not at all aware, 10 = very 
aware).  
Openly gay: 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. To some people, but not others 
Duration being openly gay (in years and months, open ended) 
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Appendix L: Stimulus text for Study 3a 
 
  
Algorithmic surveillance is the storage and analysis of our online activity. 
For example, online shopping platforms will track what we buy, and media 
streaming services will track what we watch. This type of surveillance is also 
conducted by government agencies. Organisations like America’s National 
Security Agency (NSA) and Britain’s Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) have access to the majority of our digital activity. These 
agencies can track where we go (through geolocation software on our devices), 
who we call, what we post on social media, and much more. In addition to this, 
the corporate and state organisations do not operate independently. The 
government and the corporate world will often share data on groups of people 
between themselves. 
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These surveillance techniques allow both corporate and state 
organisations to make assumptions about who we are. Specifically, they 
estimate which demographic background we come from, including (but not 
limited to) our race, gender, and sexual orientation. This social sorting comes 
with other assumptions. For example, based on our demographic information, 
the government assesses who are likely threats to public order and safety. 
Alternatively, corporate organisations use our assumed background to calculate 
which products and services would be most appealing to us. 
These assumptions can have a variety of social consequences. On a 
superficial level, how we are defined can determine what adverts we see online. 
For example, if you are assumed to be a woman, you may receive more ads for 
makeup and feminine clothing compared to an internet user assumed to be a 
man. But the consequences of surveillance can be far more profound than this. 
Algorithmic surveillance can determine what interest rates we are offered when 
we apply for a loan online.  It can impact the cost of plane tickets and how 
quickly we can flag an Uber, or if we even get one at all. Algorithmic 
surveillance can also determine whether we are allowed past border control on 
our annual holiday. The collection of our data and how it is subsequently used 
can impact our lives well beyond our computer screens.   
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Appendix M: Confirmatory factor analysis for the group-based recognition 
measure 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare the 
hypothesised two second-order factors and three first-order factors structure 
(Model 1) with two more parsimonious structures, one containing only two first-
order dimensions (Model 1a) and the other containing only two dimensions 
(Model 1b). Reverse coded items were covaried within each dimension to 
account for shared method variance. 
Model 1 was tested as a baseline that could be compared with the more 
parsimonious models. Model 1 demonstrated acceptable fit, χ271 = 269.82, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 3.80, TLI = .829, CFI = .903, RMSEA = .087, AIC = 337.82. Model 
1a was then tested, which demonstrated also showed acceptable fit, χ272 = 
305.90, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.25, TLI = .855, CFI = .885, RMSEA = .094, AIC = 
371.90, however this was significantly worse fit when compared with Model 1, 
Δχ21 = 36.08, p < .001, ΔAIC = 34.08.  
Model 1b was then tested and demonstrated adequate fit, χ274 = 362.31, 
p < .001, χ2/df = 4.90, TLI = .826, CFI = .859, RMSEA = .103, AIC = 424.31. 
This was significantly poorer than Model 1, Δχ23 = 92.49, p < .001, ΔAIC = 
86.49. As such, the hypothesised two second-order factor and three first-order 
factor model was considered superior. 
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Model 1a Model 1 
Model 1b 
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Appendix N: Study 3b manipulation materials 
Page 1. Condition: low surveillance accuracy 
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Page 2. Condition: low surveillance accuracy 
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Page 1. Condition: medium surveillance accuracy 
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Page 2. Condition: medium surveillance accuracy 
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Page 1. Condition: high surveillance accuracy 
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Page 2. Condition: high surveillance accuracy 
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Low surveillance accuracy example 1 
 
Low surveillance accuracy example 2 
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Medium surveillance accuracy example 1a 
 
Medium surveillance accuracy example 1b 
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Medium surveillance accuracy example 2a 
 
Medium surveillance accuracy example 2b 
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High surveillance accuracy example 1 
 
High surveillance accuracy example 2 
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Appendix O: Study 3b full list of measures 
Accuracy manipulation check (7-point Likert scale: 1 = not accurate at all, 7 = 
Extremely accurate): 
1. The vegan Society article suggests that algorithmic surveillance is… 
2. After reading the article, in my opinion algorithmic surveillance is… 
 
Group-based recognition: 
Distinctiveness: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance enables omnivores to recognise that my beliefs 
towards food are distinct from those following other diets 
2. Algorithmic surveillance may suggest that my diet is the same as diets 
unrelated to veganism (e.g. gluten-free diets) 
3. By using algorithmic surveillance, omnivores may recognise that 
veganism is not about food intolerance/allergy 
4. Targeted adverts and webpage suggestions imply that my diet is the 
same as 'clean eating' 
 
Positivity: 
1. The results of algorithmic surveillance offer a positive image of veganism 
2. Targeted advertising does not portray veganism positively 
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Understanding: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide omnivores with an accurate 
understanding of vegan culture 
2. Algorithmic surveillance could help omnivores appreciate vegan cultural 
values 
3. Algorithmic surveillance can provide omnivores with a good 
understanding of what vegans think 
4. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide a better understanding of 
vegan views 
 
Feelings towards surveillance: 
Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel: 
1. Worried 
2. Calm 
3. Anxious 
4. Relaxed 
5. Angry 
6. Happy 
7. Annoyed 
8. Pleased 
9. Uncomfortable 
10. Comfortable 
11. Hopeful 
12. Dejected 
13. Optimistic 
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14. Discouraged 
 
Visibility (participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between the 
adjectives to indicate which best described how algorithmic surveillance made 
them feel): 
1. Invisible/Visible 
2. Anonymous/Identifiable 
 
Degree to which algorithmic surveillance is perceived to contribute to 
discrimination. (Participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) 
between the adjectives to indicate which best described how they felt) 
 
Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust the organisations gathering my data online  
2. Surveillance conducted online is for the benefit of vegans 
3. I do not believe those gathering my data online have good intentions 
4. Surveillance online will not benefit vegans 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy 
2. People have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. People’s online data is not private information 
4. People shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
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Behaviour change intentions: 
Algorithmic surveillance would… 
1. …make me concerned about what I do online 
2. …make me censor what I do online 
3. …not change how I use the internet 
4. …not affect what I do online 
 
Demographics: 
Hours per week spent online (open ended) 
Age (open ended) 
Gender 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Non-binary 
4. Prefer not to say 
Nationality (open ended) 
Ethnicity 
1. White 
2. Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups 
3. Asian/Asian British 
4. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
5. Arab 
6. Other (open ended) 
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Membership to closed or private groups/forums online 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Awareness of algorithmic surveillance (1-10: 1 = not at all aware, 10 = very 
aware).  
Duration vegan (year and months, open ended) 
Trustworthiness of the article (7-point Likert scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) 
1. The online article was trustworthy 
2. The information in the online article was not believable 
The most important reason for going vegan (participants were asked to select 
just one answer): 
1. Health 
2. Animal welfare 
3. Environmental reasons 
4. Economic reasons 
5. Taste preferences 
6. Intolerance/allergy 
7. Weight related reasons 
8. Personal finances 
9. Cultural/religious reasons 
10. Other (open ended) 
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Appendix P: Confirmatory factor analyses of the group-based recognition 
measure 
 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare our 
hypothesised factor structure (Model 1) with a more parsimonious two sub-
dimension model (Model 1a). The two-sub-dimension model was then tested 
against a single factor structure (Model 1b). We then used the preferred model 
to assess whether accuracy is a distinct dimension as predicted, or a 
component within the recognition structure. To do this, accuracy was included 
as an additional factor (Model 2). This model was then compared to a model in 
which the accuracy items were contained in either the distinctiveness dimension 
(Model 2a) and the positivity dimension (Model 2b). Model diagrams are 
illustrated in Figure 1.    
 First, Model 1 was tested to form a baseline. This was then used as a 
comparison model against the more parsimonious structures: Model 1a and 
Model 1b. Model 1 demonstrated poor fit, χ232 = 364.03, p < .001, χ2/df = 11.38, 
TLI = .651, CFI = .752, RMSEA = .159, AIC = 410.03. However, analysis of the 
modification indices suggested shared method variance between the positively 
worded understanding pair (items 2 and 3; MI = 42.20, EPC = .33), the 
negatively worded understanding pair (items 1 and 4; MI = 46.91, EPC = .36), 
and the negatively worded distinctiveness pair (items 2 and 4; MI = 63.42, EPC 
= .68). This covariance likely represents an artefact of measurement (wording of 
survey items) rather than the underlying latent structure. As such, the error 
terms for each pair were covaried. The modified model was then tested, χ229 = 
158.84, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.48, TLI = .849, CFI = .903, RMSEA = .105, AIC = 
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210.84, which proved to be a significantly better fit than the original Model 1, 
Δχ23 = 205.19, p < .001, ΔAIC = 199.19. 
 Model 1a was then assessed, which also showed acceptable fit, χ231 = 
163.04, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.26, TLI = .857, CFI = .901, RMSEA = .102, AIC = 
211.04. However, the two-factor model did not have a significantly worse fit than 
the predicted three factor model, Δ χ22 = 4.2, p = .123, ΔAIC = 0.2. As model 1a 
provides a more parsimonious solution, the two-factor model, comprised of the 
distinctiveness and positivity dimensions, is considered preferable.  
A single-factor structure was then tested, whereby all items loaded on to 
a single recognition factor (Model 1b). The model demonstrated poor fit, χ232 = 
246.81, p < .001, χ2/df = 7.71, TLI = .774, CFI = .839, RMSEA = .128, AIC = 
292.81, and demonstrated significantly worse fit than the two-dimension 
structure Δ χ21 = 83.77, p < .001, ΔAIC = 81.77. As such, of the three model, 
Model 1a proved to be the most parsimonious model with the best fit. This 
model was then used to assess the independence of the accuracy measure 
from the recognition measure.  
 Model 2 served as a baseline for this comparison, in which accuracy was 
included as a third dimension. The model demonstrated acceptable fit, χ248 = 
219.11, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.57, TLI = .868, CFI = .904, RMSEA = .093, AIC = 
279.11. This was then compared to Model 2a, where the accuracy items were 
included within the distinctiveness dimension. Model 2a showed poor fit, χ250 = 
349.64, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.99, TLI = .777, CFI = .831, RMSEA = .121, AIC = 
405.64, and proved significantly worse than Model 2, Δ χ22 = 130.53, p < .001, 
ΔAIC = 126.53. 
 Lastly, Model 2 was compared to Model 2b, whereby the accuracy items 
were included in the positivity dimension. Model 2b showed poor fit, χ250 = 
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306.49, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.13, TLI = .810, CFI = .856, RMSEA = .112, AIC = 
362.49. This was significantly poorer than the three-factor solution, Δ χ22 = 
87.38, p < .001, ΔAIC = 83.38. Together, this suggests that the accuracy 
perception items measure a distinct accuracy construct, which is independent 
from the recognition construct. 
      
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 1a 
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Model 2 Model 2a 
Model 2b 
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Appendix Q: Study 4 manipulation materials 
Misrecognition: 
Wales – an invisible nation? 
Within the UK and beyond, Welsh national identity is poorly understood, 
or even treated as invisible altogether. As one of the four countries that 
constitute the UK, Wales has a unique identity and culture, which sets it apart 
from the Scottish, Northern Irish/Irish, and English. Welsh teams compete in 
national and global sports leagues, and Welsh people have made a unique 
contribution in making the world a better place. For example, Aneurin Bevan 
was a Welshman who championed free healthcare for all, and his legacy and 
spirit created the foundations of the NHS today. Welsh artistic culture – both in 
the Welsh language and in English – is also vibrant. All of this and more can be 
celebrated on St David’s day, an event that symbolises the unique heritage and 
resilience of the Welsh as a people. But to the wider world, it can seem as if 
Wales is barely on the map at all (quite literally).  
Despite being a distinct nationality, the Welsh are rarely recognised as 
such. For example, many Welsh people have had the experience of being 
mistaken as English when travelling. To further rub salt in the wound, 
highlighting one’s Welsh nationality is often met with the question ‘so is that in 
England?’. It’s no surprise that the wider world doesn’t recognise the 
distinctiveness of Wales and Welshness, when previous depictions of the UK 
have erased Wales entirely from the map (see below). But this is nothing new. 
Welsh contributions down the years have been written out of history, including 
Wales’ vital contributions to the British Empire at home and abroad. The Welsh 
background of many great individuals is also written out of their story: the 
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philosopher Bertrand Russell, the author Roald Dahl, the Paralympian and 
politician Tanni Grey-Thompson, and the comedian Tommy Cooper are some of 
the many great figures born in Wales, but who are more readily recognised as 
British or even English.  
The failure to recognise Wales and Welshness as something positive 
and distinct from England and Englishness is also not unique to the past: as you 
read this, Welsh heritage is quite literally being re-written. Guidebooks for some 
of the most beautiful places in Wales are renaming locations to make 
pronunciation easier for people outside of Wales. Llyn Bochlwyd, a stunning 
lake in the mountains of Eryri has been conveniently re-named ‘Lake Australia’ 
– simply because it’s shaped like Australia. Taken together, this illustrates that 
the Welsh suffer chronic misrecognition, often being seen as either English, of 
vaguely British descent, or simply non-existent. 
 
 
Recognition: 
Wales – a celebrated nation 
Within the UK and beyond, Welsh national identity is increasingly 
understood and respected. As one of the four countries that constitute the UK, 
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Wales has a unique identity and culture, which sets it apart from the Scottish, 
Northern Irish/Irish, and English. Welsh teams compete in national and global 
sports leagues, and Welsh people have made a unique contribution in making 
the world a better place. For example, Aneurin Bevan was a Welshman who 
championed free healthcare for all, and his legacy and spirit created the 
foundations of the NHS today. Welsh artistic culture – both in the Welsh 
language and in English – is also vibrant. All of this and more can be celebrated 
on St David’s day, an event that symbolises the unique heritage and resilience 
of the Welsh as a people. And it seems the wider world are joining in on the 
celebrations too.  
Wales is frequently recognised as a distinct nationality. For example, St 
David’s day is celebrated in Argentina, Hong Kong, USA, France, and Australia. 
Wales and its uniqueness are well and truly on the map. Our global presence is 
also bolstered by Welsh people’s contributions throughout history that are 
widely recognised: the philosopher Bertrand Russell, the author Roald Dahl, the 
Paralympian and politician Tanni Grey-Thompson, and the comedian Tommy 
Cooper are hailed as some of the greatest Welsh people to have lived. The 
importance of their Welsh background is also increasingly recognised – for 
example, the statue of Tommy Cooper in Caerphilly, and Roald Dahl Plass 
(plaza) in the heart of Cardiff Bay. Moreover, Tanni Grey-Thompson was 
awarded the Dame title (DBE) in recognition of her contribution to sport and was 
described by Clare Balding from the BBC as ‘one of the best Welsh Olympians 
we have seen to date – she does Wales and Great Britain proud’.  
The recognition of Wales and Welshness is also present elsewhere. In 
2017, Lonely Planet named Wales in the top 5 of places to visit in the world on 
their annual Best in Travel list. Areas in Wales ranked above regions of 
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Australia and Malaysia. Additional recognition has been found in pop-culture. 
Marvel’s blockbuster triumph, Black Panther, celebrated Welsh distinctiveness 
by displaying the Welsh flag (Y Ddraig Goch) in a scene set at a United Nations 
conference amongst the flags of other global powerhouses. Since 2005, Google 
have also celebrated St David’s Day with their iconic Google ‘Doodle’ – the logo 
that appears when opening their search engine. Designs often include 
treasured symbols, such as the daffodil and the dragon (below). In sum, the 
Welsh are embraced in many facets of life, and our unique spirit is seen as 
setting us apart from our British neighbours. 
 
 
 
Low surveillance accuracy: 
We are all familiar with targeted advertising online. It is a form of 
algorithmic surveillance that uses our past and present online behaviour to 
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make predictions about us, our lifestyles, and the groups to which we belong. 
However, in a recent survey, 89% of Welsh people stated that most suggested 
material online miscategorised them as English. This means that for most 
Welsh people, algorithms fail to identify their nationality as distinct, or they do 
not identify the Welsh individual as being a member of their nationality. Either 
way, adverts targeted at Welsh people have predominantly English content, 
which frequently promote events related to English events (e.g. St George’s 
day) and will often be geared towards English sport and culture more generally. 
The inaccuracy of surveillance is shown below with four screenshots taken from 
Welsh people’s Facebook pages.     
In sum, online algorithms rarely view the Welsh identity as a nationality in 
its own right. So no matter how you feel about internet surveillance, the 
technology has shown little potential to accurately represent what Welsh people 
are about.  
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Medium surveillance accuracy: 
We are all familiar with targeted advertising online. It is a form of 
algorithmic surveillance that uses our past and present online behaviour to 
make predictions about us, our lifestyles, and the groups to which we belong. In 
a recent survey, 50% of Welsh people stated that most suggested material 
online accurately identified them as Welsh. On the other hand, the other 50% of 
Welsh people surveyed stated that most suggested material online 
miscategorised them as English. This means that for half of Welsh people 
online, algorithms fail to identify their nationality as distinct, or they do not 
identify the Welsh individual as being a member of their nationality. Whereas for 
the other half of Welsh users online, the Welsh identity is seen as distinct and 
they are also perceived as a Welsh person. Consequently, whilst some of us 
may see predominantly English content which promotes English culture, the 
rest of us will see content tailored to our Welsh identity. The hit and miss nature 
of surveillance is shown below with four screenshots taken from Welsh people’s 
Facebook pages.     
In sum, online algorithms only occasionally view the Welsh identity as a 
nationality in its own right.  So no matter how you feel about internet 
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surveillance, the technology has shown only some potential to accurately 
represent what Welsh people are about. 
 
 
High surveillance accuracy: 
We are all familiar with targeted advertising online. It is a form of 
algorithmic surveillance that uses our past and present online behaviour to 
make predictions about us, our lifestyles, and the groups to which we belong. In 
a recent survey, 89% of Welsh people stated that most suggested material 
online accurately identified them as Welsh. This means that for the majority of 
Welsh people, algorithms successfully identify their nationality as distinct, and 
also perceived them as a Welsh individual. This demonstrates that adverts 
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targeted at Welsh people have predominantly Welsh content, which frequently 
promote events related to Welsh events (e.g. St David’s day) and will often be 
geared towards Welsh sport and culture more generally. The accuracy of 
surveillance is shown below with four screenshots taken from Welsh people’s 
Facebook pages.     
In sum, online algorithms typically view the Welsh identity as a nationality 
in its own right. So no matter how you feel about internet surveillance, the 
technology has shown the potential to accurately represent what Welsh people 
are about.  
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Misrecognition in Welsh: 
Cymru – cenedl anweladwy? 
Yn y DU a thu hwnt, ceir diffyg dealltwriaeth o hunaniaeth genedlaethol 
Cymru, neu caiff ei thrin yn gwbl anweladwy. Fel un o bedair gwlad y DU, mae 
gan Gymru ei hunaniaeth a’i diwylliant unigryw, sy’n ei gosod ar wahân i’r 
Alban, Gogledd Iwerddon/Iwerddon a Lloegr. Mae timau o Gymru yn cystadlu 
mewn cynghreiriau chwaraeon cenedlaethol a byd-eang, ac mae’r Cymry wedi 
cyfrannu’n unigryw at wneud y byd yn lle gwell. Er enghraifft, roedd Aneurin 
Bevan yn Gymro a hyrwyddodd gofal iechyd am ddim i bawb, a’i waddol a’i 
ysbryd ef osododd sylfeini’r GIG heddiw. Mae diwylliant artistig Cymru – trwy 
gyfrwng y Gymraeg a’r Saesneg – hefyd yn hyfyw. Gellir dathlu hyn oll a mwy ar 
ddydd Gŵyl Dewi, digwyddiad sy’n symbol o dreftadaeth unigryw a chadernid y 
Cymry fel pobl. Ond i’r byd ehangach, prin yr ymddengys bod Cymru ar y map o 
gwbl (yn eithaf llythrennol). 
Er gwaethaf y ffaith eu bod yn genedl ar wahân, anaml iawn y caiff y 
Cymry eu cydnabod felly. Er enghraifft, mae llawer o Gymry wedi cael y profiad 
o gael eu camgymryd yn Saeson wrth deithio. I roi halen ar y briw, mae tynnu 
sylw at eich cenedlaetholdeb Cymreig yn aml yn arwain at y cwestiwn ‘felly a yw 
yn Lloegr?’. Nid yw’n syndod nad yw’r byd ehangach yn adnabod 
arwahanrwydd Cymru a Chymreictod, pan fo portreadau blaenorol o’r DU wedi 
dileu Cymru o’r map yn llwyr (gweler isod). Ond nid rhywbeth newydd yw hyn. 
Cafodd cyfraniadau Cymru drwy’r oesoedd eu dileu o hanes, gan gynnwys 
cyfraniadau hollbwysig Cymru at yr Ymerodraeth Brydeinig gartref a thramor. 
Mae llinach Gymreig llawer o enwogion hefyd wedi’i dileu o’u hanes: yr 
athronydd Bertrand Russell, yr awdur Roald Dahl, y pencampwr Paralympaidd 
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a’r gwleidydd Tanni Grey-Thompson, a’r digrifwr Tommy Cooper yw rhai o’r 
bobl enwog niferus a anwyd yng Nghymru ond a gaiff eu hadnabod fel 
Prydeinwyr neu Saeson hyd yn oed. 
Nid yw’r methiant i gydnabod bod Cymru a Chymreictod yn rhywbeth 
cadarnhaol ac ar wahân i Loegr a Seisnigrwydd yn unigryw i’r gorffennol 
ychwaith: wrth ichi ddarllen hwn, mae treftadaeth Cymru yn llythrennol yn cael 
ei hailysgrifennu. Mae llyfrau twristiaeth i rai o leoedd hyfrytaf Cymru yn ailenwi 
lleoliadau i’w gwneud yn haws i bobl y tu allan i Gymru eu hynganu. Cafodd 
Llyn Bochlwyd, llyn hynod ym mynyddoedd Eryri, ei ailenwi’n gyfleus yn ‘Lake 
Australia’ – oherwydd bod ei siâp yn debyg i siâp Awstralia. At ei gilydd, mae 
hyn yn dangos bod y Cymry yn dioddef camadnabyddiaeth cronig, ac yn aml yn 
cael eu hystyried yn Saeson, yn lled Brydeinig, neu nid ydynt yn bodoli o gwbl. 
 
 
Recognition in Welsh: 
Cymru – cenedl a ddethlir 
Yn y DU a thu hwnt, ceir dealltwriaeth gynyddol o hunaniaeth 
genedlaethol Cymru, a pharch cynyddol tuag ati. Fel un o bedair gwlad y DU, 
mae gan Gymru ei hunaniaeth a’i diwylliant unigryw, sy’n ei gosod ar wahân i’r 
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Alban, Gogledd Iwerddon/Iwerddon a Lloegr. Mae timau o Gymru yn cystadlu 
mewn cynghreiriau chwaraeon cenedlaethol a byd-eang, ac mae’r Cymry wedi 
cyfrannu’n unigryw at wneud y byd yn lle gwell. Er enghraifft, roedd Aneurin 
Bevan yn Gymro a hyrwyddodd gofal iechyd am ddim i bawb, a’i waddol a’i 
ysbryd ef osododd sylfeini’r GIG heddiw. Mae diwylliant artistig Cymru – trwy 
gyfrwng y Gymraeg a’r Saesneg – hefyd yn hyfyw. Gellir dathlu hyn oll a mwy ar 
ddydd Gŵyl Dewi, digwyddiad sy’n symbol o dreftadaeth unigryw a chadernid y 
Cymry fel pobl. Ac mae’r byd ehangach i’w weld yn ymuno yn y dathlu hwn 
hefyd. 
Caiff Cymru ei hadnabod yn aml fel gwlad â chenedligrwydd arbennig. Er 
enghraifft, caiff dydd Gŵyl Dewi ei ddathlu yn yr Ariannin, Hong Kong, UDA, 
Ffrainc, ac Awstralia. Mae unigrywiaeth Cymru yn sicr ar y map. Rhoddir hwb i’n 
presenoldeb byd-eang hefyd gan gyfraniadau pobl Cymru drwy gydol hanes ac 
fe’i cydnabyddir yn eang: caiff yr athronydd Bertrand Russell, yr awdur Roald 
Dahl, y pencampwr Paralympaidd a gwleidydd Tanni Grey-Thompson, a’r 
digrifwr Tommy Cooper eu henwi yn rhai o bobl enwocaf Cymru erioed. Ceir 
cydnabyddiaeth gynyddol hefyd o bwysigrwydd eu llinach Gymreig – er 
enghraifft, y cerflun o Tommy Cooper yng Nghaerffili, a Phlas Roald Dahl yng 
nghanol Bae Caerdydd. Yn ogystal â hyn, dyfarnwyd teitl Bonesig (DBE) i Tanni 
Grey-Thompson i gydnabod ei chyfraniad at fyd chwaraeon ac fe’i disgrifiwyd 
gan Clare Balding o’r BBC yn un o bencampwyr Olympaidd gorau Cymru hyd 
yn hyn – mae hi’n destun balchder i Gymru a Phrydain Fawr. 
Gwelir cydnabyddiaeth o Gymru a Chymreictod mewn mannau eraill 
hefyd. Yn 2017, cafodd Cymru ei henwi yn un o’r pum lle gorau yn y byd i 
ymweld â nhw ar y rhestr flynyddoedd o leoedd gorau i deithio yn y cylchgrawn 
Lonely Planet. Daeth ardaloedd o Gymru yn uwch ar y rhestr na rhannau o 
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Awstralia a Malaysia. Hefyd, ceir cydnabyddiaeth ym myd diwylliant poblogaidd. 
Dathlodd y ffilm fawr gan Marvel, Black Panther, arwahanrwydd Cymru trwy 
ddangos baner Y Ddraig Goch mewn golygfa a leolwyd yng nghynhadledd y 
Cenhedloedd Unedig ymysg baneri gwledydd mawr eraill y byd. Ers 2005, mae 
Google hefyd wedi dathlu Dydd Gŵyl Dewi gyda’i Google ‘Doodle’ eiconig – y 
logo sydd i’w weld wrth agor ei beiriant chwilio. Mae dyluniadau yn aml yn 
cynnwys symbolau annwyl, fel y genhinen Pedr a’r ddraig (isod). I grynhoi, caiff 
y Cymry eu dathlu mewn llawer o agweddau ar fywyd, ac ystyrir bod ein 
hysbryd unigryw yn ein gosod ar wahân i’n cymdogion ym Mhrydain. 
 
 
 
Low surveillance accuracy in Welsh: 
Mae pob un ohonom yn gyfarwydd â hysbysebion targedu ar-lein. Mae’n 
fath o wyliadwriaeth algorithmig sy’n defnyddio ein hymddygiad ar-lein yn y 
gorffennol a’r presennol i lunio rhagfynegiadau amdanom ni, ein ffordd o fyw, a’r 
grwpiau yr ydym yn perthyn iddyn nhw. Fodd bynnag, mewn arolwg diweddar, 
dywedodd 89%  o’r Cymry fod y rhan fwyaf o ddeunydd ar-lein a awgrymir iddyn 
nhw yn eu cam-gategoreiddio fel Saeson. Felly, i’r rhan fwyaf o Gymry, mae 
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algorithmau yn methu ag adnabod bod eu cenedligrwydd yn unigryw, neu’n 
methu ag adnabod bod yr unigolyn o Gymru yn aelod o’i genedl. Y naill ffordd 
neu’r llall, mae hysbysebion sy’n targedu’r Cymry yn cynnwys deunydd sy’n 
ymwneud i raddau helaeth â Lloegr, sy’n aml yn hyrwyddo digwyddiadau sy’n 
berthnasol i Loegr (e.e. Dydd San Siôr) a byddant yn aml yn canolbwyntio ar 
chwaraeon a diwylliant Lloegr yn fwy cyffredinol. Dangosir isod anghywirdeb 
gwyliadwriaeth mewn pedwar ciplun o dudalennau Facebook pobl o Gymru. 
I grynhoi, yn anaml y bydd algorithmau ar-lein yn ystyried hunaniaeth 
Cymru yn genedligrwydd yn ei rhinwedd ei hun. Felly, ni waeth beth yw eich 
teimladau ynghylch gwyliadwriaeth ar y rhyngrwyd, potensial prin a 
ddangoswyd gan y dechnoleg i gynrychioli’r Cymry yn gywir. 
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Medium surveillance accuracy in Welsh: 
Mae pob un ohonom yn gyfarwydd â hysbysebion targed ar-lein. Mae’n 
fath o wyliadwriaeth algorithmig sy’n defnyddio ein hymddygiad ar-lein yn y 
gorffennol a’r presennol i lunio rhagfynegiadau amdanom ni, ein ffordd o fyw, a’r 
grwpiau yr ydym yn perthyn iddyn nhw. Mewn arolwg diweddar, dywedodd 50% 
o’r Cymry fod y rhan fwyaf o ddeunydd ar-lein a awgrymir iddynt yn eu 
hadnabod fel Cymry. Ar y llaw arall, dywedodd y 50% arall o’r Cymry a 
arolygwyd fod y rhan fwyaf o ddeunydd ar-lein a awgrymir iddynt yn eu cam-
gategoreiddio fel Saeson. Felly, i hanner y Cymry ar-lein, mae algorithmau yn 
methu ag adnabod eu cenedligrwydd fel rhywbeth ar wahân, neu’n methu ag 
adnabod yr unigolyn o Gymru fel aelod o’i genedl. Ond i’r hanner arall o Gymry 
ar-lein, ystyrir bod hunaniaeth Cymru yn rhywbeth arbennig a’u bod yn Gymry. 
O ganlyniad, er y bydd rhai ohonom yn gweld deunydd Saesnig yn bennaf sy’n 
hyrwyddo diwylliant Lloegr, bydd y gweddill ohonom yn gweld deunydd sydd 
wedi’i deilwra i’n hunaniaeth Gymreig. Dangosir isod natur ddidaro 
gwyliadwriaeth mewn pedwar ciplun o dudalennau Facebook pobl o Gymru. 
I grynhoi, dim ond ar brydiau y bydd algorithmau ar-lein yn ystyried 
hunaniaeth Cymru yn genedligrwydd yn ei rhinwedd ei hun. Felly, ni waeth beth 
yw eich teimladau ynghylch gwyliadwriaeth ar y rhyngrwyd, rhywfaint yn unig o 
botensial a ddangoswyd gan y dechnoleg i gynrychioli’r Cymry yn gywir. 
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High surveillance accuracy in Welsh: 
Mae pob un ohonom yn gyfarwydd â hysbysebion targed ar-lein. Mae’n 
fath o wyliadwriaeth algorithmig sy’n defnyddio ein hymddygiad ar-lein yn y 
gorffennol a’r presennol i lunio rhagfynegiadau amdanom ni, ein ffordd o fyw, a’r 
grwpiau yr ydym yn perthyn iddyn nhw. Mewn arolwg diweddar, dywedodd 89% 
o’r Cymry fod y rhan fwyaf o ddeunydd ar-lein a awgrymir iddyn nhw yn eu 
hadnabod yn gywir fel Cymry. Felly, i’r mwyafrif o’r Cymry, mae algorithmau yn 
adnabod bod eu cenedligrwydd fel rhywbeth ar wahân, ac yn eu hadnabod fel 
Cymro/Cymraes. Mae hyn yn dangos bod hysbysebion sydd wedi’u targedu at y 
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Cymry yn cynnwys deunydd sy’n berthnasol i Gymru ar y cyfan, sy’n aml yn 
hyrwyddo digwyddiadau sy’n berthnasol i ddigwyddiadau yng Nghymru (e.e. 
Dydd Gŵyl Dewi) a bydd yn aml yn ymwneud â chwaraeon a diwylliant Cymru 
yn fwy cyffredinol. Dangosir isod gywirdeb gwyliadwriaeth mewn pedwar ciplun 
o dudalennau Facebook pobl o Gymru. 
I grynhoi, yn nodweddiadol bydd algorithmau ar-lein yn ystyried 
hunaniaeth Cymru yn genedligrwydd yn ei rhinwedd ei hun. Felly, ni waeth beth 
yw eich teimladau ynghylch gwyliadwriaeth ar y rhyngrwyd, mae’r dechnoleg 
wedi dangos y potensial i gynrychioli’r Cymry yn gywir. 
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Appendix R: Study 4 full list of measures 
 
Group-based recognition manipulation check: 
1. The article suggested that Welsh people are well recognised by wider 
society 
2. Those outside Wales recognise that the Welsh nationality is distinct 
3. Wider society recognises diversity amongst Welsh people 
4. Welsh people are valued positively by wider society 
5. Society understands Welsh people's views 
6. Welsh people are mistreated by wider society 
7. I am typically identified as a Welsh individual 
 
Surveillance accuracy manipulation check: 
In my view, algorithmic surveillance… 
1. ...is accurate at identifying people 
2. ...creates an accurate impression of internet users 
3. ...does not identify people's characteristics accurately 
4. ...does not provide an accurate impression of internet users 
5. The article suggested that algorithmic surveillance accurately identifies 
Welsh people 
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Group-based recognition: 
Distinctiveness: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance enables society to recognise that Welsh people 
are a unique nationality 
2. Algorithmic surveillance does not recognise the unique characteristics of 
Welsh people 
3. From algorithmic surveillance, society may recognise that Welsh people 
have distinct needs 
4. Targeted adverts and web page suggestions often imply I am English 
 
Perceived stereotyping: 
1. From using algorithmic surveillance, society can recognise diversity 
amongst Welsh people 
2. Targeted adverts and web page suggestions imply all Welsh people are 
the same 
 
Positivity: 
1. The results of algorithmic surveillance offer a positive image of Welsh 
people 
2. targeted material from algorithmic surveillance does not portray Welsh 
people positively 
3. Algorithmic surveillance helps promote the positive impact of Welsh 
culture within wider society 
4. Welsh people are valued positively through algorithmic surveillance 
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Understanding: 
1. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide society with an accurate 
understanding of Welsh culture 
2. Algorithmic surveillance helps wider society appreciate Welsh people's 
values 
3. Algorithmic surveillance provides wider society with a good 
understanding of what Welsh people believe 
4. Algorithmic surveillance does not provide a better understanding of 
Welsh people's views 
 
Recognition as a group member: 
1. Through algorithmic surveillance, I believe I am identified as a Welsh 
individual 
2. Algorithmic surveillance does not identify me as Welsh. 
 
Feelings towards surveillance: 
Algorithmic surveillance makes me feel… 
1. Worried 
2. Calm 
3. Anxious 
4. Relaxed 
5. Angry 
6. Happy 
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7. Annoyed 
8. Pleased 
9. Uncomfortable 
10. Comfortable 
11. Hopeful 
12. Dejected 
13. Optimistic 
14. Discouraged 
 
Visibility (participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) between the 
adjectives to indicate which best described how algorithmic surveillance made 
them feel): 
1. Invisible/Visible 
2. Anonymous/Identifiable 
3. Unobserved/Observed 
4. Unknown/Known 
 
Degree to which algorithmic surveillance is perceived to contribute to 
discrimination. (Participants were asked to select a point (7-point scale) 
between the adjectives to indicate which best described how they felt) 
The use of algorithmic surveillance could make society’s behaviour towards 
Welsh people… 
1. Worse/Better 
2. More hostile/More friendly 
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3. More intolerant/More tolerant 
4. Colder/Warmer 
5. More unfair/More fair 
 
Surveiller trust: 
1. I trust the organisations gathering my data online  
2. Surveillance conducted online is for the benefit of Welsh people 
3. I do not believe those gathering my data online have good intentions 
4. Surveillance online will not benefit Welsh people 
 
Privacy concern: 
1. Surveillance online is an invasion of privacy 
2. People have a right to use the internet without being surveilled 
3. People’s online data is not private information 
4. People shouldn’t expect privacy when using the internet 
 
Behaviour change intentions: 
Algorithmic surveillance would… 
1. …make me concerned about what I do online 
2. …make me censor what I do online 
3. …not change how I use the internet 
4. …not affect what I do online 
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Demographics: 
Hours per week spent online (open ended) 
Age (open ended) 
Gender 
1. Woman 
2. Man 
3. Non-binary 
4. Prefer not to say 
Ethnicity 
1. White 
2. Mixed/Multiple ethnic groups 
3. Asian/Asian British 
4. Black/African/Caribbean/Black British 
5. Arab 
6. Other (open ended) 
Membership to closed or private groups/forums online 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Awareness of algorithmic surveillance (1-10: 1 = not at all aware, 10 = very 
aware).  
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Appendix S: Confirmatory factor analysis for the group-based recognition 
measure 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to compare the 
hypothesised three-dimension structure (Model 1) with two variants of a more 
parsimonious two-dimension structure (Model 1a and Model 1b). Reverse 
coded items were covaried within each dimension to account for shared method 
variance. 
Model 1 was tested as a baseline that could be compared with the two-
dimension models. Model 1 demonstrated acceptable fit, χ249 = 278.74, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 5.69, TLI = .904, CFI = .929, RMSEA = .109, AIC = 336.74. Model 
1a was then tested, which demonstrated poor fit, χ251 = 356.96, p < .001, χ2/df = 
7.00, TLI = .877, CFI = .905, RMSEA = .124, AIC = 410.96, and had 
significantly worse fit when compared with Model 1, Δχ22 = 78.22, p < .001, 
ΔAIC = 74.22.  
Model 1b was then tested and demonstrated poor fit, χ251 = 435.85, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 8.55, TLI = .845, CFI = .880, RMSEA = .139, AIC = 489.85. This 
was significantly poorer than the three-dimension Model 1, Δχ22 = 157.11, p < 
.001, ΔAIC = 153.11. As such, Model 1 was considered the superior model. 
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